Dear Danko (this is a slightly modified version of the email I sent to
you separately),

I do not think there is much that is consistent with Peirce for you here.
Your description of abduction is unrecognizable, you offer philosophical
hand waving and aspersions to biology but no actual mechanism. The levels
you imagine are not distinct in Peirce. You describe your model as
"formal," yet I see no formality.

Qualia is a subjective fantasy, feeling is not detached from action.

You would do well to study Peirce and begin by understanding his non-local
conception of thirdness - and idea that is not included or computable by
any of the Turing models of computation.

In this sense I must ask exactly what it is that you mean when you say
"pragmatics." As you are, I think, aware Peirce is the founder of American
Pragmaticism, a close European equivalent would be the neo-Positivism of
Rudolf Carnap (with whom you should also be familiar), although there are
fundamental differences in the approach and some conclusions, there is no
essential difference in method. I urge you to read, in particular, his 1922
The Logical Structure Of The World and Schlipps Biographical essays with
Carnap's response.

The "pragmatism" of Charles Peirce refers to results. It is the behavioral
consequence of apprehension. Thus a "meaning" is not merely the
transformation of syntax via semantic rules (Carnap), but the actual
behavior that is the consequence of semeiotic action.

If I leave this to stand alone I know that several scholars here will rush
forward with arguments concerning the pragmatic maxim, that is more
ambiguous than I have said. The difference is simply idealism, the Peirce
family put ideas first, so it is the case that the meaning of actions vary
depending upon the individual apprehending the act. There are no absolutes
(but do not take this to mean that ultimate certainty is unattainable).
Investigate Charles ideas on falilbism and his father's ideas on Pure
Mathematics.

You also seem to have an exclusive view of your endeavor, but it should be
clear that many of us have been here before you. Your neuroscience appears
to derive more from CS and AI than biology, I suggest therefore that you
spend some time with actual biologists and brain surgeons. That should not
be hard given your location, walk down the hall and check your assumptions
with someone that actually touches brains and not silicon. Ask them about
astrocytes and temperature as a start.

Regards,
Steven


On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:43 AM, Danko Nikolic <[email protected]
> wrote:

