Sung, Having a character that makes it a sign is not yet being a sign to someone of something. The first is potential, the second is actualization.
Regards, Jon http://inquiryintoinquiry.com > On Dec 21, 2015, at 12:33 AM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: > > Edwina, > > You said > > "All signs are triads". > > I disagree. Not all signs are triads. Only symbols are. There can be signs > without interpretant (e.g., a piece of mould with a bullet hoe in it; see > below) or without object (e.g., a lead-pencil streak as representing a > geometric line), according to Peirce: > > > "An icon is a sign which would possess the character which renders it > significant, even though its object had no existence; such as a lead-pencil > streak as representing a geometrical line. An index is a sign which would, at > once, lose the character which makes it a sign if its object were removed, > but would not lose that character if there were no interpretant. Such, for > instance, is a piece of mould with a bullet hole in it as a sign of a shot; > for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole > there, whether anyone has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not. A > symbol is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a sign if > there were no interpretant. Such is any utterance of speech which signifies > what it does only by virtue of it being understood to have that > signification." > > (Peirce, Philosophical Writings, 104, as cited in > http://goldberg.berkeley.edu/pubs/Index-and-the-Interface-Kris-Paulsen-Article-Spring-2013.pdf). > > > All the best. > > Sung > > > >> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 9:31 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: >> Sung - if you want to consider the term 'Icon' as the 'name ' for the >> Relation between the Representamen and the Object--- AND as a 'sign' of that >> Relation...then, the term, ICON, must be operating within a triad. It is not >> in itself, as that word, as you insist, an 'elementary sign'. >> >> Again - that word ICON, to be considered a sign, must itself be functioning >> within a triad. The term ICON, as a sign, is made up of those three >> relations: R-R, R-O and R-I. There is no such thing as an 'elementary sign'. >> All signs are triads. So, when I hear or read the word ICON, [R-O], my >> Representamen in its memory [R-R], mediates that sight/hearing of ICON, to >> result in an Interpretant [R-I] of the relation between the R and the O. >> That's a full triad. Not an elementary sign. >> >> Again- your lion and cat are irrelevant felines. >> >> Edwina >> ----- Original Message ----- >> From: Sungchul Ji >> To: Edwina Taborsky >> Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 8:42 PM >> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >> >> Hi Edwina, >> >> You wrote: >> >> "We are talking about the meaning of these terms. >> (122015-1) >> The term of 'icon' refers to the relation between the >> Representamen and the Object." >> >> I disagree. >> >> We are not talking about just the meaning of these terms but also their >> names. >> >> We agree that the meaning of 'icon' is the relation between representamen >> and object in the mode of Firstness. >> >> Where we do not agree is that I regard 'icon' as the name of (and hence a >> sign for) the relation between representamen and object in the mode of >> Firstness. >> >> Again you are seeing only the lion and not the cat. >> >> Sung >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >> >>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 7:59 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: >>> No, Sung. Again, it would help if you would actually read Peirce before you >>> jump in with your views. >>> We are talking about the meaning of these terms. The term of 'icon' refers >>> to the relation between the Representamen and the Object. So, no-one, >>> including me, is 'conflating 'representamen' and 'object'. ALL nine terms >>> refer to the Relations of the Representamen; in itself as R-R, between R-O, >>> and R-I. >>> >>> These 9 terms are not, as you insist, 'elementary terms', nor are they >>> ambiguous. They are very specifically outlined, repeatedly, as to their >>> meaning, in numerous Peircean texts. >>> >>> And as John Collier's post just explained, these relations are not >>> stand-alone. COLLIER:" I take it that the contained (or implied) pairwise >>> relations are abstractions, and cannot (do not) exist on their own. So >>> talking about, say, the relation between the representamen and its object >>> always has the interpretant in the background." >>> >>> That is - the relations operate within the semiosic triad. THREE relations >>> - but you can't 'decompose' them. >>> >>> Your lion-cat picture is totally irrelevant to the discussion. >>> Edwina >>> ----- Original Message ----- >>> From: Sungchul Ji >>> To: PEIRCE-L >>> Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 7:41 PM >>> Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>> >>> Edwina, Helmut, John, Gary