Ben, lists, A most excellent post, and one of the strongest arguments against constructivist epistemology that I've read, having the added virtue of being succinct.
Best, Gary *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Sun, Sep 21, 2014 at 12:28 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > Stan, > > If you think that five minutes' investigation would likely at best reach a > trivial truth about a kind of phenomenon, then substitute 'five days' or > 'five months' or 'five decades', etc. The point is the sooner or later, not > an incompletable long run. > > You're simply not distinguishing between truth and opinion. If two > traditions arrive at contrary conclusions about the same kind of > phenomenon, the normal logical conclusion about the contrarity is that at > most one of the conclusions is true and true for sound reasons, at most one > is the result of sufficient investigation even though both traditions claim > sufficiency. Peirce's semiotics is logic studied in terms of signs. You > don't distinguish between sufficiency and claims of sufficiency, truth and > claims of truth, and reality and claims of reality. Both traditions' > conclusions might be false, results of insufficient investigation. They > might both be mixes of truth and falsehood, various inaccuracies, and so > on. > > Simply accepting contrary conclusions as reflecting two "realities" > because two traditions arrived at them is a defeatist method of inquiry, a > form of 'insuccessibilism'. Imagine the swelling mischief if courts treated > widely discrepant testimony from various witnesses as reflecting different > "realities" rather than different perspectives or mistaken or differently > limited observations or memories, or lack of honesty or candor, and so on. > Imagine being an accused defendant in such a court, with one's money, > career, freedom, life, hanging in the balance. > > Waiting for the conflicting traditions to resolve their conflicts and > hoping that their resultant conclusion will be the truth, is a method of > inquiry of last resort, that to which a pure spectator is confined. To go > further and _*define*_ truth as the conclusion of any actual tradition or > actual dialogue among actual traditions, underlies the method of authority, > a form of infallibilism. If two traditions don't resolve their argument and > if you for your part have no way to investigate the question itself and > arrive at a conclusion about the subject of their argument, then your > normal logical conclusion would be that you won't know the answer to the > question, not that there are conflicting true answers to the question. > > I disbelieve that you ever did physics in either way. I don't see why > you'd want to impose such weak methods on philosophy, or have a semiotics > in which contrary signs about the same object merely reflect different > "realities"; such would turn logic and semiotics into mush. Peirce's theory > of inquiry, which seems to reflect the attitude of scientific research, > does not boil down to 'poll the experts' or 'poll the traditions', instead > it boils down to 'do the science,' by a method actively motivated and > shaped by the idea of putting into practice the fallibilist recognition > that inquiry can go wrong (because the real is independent of actual > opinion) and the 'successibilist' recognition that inquiry can go right > (because the real is the cognizable). To argue about this, as you do, is to > presuppose that there is a truth about this very matter under discussion, a > truth that can be found and can be missed. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/20/2014 3:46 PM, Stanley N Salthe wrote: > > Ben -- Replying to: > > The main idea is not that of a long run. Instead the idea is that of > sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or 'sufficiently > far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently good' or > 'sufficiently good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll the same basic > idea. > > S: Then two different traditions might come up with differently sufficient > understandings about one object. I accept that, and it implies > nominalism. Sufficiency might be quite different for different traditions. > > If in a given case you believe that you've reached the truth about a given > kind of phenomenon after five minutes of investigation, then you believe > that you have reached, after five minutes, the opinion that anybody > sufficiently investigating, over whatever length of time, would reach about > that kind of phenomenon. It's far from automatically preposterous to > believe that. > > S: But, I think, pretty 'shallow' and unsophisticated. > > There is no absolute assurance that actual inquiry on a given question > will not go wrong for millions of years, remaining insufficient for > millions of years and leaving the actual inquirers not only ignorant but > also erroneous all along the way. > > S: OK if the knowledge in question is not important to survival! > > But fallibilism implies not that the objects or findings of inquiry are > unreal and mere figments, but only that they may be unreal and figments, > insofar as the real does not depend on what any actual inquirers think of > it. > > S: My position is that 'the real' either is not one thing, or that there > might be several different traditions about it based on different > approaches and knowledges. > > On the other hand, do you really believe that there are no cases where > we've reached truths about general characters of things, done good > statistical studies on the distributions of such characters, and so on? > S: I would not think NO cases, but, given different language traditions > surviving simultaneously, the world will be constructed by each via > different models. So, given the learned fact one one must not tease > certain snakes, different traditions will construct different mythologies > about this. Our own tradition, involving concepts of evolution and > chemistry is particularly elaborate, requiring a highly educated priesthood > to come up with an -- or even more than one -- understanding. > > STAN > > > On Sat, Sep 20, 2014 at 2:31 PM, Benjamin Udell <bud...