Gary F., Howard, lists,
Gary F., regarding this excerpt from your quote of Peirce in "What
Pragmaticism Is",
[....] That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any
one man of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is
_/objectively/_ general. The word “soldier,” whether spoken or
written, is general in the same way; while the name “George
Washington” is not so. But each of these two terms remains one and
the same noun, whether it be spoken or written, and whenever and
wherever it be spoken or written. This noun is not an existent
thing: it is a _/type/_, or _/form/_, to which objects, both those
that are externally existent and those which are imagined, may
conform, but which none of them can exactly be. This is subjective
generality. [....]
[End quote]
It sounds like Peirce is considering the sign as subject and its
semiotic object as object. Do you think that that's what Peirce is
doing? In that case it makes pretty simple sense that the sign's
'subjective generality' means the sign's generality in the sign's own
being, while the sign's 'objective generality' is the sign's referring
to some object(s) generally.
I can think of a third kind of general, which could be both
'subjectively' and 'objectively' individual, yet is general in another
way, such as a _/universal ambassador/_ an (existent country's existent)
ambassador _/to/_ every country in general, addressed to a full range of
interpretants or interpreting minds in the sphere of international
relations. (On the other hand Peirce came to express doubts about
casting that which we call a legal representative as simply a sign or
representamen of the client or employer or voters, etc., since such a
representative may significantly affect its supposedly represented object).
Best, Ben
On 5/10/2015 12:09 PM, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
I don’t think Frederik wants to get into an dispute over words any
more than I do.
Howard, to the extent that you’ve clarified what /you/ mean by “the
subject-object dichotomy,” it should be clear that Peircean semiotic
has no problem with that distinction, and uses it as much as any
philosopher or physicist. But as Frederik has said, Peirce doesn’t
/call /it that, because it would violate his ethics of terminology to
do so.
In a letter to Lady Welby (dated 1908 Dec. 14), Peirce says that he
does not ‘make any contrast between Subject and Object, far less talk
about “subjective and objective” in any of the varieties of the German
senses, which I think have led to a lot of bad philosophy, but I use
“subject” as the correlative of “predicate,” and speak only of the
“subjects” of those signs which have a part which separately indicates
what the object of the sign is’ (SS, 69).
As for “subjective and objective,” Peirce does occasionally use these
terms, when he sees a need to conform to terminology which less
scrupulous users will understand. For example:
[[ The acquiring [of] a habit is nothing but an objective
generalization taking place in time. It is the fundamental logical law
in course of realization. When I call it objective, I do not mean to
say that there really is any difference between the objective and the
subjective, except that the subjective is less developed and as yet
less generalized. It is only a false word which I insert because after
all we cannot make ourselves understood if we merely say what we mean. ]]
— ‘Abstract of 8 lectures’, undated, NEM IV, 140 (quoted by Stjernfelt
2007, fn 16, p.426).
He also makes (better) use these terms elsewhere, not in reference to
what you call “the subject-object dichotomy” but in reference to a
logical distinction between two kinds of /generality/ – as for
instance when explaining pragmaticism in the following excerpt from
his article ‘What Pragmatism Is’ (EP2:342).
[[ Whatever exists, /ex-sists,/ that is, really acts upon other
existents, so obtains a self-identity, and is definitely individual.
As to the general, it will be a help to thought to notice that there
are two ways of being general. A statue of a soldier on some village
monument, in his overcoat and with his musket, is for each of a
hundred families the image of its uncle, its sacrifice to the union.
That statue, then, though it is itself single, represents any one man
of whom a certain predicate may be true. It is /objectively/ general.
The word “soldier,” whether spoken or written, is general in the same
way; while the name “George Washington” is not so. But each of these
two terms remains one and the same noun, whether it be spoken or
written, and whenever and wherever it be spoken or written. This noun
is not an existent thing: it is a /type/, or /form/, to which objects,
both those that are externally existent and those which are imagined,
may /conform/, but which none of them can exactly be. This is
subjective generality. The pragmaticistic purport is general in both
ways. ]]
I don’t expect any of this to make sense to you, Howard, but it may
clarify Peirce’s logic for others.