R, List, >>> >>> You wrote: >>> >>> "Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of >>> representamen relations'. (122015-1) >>> Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, . . . " >>> >>> These '9 types of representmane relations' are the objects of the 9 types >>> of signs that Peirce named 'qualisign', 'singsign, 'legisign', 'dicisign', >>> etc. For example, icon, index , and symbol are the signs referring to the >>> relation between representamen and its object in the mode of being of >>> Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness, respectively. It seems to me that >>> you are conflating representmen and object. >>> >>> The 3x3 table of the 9 types of signs is an ambiguous diagram, since it an >>> be intepreted in more than one ways with equal validity, like the figure >>> shown below. Clearly the figure can be interpreted as depicting a lion, a >>> cat, or both, not unlike our 9 types and 10 classes of signs. I see both a >>> lion (relations, i.e., objects) and a cat (name of the relations, i.e., >>> signs) in the picture, but, metaphorically speaking, Edwina seems to see >>> only a lion, and Helmut only a cat. >>> >>> >>> >>> <image.png> >>> >>> Retrieved from >>> http://www.gla.ac.uk/schools/humanities/research/philosophyresearch/cspe/illusions/ >>> on 12/20/2015. >>> >>> >>> All the best. >>> >>> Sung >>> >>> >>> >>> >>> >>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 6:26 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>>> wrote: >>>> Helmut - I can see the value of using your term of '9 types of >>>> representamen relations'. Certainly, these 9 are NOT signs, despite Sung's >>>> description of them as 'elementary signs'. A sign is, by definition, a >>>> triad - and therefore, in my view, even the representamen-in-itself, can't >>>> be a sign, because it is not in a triad. The triad is the sign. >>>> >>>> That is why I refer to the interactions between the Representamen and the >>>> Object; the Representamen and the Interpretant - as Relations. And of >>>> course, Peirce does this as well, I've provided the quotes previously. The >>>> Representamen-in-itself is also a Relation, a depth relation, with its >>>> history. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> From: Helmut Raulien >>>> To: [email protected] >>>> Cc: Sungchul Ji ; PEIRCE-L >>>> Sent: Sunday, December 20, 2015 5:40 PM >>>> Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>>> >>>> John, Sung, list, >>>> for me, as far as I understand, "types" and "classes" are synonyms. The >>>> difference between the "9 types of signs" and the "10 classes of signs" is >>>> not, as I understand it, a matter of "type" versus "class", but of what it >>>> is a type/class of. Id say, the 10 classes are classes of triadic signs, >>>> and the 9 types are classes (or types) of sign relations: 3 representamen >>>> relations, 3 object relations, and 3 interpretant relations. What I am not >>>> completely clear about, is, what the representamen, object, or >>>> interpretant, has a relation with: Is it the representamen, or the whole >>>> sign? I think it is the representamen, as Edwina often has said, because, >>>> if they were relations between the whole triadic sign and either element >>>> of its, this would be some circular affair, as the whole triadic sign >>>> already is a relation between (or composition of?) these three >>>> relations...A logical loop. So, my temporal understanding is to replace "9 >>>> types of signs" with "9 types of representamen relations". Is that correct? >>>> Best, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>>> 20. Dezember 2015 um 15:08 Uhr >>>> "John Collier" <[email protected]> wrote: >>>> >>>> Sorry Sung, but this doesn'the help me. It seems to me that you are only >>>> picking out different ways of classifying the same things, which is fine, >>>> but they are not different things, as you seem to be saying. There is no >>>> difference in the dynamical objects involved. If there is, you have not >>>> shown this. You need tof show how the different classifications are >>>> grounded in different expectations about possible experiences. You haven't >>>> done that yet. From your response here it seems that you are confusing >>>> different ways of talking about the same things with different objects. I >>>> don't know of anyone who makes the mistake of confusing the objects of the >>>> classifications. Perhaps you could give an example. Of course someone >>>> could be misled by the difference in the immediate objects, which depends >>>> on how we are thinking, if they are confused about what Peirce is talking >>>> about with these classifications, I don't think that there are Peirce >>>> scholars who make that mistake. So perhaps you could provide >>>> examples. There is a good reason why Peirce didn't use different names. >>>> There is no need to. This is quite different from the baryon-quark case, >>>> where the difference has experimental consequences. >>>> >>>> John >>>> >>>> Sent from my Samsung