I don’t think Frederik wants to get into an dispute over words any more than I do.
Howard, to the extent that you’ve clarified what you mean by “the subject-object dichotomy,” it should be clear that Peircean semiotic has no problem with that distinction, and uses it as much as any philosopher or physicist. But as Frederik has said, Peirce doesn’t call it that, because it would violate his ethics of terminology to do so. In a letter to Lady Welby (dated 1908 Dec. 14), Peirce says that he does not ‘make any contrast between Subject and Object, far less talk about “subjective and objective” in any of the varieties of the German senses, which I think have led to a lot of bad philosophy, but I use “subject” as the correlative of “predicate,” and speak only of the “subjects” of those signs which have a part which separately indicates what the object of the sign is’ (SS, 69). As for “subjective and objective,” Peirce does occasionally use these terms, when he sees a need to conform to terminology which less scrupulous users will understand. For example: [[ The acquiring [of] a habit is nothing but an objective generalization taking place in time. It is the fundamental logical law in course of realization. When I call it objective, I do not mean to say that there really is any difference between the objective and the subjective, except that the subjective is less developed and as yet less generalized. It is only a false word which I insert because after all we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean. ]] — ‘Abstract of 8 lectures’, undated, NEM IV, 140 (quoted by Stjernfelt 2007, fn 16, p.426). He also makes (better) use these terms elsewhere, not in reference to what you call “the subject-object dichotomy” but in reference to a logical distinction between two kinds of generality – as for instance when explaining pragmaticism in the following excerpt from his article ‘What Pragmatism Is’ (EP2:342). [[ Whatever exists, ex-sists, that is, really acts upon other existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual. As to the general, it will be a help to thought to notice that there are two ways of being general. A statue of a soldier on some village monument, in his overcoat and with his musket, is for each of a hundred families the image of its uncle, its sacrifice to the union. That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any one man of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is objectively general. The word “soldier,” whether spoken or written, is general in the same way; while the name “George Washington” is not so. But each of these two terms remains one and the same noun, whether it be spoken or written, and whenever and wherever it be spoken or written. This noun is not an existent thing: it is a type, or form, to which objects, both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may conform, but which none of them can exactly be. This is subjective generality. The pragmaticistic purport is general in both ways. ]] I don’t expect any of this to make sense to you, Howard, but it may clarify Peirce’s logic for others. Gary f. From: Howard Pattee [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: May 8, 2015 7:30 AM To: [email protected] Cc: 'Peirce-L 1' Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8600] Re: Natural on At 10:20 AM 5/7/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote: >From my point of view, you avoid facing the obvious chicken-and-egg problem >intrinsic to your hypothesis of "self-replication as the first self". (Which >is no more testable as a hypothesis than Peirce's "matter as effete mind.") HP: Your point of view is wrong. I do not avoid facing the problem, and it is experimentally testable (e.g., check out my early experimental studies <https://www.academia.edu/863878/Experimental_approaches_to_the_origin_of_life_problem> on abiogenic synthesis, on self-organization <https://www.academia.edu/863862/On_the_origin_of_macromolecular_sequences> , and on self-replication simulation, Michael Conrad <https://www.academia.edu/6806624/Origins_of_Michael_Conrads_Research_1964-1979> ). Von Neumann's theory of self-replication showed the necessity of symbol systems, now a principle of biosemiotics. RNA catalysis is a recent empirical advance. Obviously, self-replication implies the existence of a self. If you are suggesting a "simpler self" that does not replicate how does it evolve or even persist? Of what interest would such a transient, impotent "self" be? How would it differ from a rock? In Peirce's time the nature of the origin problem could not have been imagined, so we can't blame him for avoiding the problem. However, I think it is fair to ask how you and the Peirceans are facing the origin of life and origin of signs problem. To just insist that signs and minds have always existed is begging the origin question and blocking the empirical path of inquiry. GF:Your conceptual framework apparently does not allow for a semiosic process which is also a physical process,. . . HP: Nonsense. It is a demonstrable fact that all semiotic processes, from cells to humans, have a physical vehicle that functions semiotically by harnessing physical laws. More precisely, symbol <https://www.academia.edu/863864/The_physics_of_symbols_and_the_evolution_of_semiotic_controls> systems <https://www.academia.edu/863864/The_physics_of_symbols_and_the_evolution_of_semiotic_controls> function by the vehicle acting as a complicated boundary condition (cf. Polanyi). GF: Of course all theoretical explanations have to make distinctions, and the subject/object distinction (under some name) is obviously necessary in some theories. . . HP: The distinction is necessary in the empirical testing of all theories. I agree with Peirce (and all modern physicists) -- the relation of the result of measurement to what is measured is still obscure and mysterious. All the various high level expressions of subject-object dichotomies must have evolved from the first symbol-matter dichotomy implied by von Neumann's "description-construction" self-replication. GF: . . . The problem is that you confuse this particular theoretical distinction with an ontological distinction . . . HP: I'm not doing the confusing here. I have said repeatedly, the subject-object distinction is not an ontological distinction. I quote my post: "I call this an epistemic mind-matter problem. (Descartes substance dualism is irrelevant.)" As I said, I agree with Peirce in generalizing minds, quasi-minds, subjects, signs, symbols, and semiotics below humans to all life, but not to inanimate physics. I have explained in many contexts why there is empirical evidence allowing the generalization to all life, and even requiring it for life to exist. This is a founding biophysical principle. It is only the Peircean "laws of mind" extreme that is untestable. No one has given a hint as to how "matter as effete mind" could be empirically tested. It is not even suggested how such a mind could have any effect, or even exist, without violating physical laws. I would like to hear Frederik's and others' views. Howard
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