@nyc.rr.com> wrote: > >> Stan, list, >> >> The main idea is not that of a long run. Instead the idea is that of >> sufficient investigation. Call it 'sufficiently long' or 'sufficiently >> far-reaching' or 'sufficiently deep' or 'sufficiently good' or >> 'sufficiently good for long enough', or the like, it's stlll the same basic >> idea. >> >> If in a given case you believe that you've reached the truth about a >> given kind of phenomenon after five minutes of investigation, then you >> believe that you have reached, after five minutes, the opinion that anybody >> sufficiently investigating, over whatever length of time, would reach about >> that kind of phenomenon. It's far from automatically preposterous to >> believe that. >> >> There is no absolute assurance that actual inquiry on a given question >> will not go wrong for millions of years, remaining insufficient for >> millions of years and leaving the actual inquirers not only ignorant but >> also erroneous all along the way. But fallibilism implies not that the >> objects or findings of inquiry are unreal and mere figments, but only that >> they may be unreal and figments, insofar as the real does not depend on >> what any actual inquirers think of it. On the other hand, do you really >> believe that there are no cases where we've reached truths about general >> characters of things, done good statistical studies on the distributions of >> such characters, and so on? >> >> The idea that we can succeed in inquiry does not drive us to the idea >> that we can't fail in it. Peirce was both a fallibilist and, to coin a >> word, a successibilist (he opposed radical skepticism and held that the >> real is the cognizable). Peirce took these ideas as presuppositions to >> reasoning in general and shaping scientific method. He regarded such >> presuppositions as collectively taking on the aspect of hopes which, in >> practice, we hardly can doubt. Really, one can reasonably believe that >> sharks have a general character without knowing a great deal about sharks. >> They would be like other kinds of things where investigation revealed only >> over time certain definite characters common to members of a kind, some of >> which characters also distinguish the kind, the characters together parts >> of a complex character called the general nature of the kind. >> Best, Ben >> >> On 9/20/2014 10:03 AM, Stanley N Salthe wrote: >> >> Ben -- You asserted >> >> >But "real" in a Peircean context just means capable of being >> objectively investigated such that various intelligences would converge >> sooner or later, but still inevitably, on the same conclusions, rather >> than on some set of mutually incompatible conclusions. >> >> Regarding suppositions about actual phenomena -- like, say, the nature of >> sharks -- since 'the long run' is NOT now, how can we know which version >> from different cultures is 'real'? This is the basic reason one must be a >> nominalist. >> >> STAN >> >> On Fri, Sep 19, 2014 at 10:31 PM, Benjamin Udell wrote: >> >> Howard, lists, >> >> Epistemologies are not claims about special concrete phenomena in the >> sense that they and their deductively implied conclusions would be directly >> testable for falsity by special concrete experiments or experiences. That's >> also true of principles of statistics and of statistical inference, yet >> such principles are not generally regarded as requiring a leap of faith. >> Mathematics is also not directly testable by special concrete experiments, >> yet mathematics, whether as theory or language, is not generally regarded >> as requiring a leap of faith. What mathematics requires is leaps of >> transformational imagination in honoring agreements (hypothetical >> assumptions) as binding. Two dots in the imagination are as good an example >> of two things as any two physical objects - better, even, since more >> amenable for mathematical study. Some sets of mathematical assumptions are >> nontrivial and lead inexorably, deductively, to nontrivial conclusions >> which compel the reasoner. If you think that mathematics is _*merely* _ >> symbols, still that's to admit that mathematical symbols form structures >> that, by their transformabilities, model possibilities. >> >> Contrary to your claim, physical laws are not physical forces and do not >> depend like forces on time and rates. Instead physical laws _*are* _ >> those dependences on time and rates and are expressed mathematically, which >> is to say that some mathematics is instantiated in the actual, although you >> think that mathematical limit ideas of absolute continuity and absolute >> discreteness should be instantiated like photons, rocks, trees, or Socrates >> in order for mathematics to be real. But "real" in a Peircean context just >> means capable of being objectively investigated such that various >> intelligences would converge sooner or later, but still inevitably, on the >> same conclusions, rather than on some set of mutually incompatible >> conclusions. You think that some sort of dynamicism is a safer and more >> skeptical bet than realism about generals and modalities. But the idea that >> varied intelligences will not tend toward agreement about mathematical >> conclusions is no safe bet. >> >> So the question is, again, do you think that numbers can be objectively >> investigated as numbers? - such that (individually, biologically, etc.) >> various