device >>>> >>>> >>>> -------- Original message -------- >>>> From: Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> >>>> Date: 20/12/2015 14:04 (GMT+02:00) >>>> To: PEIRCE-L <[email protected]> >>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>>> >>>> John, List, >>>> >>>> You wrote: >>>> >>>> "So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for >>>> “measurable” >>>> (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot fathom without >>>> more clarity >>>> than I have now by what you mean by distinction you are trying to make, >>>> the distinction >>>> between elementary signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; >>>> you would >>>> be making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no >>>> information." >>>> >>>> The distinction between elementary signs and composite signs is the same >>>> as the distinction between the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of >>>> sign that Peirce himself made. (If you do not like these terms, any one is >>>> entitled to come up with better replacements.) So the distinction must >>>> have been in Peirce's mind whenever Peirce wrote about the 9 types and 10 >>>> classes. The only thing that I am trying to do here, since 2012, is to >>>> give "names" or "representamens" to these distinct objects, so that we can >>>> avoid conflating them, or so that we can have two different interpretants. >>>> Right now, we have only one representamen, "sign", to refer to two >>>> different objects (9 types and 10 classes) making them appear the same and >>>> yet they are not as you can plainly see in the fact that Peirce >>>> distinguished between 9 types and 10 classes. This is why many, if not >>>> all, students of Peirce, seem confused. >>>> >>>> All the best. >>>> >>>> Sung >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> On Sun, Dec 20, 2015 at 4:02 AM, John Collier <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> Sung, Lists, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I am unclear what you mean by measurable. The reason why this is >>>>> important is that if there is no difference to possible experience, by >>>>> the Pragmatic Maxim there is no difference in meaning. No elementary >>>>> particle properties are directly measurable. The best we can do is to >>>>> have evidence for them by way of properties that are directly measurable, >>>>> together with the theory (the measurements of quark properties are what >>>>> is called “theory-laden”). So the notion of measurement that you are >>>>> using is void unless there is some measurable difference between “there >>>>> are nine elementary signs” and “there are ten composite signs”). The same >>>>> would, of course hold for quarks and baryons unless there is a detectable >>>>> difference to experience. In this case the difference is, of course, by >>>>> your notion of a baryon as isolatable, that we can isolate baryons but >>>>> not quarks (for a combination of theoretical and experimental reasons). >>>>> So it seems to me that, unless you have a rather special meaning for >>>>> “measurable” (or even “detectable”) in the case of signs that I cannot >>>>> fathom without more clarity than I have now by what you mean by >>>>> distinction you are trying to make, the distinction between elementary >>>>> signs and composite signs have no basis in what exists; you would be >>>>> making a distinction without a difference, and thus containing no >>>>> information. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> John Collier >>>>> >>>>> Professor Emeritus, UKZN >>>>> >>>>> http://web.ncf.ca/collier >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf >>>>> Of Sungchul Ji >>>>> Sent: Sunday, 20 December 2015 07:05 >>>>> To: PEIRCE-L >>>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Hi Gary R, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> You wrote : >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite >>>>> recently, I do not consider the 9 parameters >>>>> (121915-1) >>>>> as signs at all, so that when I am discussing signs as possibly embodied >>>>> signs, I am always referring to >>>>> >>>>> the 10 classes." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I have two comments on (121915-1) and a suggestion: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> (1) If 'qualisign' is not a sign, why do you think Peirce used the word >>>>> "sign" in "qualisign" ? >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> (2) The problem, as I see it, may stem from what seems to me to be an >>>>> unjustifiably firm belief on the part of many semioticians that there is >>>>> only one kind of sign in Peirce's writings, i.e., the triadic ones (or >>>>> the 10 classes of signs). But what if, in Peirce's mind, there were two >>>>> kinds of signs, i.e., the 9 types of signs and the 10 classes of signs, >>>>> although he used the same word "sign" to refer to both of them, just as >>>>> physicists use the same word "particles" for both quarks and baryons. >>>>> They are both particles but physicists discovered that protons and >>>>> neutrons are not fundamental particles but are composed of triplets of >>>>> more fundamental particles called quarks. