A very brief comment; the table 2 below fits in very nicely with the 'adaptive evolution' that some of us have been discussing recently, and; the rejection of symbols in favour of a 'higher level of organization' which directs actions fits into Stjernfelt's 'actuality of dicisigns'.
As Danko wrote: "The process of apprehension is the very process of practo-poiesis, which means "creation of actions". To apprehend means to create new monitor-and-act units for executing actions at a higher level of organization. In other words, to apprehend is to create new cybernetic capabilities at one specific level of organization (called top-1). That way, one does not really have to "move" from apprehension to action. One is already there by the very act of apprehending." The 'act of apprehending' is an action of Thirdness operating within Secondness (sorry Danko, these are Peircean terms but I think it shows that your outline could fit in with the Peircean model very well). Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Danko Nikolic To: Steven Ericsson-Zenith ; [email protected] Sent: Friday, March 27, 2015 4:43 AM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] abduction in the brain Dear Steven, Good questions, right to the point! See my answers bellow. On 27/03/15 05:19, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote: A lot has been said by list members, I am not sure that I can add. I do have a few questions though. In terms of work of the Peirce family, what aspects of Peirce's logic, exactly, appear to be consistent with your theory? When pratopoietic agents have three traverses they become by their very nature abductive. Abductive reasoning is a kind of an emergent property of tri-traversal organizations. Thus, practopoiesis explains where abduction comes from, what it takes to implement it, etc. The theory tells us why adaptive systems cannot operate in any other way but abductively. In fact, an implication is that biological systems in general by their very nature can be considered abductive, even bacteria and plants can do that (of course, in a "non-cognitive" way). For example, where is there a relation to "universal will" or "matter as effete mind?" These concepts are completely new to me and hence, I cannot answer your question. This is, I guess, the work that still needs to be done by someone: Learn about those concepts + learn about practopoiesis, and see how they are related (or not related). I would love to to do it, as far as my time allows. Where is there an explanation of sense or experience and the role it plays in biophysical dynamics? If you refer to qualia and the "hard" problem of consciousness, this is something I can answer. Practopoiesis was designed to provide useful answers to those questions -- one may say even "breakthrough" answers to those questions. However, I have cut it out of the initial draft (it was there in the very first version) because all my friends who read the draft, agreed that it was way too much of information and the paper was too long. So, I left that part for another manuscript. If you decide to study the present paper on practopoiesis, you will likely agree that the manuscript is already quite a lot to go through. And it also already explains a lot about the mind without tackling the sweet problem of qualia. So, one has to do it in stages. Anyway, one has to get a hold on practopoiesis and tri-traversal theory before one can use those insights to handle the "hard" problem of consciousness. But, not to keep you in dark, and assuming that you do get a certain grip on practopoiesis, I can give you a preview where it is going to go after that: Experience will have to do with understanding to greater detail the dynamics of anapoietic processes. Also, it will be tightly related to the emergence of semantics in tri-traversal systems which is in turn, related to the structure of ideatheca. These new theoretical tools derived from practopoiesis (anapoiesis, and ideatheca) will be central and will be applied for understanding how an individual develops the concept of self, which will be necessary to understand how a tri-traversal system can end up saying something like "I think (and I have qualia), therefore I am". And this will be also tied with empirical evidence, including my own experimental work on qualia of color in synesthesia and ideasthesia. So, in short, qualia issues are in works and (in my judgment) the progress is great. You can learn about ideasthesia and the new empirical insights about the relation between semantics and qualia here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideasthesia and here: http://ed.ted.com/lessons/ideasthesia-how-do-ideas-feel-danko-nikolic How does your model fit into Charles' semeiotic triad? If it does, how may it be applied? This is again something new to me. I have to learn first what semiotic triad is, and then probably think intensively for several months, before I can answer with any confidence. You paper appear to suggest that the model you present is computable, i.e., that the plasticity properties of the brain may in fact be combined with synaptic weights. Actually, if you read further, you will see that the key emphasis is on neural adaption mechanisms. But this does not change your question on computability, as neural adaptation is as "computable" as is synaptic weight. In any case, that you model may be implemented upon a Turing model of computation. Is this a correct reading? Yes and no. Yes, in a sense that there is no need for dualism and for postulating additional fundamental non-physical entities in order to explain qualia. One can rely in principle on a Turing computer instead of a biological brain to create a conscious sentient artificially intelligent system. But there is also a "no" in a sense that the role of this computer should not be conceptualized in a way the traditional (currently dominant) brain theory conceptualizes the role of computation for cognition and consciousness. The tri-traversal theory tells us that mental operations are not "boxed" within a computer, but rely heavily on the interactions with the environment. This issue is discussed explicitly in the very last chapter of the paper entitled: "What is thought?", and is summarized in Table 2. The table I copy here for your convenience: In conclusion, practopoiesis gives answers to some of the important questions that you posed, and also promises to prepare the grounds to answer some other even more important questions. So, perhaps, it is not a bad start. With best regards, Danko Let's say you do, in fact, have a theory of mind. How does your theory move from apprehension to action? Regards, Steven On Thu, Mar 26, 2015 at 8:01 AM, Danko Nikolic <[email protected]> wrote: Dear members of Peirce list, I would like to bring to your attention the upcoming theoretical paper in Journal of Theoretical Biology entitled "Practopoiesis: Or how life fosters a mind". The paper proposes neurophysiological/cybernetic account of abductive reasoning, as introduced by Peirce. As I am not an expert of Perice's work (I am foremost a neuroscientist) but my theory seems to apply to his contribution to logic, I would appreciate very much any critical feedback. Have I understood abduction right? Or did I misted out on something? Also, if there is anything else relevant from Peirce's work that I should pay attention to, I would appreciate knowing. For example, the theory of practopoiesis makes very specific suggestions of how the meaning (semantics) is dealt with within neural systems. I don't know how much this particular proposal is in agreement or in discord with Peirce's work on meaning. One can download a pre-print of the paper here: http://www.danko-nikolic.com/practopoiesis/ Thank you very much, and please do not hesitate to address to me any well-deserved criticism. With best regards, Danko Nikolic -- Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić Web: http://www.danko-nikolic.com Mail address 1: Department of Neurophysiology Max Planck Institut for Brain Research Deutschordenstr. 46 60528 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY Mail address 2: Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Wolfgang Goethe University Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1 60433 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY ---------------------------- Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 [email protected] ---------------------------- ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . -- Prof. Dr. Danko Nikolić Web: http://www.danko-nikolic.com Mail address 1: Department of Neurophysiology Max Planck Institut for Brain Research Deutschordenstr. 46 60528 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY Mail address 2: Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies Wolfgang Goethe University Ruth-Moufang-Str. 1 60433 Frankfurt am Main GERMANY ---------------------------- Office: (..49-69) 96769-736 Lab: (..49-69) 96769-209 Fax: (..49-69) 96769-327 [email protected] ---------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 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