Steven, list,

You haven't made it clear when you're speaking for yourself and when you're speaking for Peirce.

You wrote,

   Qualia is a subjective fantasy, feeling is not detached from action.
   [End quote]

Peirce held that quality of feeling is one of three fundamental categories, not a subjective fantasy. He held that, to grasp it properly, one must contemplate it independently of reaction and reflection. See "What Is a Sign?" (MS 404 of 1894) http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/ch02/ep2ch2.htm <http://www.iupui.edu/%7Epeirce/ep/ep2/ep2book/ch02/ep2ch2.htm> .

You wrote,

   The "pragmatism" of Charles Peirce refers to results. It is the
   behavioral consequence of apprehension. Thus a "meaning" is not
   merely the transformation of syntax via semantic rules (Carnap), but
   the actual behavior that is the consequence of semeiotic action.
   [End quote]

Peirce disagreed with that view from at least the 1870s until the end. He held instead that a conception's meaning is not any actual behavior that does take place, but rather the general form of conduct or behavior that _/would/_ result from belief in the conception, and his emphasis on the modal _/would-be/_ increased over time, culminating in his embrace of modal realism. The meaning is not an actual outcome or set of actual outcomes or the form actually taken by a set of outcomes, but instead an intellectual _/purport/_. See the quotes from Peirce, gathered mostly by Jon Awbrey, in http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pragmatic_maxim .

Best, Ben

On 3/27/2015 1:40 PM, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

Dear Danko (this is a slightly modified version of the email I sent to you separately),

I do not think there is much that is consistent with Peirce for you here. Your description of abduction is unrecognizable, you offer philosophical hand waving and aspersions to biology but no actual mechanism. The levels you imagine are not distinct in Peirce. You describe your model as "formal," yet I see no formality.

Qualia is a subjective fantasy, feeling is not detached from action.

You would do well to study Peirce and begin by understanding his non-local conception of thirdness - and idea that is not included or computable by any of the Turing models of computation.

In this sense I must ask exactly what it is that you mean when you say "pragmatics." As you are, I think, aware Peirce is the founder of American Pragmaticism, a close European equivalent would be the neo-Positivism of Rudolf Carnap (with whom you should also be familiar), although there are fundamental differences in the approach and some conclusions, there is no essential difference in method. I urge you to read, in particular, his 1922 The Logical Structure Of The World and Schlipps Biographical essays with Carnap's response.

The "pragmatism" of Charles Peirce refers to results. It is the behavioral consequence of apprehension. Thus a "meaning" is not merely the transformation of syntax via semantic rules (Carnap), but the actual behavior that is the consequence of semeiotic action.

If I leave this to stand alone I know that several scholars here will rush forward with arguments concerning the pragmatic maxim, that is more ambiguous than I have said. The difference is simply idealism, the Peirce family put ideas first, so it is the case that the meaning of actions vary depending upon the individual apprehending the act. There are no absolutes (but do not take this to mean that ultimate certainty is unattainable). Investigate Charles ideas on falilbism and his father's ideas on Pure Mathematics.

You also seem to have an exclusive view of your endeavor, but it should be clear that many of us have been here before you. Your neuroscience appears to derive more from CS and AI than biology, I suggest therefore that you spend some time with actual biologists and brain surgeons. That should not be hard given your location, walk down the hall and check your assumptions with someone that actually touches brains and not silicon. Ask them about astrocytes and temperature as a start.

Regards,
Steven

On Fri, Mar 27, 2015 at 1:43 AM, Danko Nikolic wrote:

Dear Steven,

  Good questions, right to the point! See my answers bellow.

On 27/03/15 05:19, Steven Ericsson-Zenith wrote:

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