Stefan, Gary F., list,
I was indeed addressing the snakebite example, just not mentioning it by
name. If two traditions, two people, two of anything, arrive at
incompatible conclusions about snakebites, then at most one of their
conclusions is true. That's what "incompatible conclusions" means. It
doesn't take Peircean semiotics or pragmatism to see it, it's elementary
definitions and logic.
I haven't ever argued or believed that judgments, that two given
traditions' conclusions are incompatible, are infallible. I haven't ever
argued or believed that society does not influence, help, or hinder
inquiry, or contribute to focusing it in some directions rather than
others. This sort of thing will result in society's influencing the
opinions that result from actual inquiry.
But opinion and truth are not the same thing.
Conflating opinion with truth seems to produce some light
pseudo-hallucinatory fun, at least that has been my consistent
experience since I was a teenager (as I said I do look at other
perspectives). It's the fun of absurdity. Yet, to build a theory on the
acceptance of that conflation is to build on broken logic, inquiry with
its bones broken, inquiry more susceptible than ever to social
manipulation, inquiry less likely than ever to be fruitful.
A challenge for inquiry and society is to overcome capricious or
mischievous skews produced by society's influence on inquiry, without
keeping society from helping inquiry thrive and vice versa. It's one
thing for society to reward some disciplines more than others. In
various cases there can be good reasons for that, bad reasons for that,
and so on. The economy of inquiry itself may sometimes impoverish
inquiries that would not have been all that costly and whose findings
would have corrected and improved the inquiries that do proceed, but
people can't know everything in advance, and people need to make
choices. So inquiry will tend, even when going comparatively well, to
have defects. But it can also correct and improve itself. It's another
thing for society to reward disciplines with power, wealth, glamour,
status, only for producing conclusions that suit society's
preconceptions. And so on.
Best, Ben
On 9/23/2014 5:20 AM, sb wrote:
Gary F., Ben, List,
yes, it is an extremist position. Ludwik Fleck in some of his texts
about the /Denkkollektive/ (thought collectives) comes close to this
point. But his microbiological bench research maybe prevented him to
fall prey to such solipcism. Also Latours (maybe polemic) can be read
this way, but even he says now, facing the threat of climate change
deniers, that he has gone to far. Apart from these two (and alleged
epigones of social constructivism of different strives) i would say this
is a crude misrepresentation of social constructivism.
Yes, you may be right that you and Ben are just responding, but i have
the imression that Stans polarization fell on just too fertile ground.
Maybe it activated an already existent resentiment?! Now when Gary and
Cathy applaud Bens post, i would follow them if it was not under the
label of social constructivism. If we call it
solipcism/relativism/culturalism i'd be fine. Nevertheless i feel
uncomfortable with Bens post since it doesn't try to understand Stans
position.
Stan braught up the example "one must not tease certain snakes". If you
tease the snake, it bites you, injects enough poison and there are no
lucky circumstances that safe you, then you will die! These are the
plain facts. But there can be different mythologies/theories arround
this snake type. At this point i always remember the end of Ecos "Name
of the Rose" when Adson and William discuss retrospective what has
happend. Adson says to William: "Over the whole investigation we had the
false premisses and the false hypothesis' but we came up with the right
conclusion". Important in this example is now that they start with
predjudice which turns out to be false. In the same manner scientists
start with personaly, socially or tradionally conditioned predjudices.
All scientific theories have a social import which is not forced upon us
by reality. E.g. Fleck shows in his book that until the 20th century
and the discovery of the Wassermann-reaction the syphillis research was
influenced by the religious idea of the syphillitic blood as a
punishment of god. In an enlightment perspective it is important to
understand and explore such imports. Ben argues in his response only
from an epistemological standpoint and ignores the importance of the
sociologcal view Stan brings in. Sociologically the "claim of truth" as
"truth" and the will to act upon this truth is a interesting phenomenon.
At the same time Stan mixes up the epistemological and the sociological
perspective and thinks we can conclude from the sociology of knowledge
to epistemology. Once again, i do follow Bens critique, but it should
also pick up the sociological perspective.
Science is not only brought forward by empirical research and new
theories, it is also brought forward by the critique of its own social
boundedness. Sure, the sociological is from a different sphere but since
it is from a different sphere it could and should inform science. From
my point of view social constructivism/ sociology of knowledge and
pragmatism are complementary, means pragmatism delivers the right
epistemology for the sociology of knowledge.
Best
Stefan
Am 22.09.14 14:22, schrieb Gary Fuhrman:
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