Gary f.
*From:*Howard Pattee [mailto:[email protected]]
*Sent:* May 8, 2015 7:30 AM
*To:* [email protected]
*Cc:* 'Peirce-L 1'
*Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: [biosemiotics:8600] Re: Natural
on At 10:20 AM 5/7/2015, Gary Fuhrman wrote:
From my point of view, you avoid facing the obvious
chicken-and-egg problem intrinsic to your hypothesis of
"self-replication as the first self". (Which is no more testable
as a hypothesis than Peirce's "matter as effete mind.")
HP: Your point of view is wrong. I do not avoid facing the problem,
and it is experimentally testable (e.g., check out my early
experimental studies
<https://www.academia.edu/863878/Experimental_approaches_to_the_origin_of_life_problem>
on abiogenic synthesis, on self-organization
<https://www.academia.edu/863862/On_the_origin_of_macromolecular_sequences>,
and on self-replication simulation, Michael Conrad
<https://www.academia.edu/6806624/Origins_of_Michael_Conrads_Research_1964-1979>).
Von Neumann's theory of self-replication showed the necessity of
symbol systems, now a principle of biosemiotics. RNA catalysis is a
recent empirical advance.
Obviously, /self/-replication implies the existence of a /self/. If
you are suggesting a "simpler self" that does /not/ replicate how does
it evolve or even persist? Of what interest would such a transient,
impotent "self" be? How would it differ from a rock?
In Peirce's time the nature of the origin problem could not have been
imagined, so we can't blame him for avoiding the problem. However, I
think it is fair to ask how you and the Peirceans are facing the
origin of life and origin of signs problem. To just insist that signs
and minds have always existed is begging the origin question and
blocking the empirical path of inquiry.
GF:Your conceptual framework apparently does not allow for a
semiosic process which is /also/ a physical process,. . .
HP: Nonsense. It is a demonstrable//fact that/all /semiotic processes,
from cells to humans, have a /physical vehicle/ that functions
semiotically by harnessing physical laws. More precisely, symbol
<https://www.academia.edu/863864/The_physics_of_symbols_and_the_evolution_of_semiotic_controls>systems
<https://www.academia.edu/863864/The_physics_of_symbols_and_the_evolution_of_semiotic_controls>
function by the vehicle acting as a complicated boundary condition
(cf. Polanyi).
GF: Of course all theoretical explanations have to make
distinctions, and the subject/object distinction (under /some/
name) is obviously necessary in some theories. . .
HP: The distinction is necessary in the empirical testing of /all
/theories. I agree with Peirce (and all modern physicists) -- the
relation of the /result/ of measurement to/what is measured/ is still
obscure and mysterious. All the various high level expressions of
subject-object dichotomies must have evolved from the first
/symbol-matter /dichotomy implied by von Neumann's
"description-construction" self-replication.
GF: . . . The problem is that you confuse this particular
theoretical distinction with an ontological distinction . . .
HP: I'm not doing the confusing here. I have said repeatedly, the
subject-object distinction is /not /an ontological distinction. I
quote my post: "I call this an epistemic mind-matter problem.
(Descartes substance dualism is irrelevant.)"
As I said, I agree with Peirce in generalizing minds, quasi-minds,
subjects, signs, symbols, and semiotics below humans to /all life/,
but /not/ to inanimate physics. I have explained in many contexts why
there is empirical evidence allowing the generalization to all life,
and even requiring it for life to exist. This is a founding
biophysical principle.
It is only the Peircean "laws of mind" extreme that is untestable. No
one has given a hint as to how "matter as effete mind" could be
empirically tested. It is not even suggested how such a mind could
have any effect, or even exist, without violating physical laws.
I would like to hear Frederik's and others' views.
Howard
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