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> (3) I think the confusions in semiotics that Peirce himself seemed to >>>>> have contributed to creating by not naming the 9 types of signs and 10 >>>>> classes of signs DIFFERENTLY may be removed by adopting two different >>>>> names (belatedly) for these two kinds of signs, e.g., the "elementary >>>>> signs" for the 9 types and the "composite signs" for the 10 classes of >>>>> signs as I recommended in [biosemiotics:46]. The former is monadic and >>>>> incomplete as a sign, while the latter is triadic and hence complete as a >>>>> sign. Again this situation seems similar to the relation between quarks >>>>> and baryons: Quarks are incomplete particles in that they cannot be >>>>> isolated outside baryons whereas baryons (which are composed of three >>>>> quarks) are complete particles since they can be isolated and >>>>> experimentally measured. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> All the best. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sung >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 7:25 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Sung, list, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> When I gave the example of the qualisign as a sign which " 'may not >>>>> possess all the essential characters of a more complete sign', and yet be >>>>> a part of that more complex sign," I was in fact referring to the >>>>> rhematic iconic qualisign following Peirce's (shorthand) usage, since "To >>>>> designate a qualisign as a rhematic iconic qualisign is redundant [. . .] >>>>> because a qualisign can only be rhematic and iconic." >>>>> >>>>> http://www.angelfire.com/md2/timewarp/peirce.html >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> As I thought I'd made clear over the years, and even quite recently, I do >>>>> not consider the 9 parameters as signs at all, so that when I am >>>>> discussing signs as possibly embodied signs, I am always referring to the >>>>> 10 classes. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> What I intended to convey in my last message was that the qualisign (that >>>>> is, the rhematic iconic qualisign) *must* be part of a more complete sign >>>>> (clear enough, I think, is Peirce's discussions of the 10 classes), that >>>>> it simply cannot exist independently of that fuller sign complex (e.g., a >>>>> 'feeling of red' doesn't float around in some unembodied Platonic >>>>> universe). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Now, I'm off to a holiday party, but I thought I'd best make this point >>>>> clear before there was any further confusion. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary Richmond >>>>> >>>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>>> >>>>> Communication Studies >>>>> >>>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>>> >>>>> C 745 >>>>> >>>>> 718 482-5690 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 5:30 PM, Sungchul Ji <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hi Jeff, Gary R, List, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I agree that "qualisigin" is not a complete sign because it is one of the >>>>> 9 sigh types and not one of the 10 sign classes. It seems to me that in >>>>> order for "qualisign" to be a complete sign, it has to be a part of one >>>>> of the 10 classes of signs, e.g., a "rhematic iconic qualisign" such as >>>>> "feeling of red", i.e., the "redness" felt by someone or some agent. >>>>> However, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Redness", as a qualisign, can be there even though no one is there to >>>>> feel it. >>>>> (121915-1) >>>>> For example, red color was there before we invented artificial signs and >>>>> >>>>> applied one of them to it." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Peirce said that legisign is "a sign which would lose the character which >>>>> renders it a sign if there were no interpretant", and sinsign can be >>>>> index or icon, but as index it is is "a sign which would, at once, lose >>>>> the character which makes it a sign if its object is removed , but would >>>>> not lose that character if there were no interpretant". >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> By extension, I wonder if we can say that >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Qualisign is a sign which would lose the character which renders it a >>>>> sign if there were no representamen." (121915-2) >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Statement (121915-2) seems to be supported by Statement (121915-1). >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Again I think the quark model of the Peircean sign is helpful in avoiding >>>>> confusions resulting from not distinguishing the two kinds of signs, >>>>> i.e., 9 types of signs vs. 10 classes of signs: >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> "Both quarks and baryons are particles but only the latter are >>>>> experimentally measurable; >>>>> (121915-3) >>>>> >>>>> Similarly 9 types of signs and 10 classes of signs are both signs but >>>>> only the latter can be >>>>> >>>>> used as a means of communicating information." >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> In [biosemiotics:46] dated 12/26/2012, I referred to the 9 types of >>>>> signs as "elementary signs" and the 10 classes of signs >>>>> >>>>> as "composite signs", in analogy to baryons (protons, neutrons) being >>>>> composed of elementary quarks. