My thanks for pointing to this TLS article by Galen Strawson. His comments relate to the intellectual social dynamics primarily and this is exactly what I have been saying for the past 15 years :-)
Regards, Steven On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 12:12 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi <[email protected]> wrote: > Dear Steven, > > I cannot tell you exactly what "fact" Tim Maudlin had in mind. > > My goal was just to better understand Danko's worldview. I have chosen Tim > Maudlin's statements, as in my view, they supplement physicalism quite well. > > By the way, have you seen recent Galen Strawson's paper in > The Times Literary Supplement? > > http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/article1523413.ece > > I believe that his views are close to yours: > > "At the root of the muddle lies an inability to overcome the Very Large > Mistake so clearly identified by Eddington and others in the 1920s – not to > mention the lovely Irishman John Toland in 1704, Anthony Collins in 1707, > Hume in 1739, Joseph Priestley in 1777, and many others. The mistake is to > think we know enough about the nature of physical reality to have any good > reason to think that consciousness can’t be physical." > > Evgenii > > > Am 29.03.2015 um 20:10 schrieb Steven Ericsson-Zenith: > >> Can you give me an idea of the types of "fact" you have in mind? Do >> you mean statements of the kind "This jam is made from strawberries." >> or "If A = B AND B = C, A = C" or "This statement is false." or >> "There is a God." >> >> There are well known problems with language that do "supervene" upon >> our usage. In inventing ideas, in speaking, about the world >> (scientific or not) there is no necessary correlation there is error >> and ambiguity and simply ways of speaking. A simple way to state my >> view is to say that there is nothing contradictory in the physical >> world. It is what it is, it is discoverable, we may develop knowledge >> of it and refine that knowledge by falliblism (classic Ontology in >> the Epistemology of Science). This knowledge evolves toward the way >> things are. >> >> The science of Benjamin Peirce is a/the science of necessity, >> "Mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions" he >> says. And as I noted before, he believed that Logic could build the >> bridge between Pure Mathematics and the Physical Sciences. He did not >> argue Logicism (that logic is the foundation of mathematics). >> >> This view suggests "a conceivable certainty." That Scientific >> knowledge can be developed, still be fallible, but is ultimately >> sustainable for all time. >> >> The Peirce family, Rudolf Carnap and I all argue for and by >> necessity. There is, indeed, a fundamental state of the world toward >> which we, and all other scientists, work. >> >> If there were no necessity then the world would simply not exist. >> Since the world manifestly does exist it has the following properties >> 1. it has always existed (by implication you do not get something >> from nothing) 2. it has unidirectional necessity (cause and effect, >> by observation). If the world did not exist, at any point, then it >> cannot, by any means, exist today. This is an argument that I call >> "Logical Existentialism." >> >> Benjamin Peirce, in particular, argued for pure mathematics: the >> human mind is necessarily capable of ideas that correspond to the >> physical world. "In every form of material manifestation, there is a >> corresponding form of human thought, so that the human mind is as >> wide in its range of thought as the physical universe in which it >> thinks." (in his Linear Associative Algebra) >> >> We lost faith in this view because of the perceived failure of the >> Hilbert program at the start of the twentieth century. I argue that >> this is a failure not of mathematics in general but a failure of a >> particular method (FOL). >> >> So, generally, if anything "supervenes" upon the physical it is what >> we call either "error" or "narrative." >> >> Narrative is the story that we tell ourselves about the world and it >> includes a range of things that are important to our behaviors. >> Religion is such a narrative. How I fit into the world. What people >> think of me. How much I am worth. How smart I am. What my politics >> are. Etc... Could these ideas be said to "supervene?" >> >> If you limit your Physicalist view and accept Materialism you have >> to, by necessity, say that they do. But if you accept the broader >> Liberal Physicalism articulated by early Carnap, the Peirce's and >> myself, in which a knowledge of sense and response is included, you >> do not. >> >> Regards, Steven >> >> >> On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 2:09 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> Thank you. I have one more question about physical. We talk after >>> all about processes in time and the question would be on how it >>> happens according to your view. To this end, let me quote from Tim >>> Maudlin's "The Metaphysics Within Physics" >>> >>> “I believe there is a fundamental physical state of the world.” >>> >>> “In addition to the physical state of the universe, I believe in >>> fundamental physical laws.” >>> >>> “Once the total physical state of the universe and the laws of >>> physics are fixed, every other fact, such as may be, supervenes.” >>> >>> Would you agree with such a description of physical processes? Or >>> do you consider a physical process differently? >>> >>> Evgenii >>> >>> >>> > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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