intelligences, proceeding from the same assumptions, would reach >> the same conclusions. If you do think so, then you are a nominalist or >> anti-realist in name only. >> >> >> *One man, two votes, for Dominic Frontiere* >> Rigid bodies, and incompletely but sufficiently rigid bodies, although >> able to go through transformations that leave them, e.g., rotated 180 >> degrees, and so on, still cannot change their chirality or handedness in >> that manner (except in an eldritch elder Outer Limits episode). >> Opposite-handed but otherwise equivalent objects conform to the mathematics >> of their mirror-style equivalence as inexorably as a dynamic process >> follows dynamic laws. Phenomenologically, forces are like sheriffs >> enforcing the physical laws. Yet there are mathematical rules that physical >> phenomena respect without forces pushing one around when one attempts to >> defy them, such as the lack of a non-deformative continuous transformation >> into a chiral opposite. Sometimes mathematics rules by 'smart power'. >> >> The idea that mathematics' real end is to help physics, with which your >> wording suggests agreement, was put forth by some positivists, one of whom >> went so far as to say that mathematicians who thought themselves to have >> some other or broader purpose should discount their subjective feelings >> about it as merely illusory and due to their choice of profession. >> >> I could go on, but the question is, do you think that numbers can be >> objectively investigated as numbers? If so, then you are a nominalist or >> anti-realist in name only, and a realist in the Peircean sense. If not, >> then you do not believe that there is a reliable mathematical expression of >> physical phenomena. >> >> Best, Ben >> >> On 9/18/2014 11:42 PM, Howard Pattee wrote: >> >> At 10:39 AM 9/18/2014, Benjamin wrote: >> >> Only humans (at least here on Earth) do sociology, psychology, biology, >> chemistry, or physics. I have no evidence that elementary nature does even >> simple physics, or even wears a lab coat. >> >> >> HP: I agree. These are all fields in which humans make models of their >> experiences. They may agree on their models but still disagree on different >> epistemologies, realism, nominalism, eliminative materialism, and so on. >> These epistemologies are *interpretations * of their models with respect >> to what they believe exists or what they believe is real. >> >> Epistemologies are not empirically decidable, e.g., not falsifiable. True >> belief in any epistemology requires a leap of faith. There are degrees of >> faith, skepticism being at the low end. In my own view as a physicist, >> nominalism requires a much safer leap of faith than realism. However, I >> often think realistically. I see no harm in it as long as I don't see it >> as the one true belief. >> >> BU: Being alive, instantiating life, is far from enough to do biology. >> Instantiating mathematical structure is far from enough to do mathematics. >> >> >> HP: Again, I agree. That does not mean that "doing math" is the same as >> "doing physics". Mathematics is the best *language* that we use to >> describe physical laws. There is an inexorability in physical laws that >> does not exist in the great variety of mathematical concepts and rules. >> >> > [HP] No one has discovered a point or a triangle or a number, the >> infinite or the infinitesimal, in Nature >> BU: In your sense, nobody has discovered a physical law in nature >> either. Rules, constraints, norms, distributions, etc., are not animals, >> vegetables, minerals, or particles. Therefore by your standards they are >> not real. >> >> >> HP: Here I disagree. You are not distinguishing mathematical *rules* >> from physical *laws* . Mathematics provides the most exact *symbolic >> language* in which the laws are described. Symbolic rules are not like >> physical material forces. Specifically, laws are inexorably time and >> rate-dependent. Logic and mathematics do not involve time and rates. That >> is why I say that "only humans do mathematics" (manipulate symbols), which >> they do at their own rates. Humans cannot "do forces and laws". Forces act >> at the lawful rates whether we like it or not. >> >> By saying that X is "real," Peirce means that X is objectively >> investigable as X. You won't use the word "real" in that way. >> >> >> HP: I do not understand. What I call real depends only on my epistemic >> assumptions, and I am not at all sure that defining "real" is important to >> have a good model. What we need to understand is what Wigner called the >> "unreasonable effectiveness" of our mathematics in describing laws. There >> is no good reason for this effectiveness. Wigner quotes Peirce: " . . . >> and it is probable that there is some secret here which remains to be >> discovered." >> >> Peirce, as a chemist (1887) also agreed with Hertz's epistemology (1884): >> "The result that the chemist *observes* is brought about by* nature* >> [Hertz: "the image of the consequents of nature"]; the result that the >> mathematician observes is brought about by the associations of the* mind* >> . [Hertz: "consequents of images in the mind"] . . . the power that >> connects the conditions of the mathematicians diagram with the relations he >> *observes* in it is just as occult and mysterious to us as the power of >> Nature that brings about the results of the chemical experiment." [W:6, 37, >> Letter to Noble on the Nature of Reasoning, May 28, 1987. (1897)] >> >> Hertz: "As a matter of fact, we do not know, nor have we any means of >> knowing, whether our conception of things are in conformity with them in >> any other than this *one* fundamental respect [Peirce's "power that >> connects"]. >> >> Howard >> >> > >
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