>  Dear Steven,
>
>   Good questions, right to the point! See my answers bellow.
>
> On 27/03/15 05:19, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:
>
> A lot has been said by list members, I am not sure that I can add. I do
> have a few questions though.
>
>  In terms of work of the Peirce family, what aspects of Peirce's logic,
> exactly, appear to be consistent with your theory?
>
>
> When pratopoietic agents have three traverses they become by their very
> nature abductive. Abductive reasoning is a kind of an emergent property of
> tri-traversal organizations. Thus, practopoiesis explains where abduction
> comes from, what it takes to implement it, etc. The theory tells us why
> adaptive systems cannot operate in any other way but abductively. In fact,
> an implication is that biological systems in general by their very nature
> can be considered abductive, even bacteria and plants can do that (of
> course, in a "non-cognitive" way).
>
>  For example, where is there a relation to "universal will" or "matter as
> effete mind?"
>
> These concepts are completely new to me and hence, I cannot answer your
> question. This is, I guess, the work that still needs to be done by
> someone: Learn about those concepts + learn about practopoiesis, and see
> how they are related (or not related).
>
> I would love to to do it, as far as my time allows.
>
>  Where is there an explanation of sense or experience and the role it
> plays in biophysical dynamics?
>
>
> If you refer to qualia and the "hard" problem of consciousness, this is
> something I can answer. Practopoiesis was designed to provide useful
> answers to those questions -- one may say even "breakthrough" answers to
> those questions.
>
> However, I have cut it out of the initial draft (it was there in the very
> first version) because all my friends who read the draft, agreed that it
> was way too much of information and the paper was too long. So, I left that
> part for another manuscript.
>
> If you decide to study the present paper on practopoiesis, you will likely
> agree that the manuscript is already quite a lot to go through. And it also
> already explains a lot about the mind without tackling the sweet problem of
> qualia.
>
> So, one has to do it in stages. Anyway, one has to get a hold on
> practopoiesis and tri-traversal theory before one can use those insights to
> handle the "hard" problem of consciousness.
>
> But, not to keep you in dark, and assuming that you do get a certain grip
> on practopoiesis, I can give you a preview where it is going to go after
> that: Experience will have to do with understanding to greater detail the
> dynamics of anapoietic processes. Also, it will be tightly related to the
> emergence of semantics in tri-traversal systems which is in turn, related
> to the structure of ideatheca. These new theoretical tools derived from
> practopoiesis (anapoiesis, and ideatheca) will be central and will be
> applied for understanding how an individual develops the concept of self,
> which will be necessary to understand how a tri-traversal system can end up
> saying something like "I think (and I have qualia), therefore I am".
>
> And this will be also tied with empirical evidence, including my own
> experimental work on qualia of color in synesthesia and ideasthesia.
>
> So, in short, qualia issues are in works and (in my judgment) the progress
> is great.
>
> You can learn about ideasthesia and the new empirical insights about the
> relation between semantics and qualia here:
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideasthesia
>
> and here:
>
> http://ed.ted.com/lessons/ideasthesia-how-do-ideas-feel-danko-nikolic
>
>  How does your model fit into Charles' semeiotic triad? If it does, how
> may it be applied?
>
>   This is again something new to me. I have to learn first what semiotic
> triad is, and then probably think intensively for several months, before I
> can answer with any confidence.
>
>  You paper appear to suggest that the model you present is computable,
> i.e., that the plasticity properties of the brain may in fact be combined
> with synaptic weights.
>
> Actually, if you read further, you will see that the key emphasis is on
> neural adaption mechanisms. But this does not change your question on
> computability, as neural adaptation is as "computable" as is synaptic
> weight.
>
>  In any case, that you model may be implemented upon a Turing model of
> computation. Is this a correct reading?
>
> Yes and no. Yes, in a sense that there is no need for dualism and for
> postulating additional fundamental non-physical entities in order to
> explain qualia. One can rely in principle on a Turing computer instead of a
> biological brain to create a conscious sentient artificially intelligent
> system.
>
> But there is also a "no" in a sense that the role of this computer should
> not be conceptualized in a way the traditional (currently dominant) brain
> theory conceptualizes the role of computation for cognition and
> consciousness. The tri-traversal theory tells us that mental operations are
> not "boxed" within a computer, but rely heavily on the interactions with
> the environment.
>
> This issue is discussed explicitly in the very last chapter of the paper
> entitled: "What is thought?", and is summarized in Table 2. The table I
> copy here for your convenience:
>
>
>
>
>
> In conclusion, practopoiesis gives answers to some of the important
> questions that you posed, and also promises to prepare the grounds to
> answer some other even more important questions. So, perhaps, it is not a
> bad start.
>
> With best regards,
>
> Danko
>
>
>
>
>
>
>  Let's say you do, in fact, have a theory of mind. How does your theory
> move from apprehension to action?
>
>  Regards,
> Steven
>
>
> On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 8:01 AM, Danko Nikolic <
> [email protected]> wrote:
>
>> Dear members of Peirce list,
>>
>>    I would like to bring to your attention the upcoming theoretical
>> paper in Journal of Theoretical Biology entitled "Practopoiesis: Or how
>> life fosters a mind". The paper proposes neurophysiological/cybernetic
>> account of
>> abductive reasoning, as introduced by Peirce.
>>
>>    As I am not an expert of Perice's work (I am foremost a
>> neuroscientist) but my theory seems to apply to his contribution to logic,
>> I would appreciate very much any critical feedback. Have I understood
>> abduction right? Or did I misted out on something?
>>
>>   Also, if there is anything else relevant from Peirce's work that I
>> should pay attention to, I would appreciate knowing. For example, the
>> theory of practopoiesis makes very specific suggestions of how the meaning
>> (semantics) is dealt with within neural systems. I don't know how much this
>> particular proposal is in agreement or in discord with Peirce's work on
>> meaning.
>>
>>  One can download a pre-print of the paper here:
>>
>> http://www.danko-nikolic.com/practopoiesis/
>>
>> Thank you very much, and please do not hesitate to address to me any
>> well-deserved criticism.
>>
>> With best regards,
>>
>> Danko Nikolic
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić
>>
>> Web:
>> http://www.danko-nikolic.com
>>
>> Mail address 1:
>> Department of Neurophysiology
>> Max Planck Institut for Brain Research
>> Deutschordenstr. 46
>> 60528 Frankfurt am Main
>> GERMANY
>>
>> Mail address 2:
>> Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies
>> Wolfgang Goethe University
>> Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1
>> 60433 Frankfurt am Main
>> GERMANY
>>
>> ----------------------------
>> Office: (..49-69) 96769-736
>> Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209
>> Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327
>> [email protected]
>> ----------------------------
>>
>>
>>
>> -----------------------------
>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to
>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L
>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the
>> BODY of the message. More at
>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>
>
> --
> Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić
>
> Web:http://www.danko-nikolic.com
>
> Mail address 1:
> Department of Neurophysiology
> Max Planck Institut for Brain Research
> Deutschordenstr. 46
> 60528 Frankfurt am Main
> GERMANY
>
> Mail address 2:
> Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies
> Wolfgang Goethe University
> Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1
> 60433 Frankfurt am Main
> GERMANY
>
> ----------------------------
> Office: (..49-69) 96769-736
> Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209
> Fax: (..49-69) [email protected]
> ----------------------------
>
>
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to