i can only speak for my own theory in this matter. So, for me they are simply different structures. Love for example, is a broad and general structure (including things like compassion, empathy etc...), while the taste of jam, is a particular structure in a particular location.
Steven On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 11:59 PM, marccu s <[email protected]> wrote: > Antonio R. Damasio has told us that feelings are connected to emotions. > In his theory, feelings are not Firstness. How do you distinct emotions and > feelings in peircean theory? > > kindly markku > > > Lähetetty laitteesta Windowsin sähköposti > > *Lähettäjä:* Steven Ericsson-Zenith <[email protected]> > *Lähetetty:* sunnuntai, 29. maaliskuuta 2015 1:56 > *Vast.ott:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>, [email protected] > > > The term "physical," during the twentieth century, has transformed to be > equated with materialism. That is a naive and technical mistake. In this > view matter or material is epistemically first, ideas and feelings are a > mystery that "evolves" or "emerges." But this is a stagnant view. > > Carnap did not share it, nor did any Peirce, nor do I. Carnap said, > basically, that physical is whatever structure *does,* concurring with your > nature argument. Empiricism, the observation and record of actions in > structure, is epistemically first. > > Now before scholars jump in and accuse me of materialism or nominalism, > let's be clear. First, not all has been discovered and this is the > principle mistake and arrogance of twentieth century science. So how and > where may we make new discovery? Simple, in Biophysics. > > It never was reasonable to assume that we could proceed in biophysics or > medicine without making new physical discoveries. Not least because we have > this nebulous thing that people do not understand with a variety of names, > spirituality, consciousness, the mind, logic. In all cases, ideas and > feelings. > > Explanation is required for the cause of structural forms and behaviors > (motions, however complex). Gravitation and electromagnetic force, are > examples of twentieth century explanations - but clearly these are not > adequate for biophysics and medicine. In addition, they must be unified. > > This leaves us with the pragmatist view of epistemology and the reason > Peirce and Carnap are so close. In it explanation is directed toward > structure and its behaviors. The quest of science is the minimal set of > equations required to explain it all. Einstein had both direct and indirect > things to add to this argument but he was less an epistemologist than he > was a physicist. > > Gravitation is a manifest universal non-local force and its strength is as > much for the epistemology it brings (general covariance) as its simple > physical idea. The endless failure of Quantum-Gravity efforts only goes to > underscore this. > > So this is where the Peirce family view comes into play and this view is > that of Benjamin Peirce, not Charles. There is another universal akin to > gravitation that is the basis of all biophysical behavior. It is not > account for today. It cannot be repeated computationally (although we may > just be able to compute it at work in simple form and a lot of > computational power). Turing's computation is excluded from biophysics due > to its power profile. > > Benjamin called this new feature of the world "Universal Will" and Charles > referred to it as "matter as effete mind" - I refer to it as the "basis of > experience," covariant to light, gravitation and "shaped" into its various > forms by structure. It plays a role akin to the role in structure played by > its sibling gravitation. > > How do we incorporate this view into physical theory? By looking to > Einstein's "general covariance." The power of general covariance was > essnetially missed by both Carnap and Geodel, Einstein's logician friends. > I believe that Benjamin would have seen it clearly and was simply lacking > the advanced conceptual and technical tools to take him the full way at the > time. > > So let's be clear. How does this differ from physical theory before? It > says: 1. there is more to be discovered. 2. new empirical evidence is > coming from biophysics (often generated for "mundane" causes). 3. a new > universal non-local effect in structure. 4. it is mathematizable. 5. > rethink everything. > > How do we mathematically reason about the mind and sense/feeling? Do we > follow Charles? No. We follow Benjamin Peirce's intuition on quaternions. > Complex Analysis provides a pointer to the necessary tools. A holomorphic > functor can describe the character of a particular and developing sense, > feeling, memory or response - a particular shape upon the cells or membrane > structure. This non-local behavior across structure IS a sense. A > hyper-functor (two holomorphic functors combined) is sense and response, > with a critical decision points between sense and response potentials. The > supporting mechanisms are evident in biophysics. And this scales up to the > operation of all biophysics and the familiar mind. This is the result of a > decade of full-time research on my part. I am writing it up. > > My advantage is simply to live in a time when biophysical data has become > accessible through technology ... and I have now begun to make my case. See > my Stanford University lecture for more details: > > https://youtu.be/zF5Bp_YsZ3M > > Apparently I am not immortal (my view before the past year). And, > unfortunately, I was suffering from a superficial stroke and cancer at the > time of this presentation that went into stage four a month or two later > (it's a shock just how quickly cancer can extrapolate). I have been slowed > down. But I have been treated and the prognosis is good, the cancer "fog" > is clearing. I expect a full recovery. I now trust that I can get back on > track in this coming year. My book is only delayed (and better for the new > and humbling experience). :-) > > Regards, > Steven > > > > > > > On Sat, Mar 28, 2015 at 3:06 PM, Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Hi! Does "physical" mean "natural" or "material"? I think, that it means >> "natural", although in medicine it is often used for affairs of the body in >> contrast to affairs of the mind (psychical). In Greek "physica" means >> science of the nature. Maybe this is only a term problem? >> Helmut >> >> *Gesendet:* Samstag, 28. März 2015 um 21:00 Uhr >> *Von:* "Danko Nikolic" <[email protected]> >> *An:* "Evgenii Rudnyi" <[email protected]>, [email protected] >> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain >> >> I subscribe to this. >> >> (I am also aware that this is not an absolute truth, but a convenient way >> of describing the world in scientific terms.) >> >> Danko >> On 28 Mar 2015 14:46, "Evgenii Rudnyi" <[email protected] >> <http://rudnyi.ru>> wrote: >>> >>> Dear Danko, >>> >>> Before discussing Peirce, I would like to know your understanding of >>> physical. >>> >>> Let me quote the definition of physicalism from Stanford Encyclopedia of >>> Philosophy >>> >>> "The general idea is that the nature of the actual world (i.e. the >>> universe and everything in it) conforms to a certain condition, the >>> condition of being physical. Of course, physicalists don't deny that the >>> world might contain many items that at first glance don't seem physical — >>> items of a biological, or psychological, or moral, or social nature. But >>> they insist nevertheless that at the end of the day such items are either >>> physical or supervene on the physical." >>> >>> Do you subscribe to this, or your vision of physical is different? >>> >>> Evgenii >>> >>> Am 27.03.2015 um 20:50 schrieb Danko Nikolic: >>>> >>>> Dear Evgenii, >>>> >>>> This is the first time I hear of that definition of matter. It is >>>> interesting. I don't know the implications as I am new to Peirce. >>>> >>>> Yes, of course, I would agree that being biological implies that the >>>> mind is a physical phenomenon. >>>> >>>> Danko >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On 27/03/15 19:34, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: >>>>> >>>>> This implies that "The mind is a physical phenomenon." Along this >>>>> line I would appreciate if you make your statement on what is for >>>>> you physical and how it is related to inevitable physical laws. >>>>> >>>>> Peirce's quote in this respect: >>>>> >>>>> “Matter is merely mind deadened by the development of habit to the >>>>> point where the breaking up of this habits is very difficult.” >>>>> >>>>> Evgenii >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] <http://list.iupui.edu> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send >>> a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>> <http://list.iupui.edu> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>> BODY of the message. More at >>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply >> List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts >> should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message >> not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe >> PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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