Correct me if I am wrong. As a philosopher Stawson has no way of resolving his "panpsychism" which leads him necessarily to identity theory. He doesn't realize however that this is a dualism.
Which is why you should never leave philosophy of mind to philosophers :-) Regards, Steven On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 7:00 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith <[email protected]> wrote: > My thanks for pointing to this TLS article by Galen Strawson. His comments > relate to the intellectual social dynamics primarily and this is exactly > what I have been saying for the past 15 years :-) > > Regards, > Steven > > > On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 12:12 PM, Evgenii Rudnyi <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Dear Steven, >> >> I cannot tell you exactly what "fact" Tim Maudlin had in mind. >> >> My goal was just to better understand Danko's worldview. I have chosen >> Tim Maudlin's statements, as in my view, they supplement physicalism quite >> well. >> >> By the way, have you seen recent Galen Strawson's paper in >> The Times Literary Supplement? >> >> http://www.the-tls.co.uk/tls/public/article1523413.ece >> >> I believe that his views are close to yours: >> >> "At the root of the muddle lies an inability to overcome the Very Large >> Mistake so clearly identified by Eddington and others in the 1920s – not to >> mention the lovely Irishman John Toland in 1704, Anthony Collins in 1707, >> Hume in 1739, Joseph Priestley in 1777, and many others. The mistake is to >> think we know enough about the nature of physical reality to have any good >> reason to think that consciousness can’t be physical." >> >> Evgenii >> >> >> Am 29.03.2015 um 20:10 schrieb Steven Ericsson-Zenith: >> >>> Can you give me an idea of the types of "fact" you have in mind? Do >>> you mean statements of the kind "This jam is made from strawberries." >>> or "If A = B AND B = C, A = C" or "This statement is false." or >>> "There is a God." >>> >>> There are well known problems with language that do "supervene" upon >>> our usage. In inventing ideas, in speaking, about the world >>> (scientific or not) there is no necessary correlation there is error >>> and ambiguity and simply ways of speaking. A simple way to state my >>> view is to say that there is nothing contradictory in the physical >>> world. It is what it is, it is discoverable, we may develop knowledge >>> of it and refine that knowledge by falliblism (classic Ontology in >>> the Epistemology of Science). This knowledge evolves toward the way >>> things are. >>> >>> The science of Benjamin Peirce is a/the science of necessity, >>> "Mathematics is the science that draws necessary conclusions" he >>> says. And as I noted before, he believed that Logic could build the >>> bridge between Pure Mathematics and the Physical Sciences. He did not >>> argue Logicism (that logic is the foundation of mathematics). >>> >>> This view suggests "a conceivable certainty." That Scientific >>> knowledge can be developed, still be fallible, but is ultimately >>> sustainable for all time. >>> >>> The Peirce family, Rudolf Carnap and I all argue for and by >>> necessity. There is, indeed, a fundamental state of the world toward >>> which we, and all other scientists, work. >>> >>> If there were no necessity then the world would simply not exist. >>> Since the world manifestly does exist it has the following properties >>> 1. it has always existed (by implication you do not get something >>> from nothing) 2. it has unidirectional necessity (cause and effect, >>> by observation). If the world did not exist, at any point, then it >>> cannot, by any means, exist today. This is an argument that I call >>> "Logical Existentialism." >>> >>> Benjamin Peirce, in particular, argued for pure mathematics: the >>> human mind is necessarily capable of ideas that correspond to the >>> physical world. "In every form of material manifestation, there is a >>> corresponding form of human thought, so that the human mind is as >>> wide in its range of thought as the physical universe in which it >>> thinks." (in his Linear Associative Algebra) >>> >>> We lost faith in this view because of the perceived failure of the >>> Hilbert program at the start of the twentieth century. I argue that >>> this is a failure not of mathematics in general but a failure of a >>> particular method (FOL). >>> >>> So, generally, if anything "supervenes" upon the physical it is what >>> we call either "error" or "narrative." >>> >>> Narrative is the story that we tell ourselves about the world and it >>> includes a range of things that are important to our behaviors. >>> Religion is such a narrative. How I fit into the world. What people >>> think of me. How much I am worth. How smart I am. What my politics >>> are. Etc... Could these ideas be said to "supervene?" >>> >>> If you limit your Physicalist view and accept Materialism you have >>> to, by necessity, say that they do. But if you accept the broader >>> Liberal Physicalism articulated by early Carnap, the Peirce's and >>> myself, in which a knowledge of sense and response is included, you >>> do not. >>> >>> Regards, Steven >>> >>> >>> On Sun, Mar 29, 2015 at 2:09 AM, Evgenii Rudnyi <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> Thank you. I have one more question about physical. We talk after >>>> all about processes in time and the question would be on how it >>>> happens according to your view. To this end, let me quote from Tim >>>> Maudlin's "The Metaphysics Within Physics" >>>> >>>> “I believe there is a fundamental physical state of the world.” >>>> >>>> “In addition to the physical state of the universe, I believe in >>>> fundamental physical laws.” >>>> >>>> “Once the total physical state of the universe and the laws of >>>> physics are fixed, every other fact, such as may be, supervenes.” >>>> >>>> Would you agree with such a description of physical processes? Or >>>> do you consider a physical process differently? >>>> >>>> Evgenii >>>> >>>> >>>> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at >> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >
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