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> A Happy Holiday Season and A Wonderful New Year to you all ! >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Sung >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 2:29 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> >>>>> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Jeff, Gary F. list, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> I think one need look no further than to the qualisign for a good example >>>>> of a sign which "may not possess all the essential characters of a more >>>>> complete sign," and yet be a part of that more complex sign. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Best, >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary R >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Gary Richmond >>>>> >>>>> Philosophy and Critical Thinking >>>>> >>>>> Communication Studies >>>>> >>>>> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York >>>>> >>>>> C 745 >>>>> >>>>> 718 482-5690 >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> On Sat, Dec 19, 2015 at 1:33 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard >>>>> <[email protected]> wrote: >>>>> >>>>> Hello Gary F., List, >>>>> >>>>> In MS 7, Peirce says: "Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of >>>>> a sign, though they are signs, may not possess all the essential >>>>> characters of a more complete sign." How should we understand this >>>>> distinction between a sufficiently complete sign and those parts of a >>>>> sign that are less complete? >>>>> >>>>> --Jeff >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> Jeffrey Downard >>>>> Associate Professor >>>>> Department of Philosophy >>>>> Northern Arizona University >>>>> (o) 928 523-8354 >>>>> ________________________________________ >>>>> From: [email protected] [[email protected]] >>>>> Sent: Friday, December 18, 2015 3:54 PM >>>>> To: 'PEIRCE-L' >>>>> Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] RE: signs, correlates, and triadic relations >>>>> >>>>> NDTR is an acronym for “Nomenclature and Divisions of Triadic Relations,” >>>>> EP2:289-99, fifth section of the 1903 Syllabus, and the main text this >>>>> thread has been referring to, so far. >>>>> >>>>> Since I included in my post a few quotes from MS 7, which we discussed at >>>>> some length back in the spring of 2014, I’ll post my transcription of the >>>>> manuscript here (from a photocopy of it posted to the list by Vinicius >>>>> Romanini, I think). It’s an interesting text because it prefigures (or >>>>> refigures?) many of the things Peirce says about signs in “New Elements,” >>>>> which follows immediately after NDTR in EP2. The lack of paragraphing is >>>>> Peirce’s. — gary f. >>>>> >>>>> On the Foundations of Mathematics >>>>> MS 7, c. 1903 [gf transcription, 4 Apr 2014, Peirce's underlining >>>>> rendered as italics] >>>>> §1. Mathematics deals essentially with Signs. All that we know or think >>>>> is so known or thought by signs, and our knowledge itself is a sign. The >>>>> word and idea of a sign is familiar but it is indistinct. Let us endeavor >>>>> to analyze it. >>>>> It is plain at the outset, first, that a sign is not any particular >>>>> replica of it. If one casts one's eye down a printed page, every ‘the’ is >>>>> the same word, and every e the same letter. The exact identity is not >>>>> clear. Secondly, a sign may be complex; and the parts of a sign, though >>>>> they are signs, may not possess all the essential characters of a more >>>>> complete sign. Thirdly, a sign sufficiently complete must be capable of >>>>> determining an interpretant sign, and must be capable of ultimately >>>>> producing real results. For a proposition of metaphysics which could >>>>> never contribute to the determination of conduct would be meaningless >>>>> jargon. On the other hand, the cards which, slipped into a Jacquard loom, >>>>> cause appropriate figures to be woven, may very properly be called signs >>>>> although there is no conscious interpretation of them. If not, it can >>>>> only be because they are not interpreted by signs. In fact, in the >>>>> present condition of philosophy, consciousness seems to be a mere quality >>>>> of feeling which a formal science will do best to leave out of account. >>>>> But a sign only functions as a sign when it is interpreted. It is >>>>> therefore essential that it should be capable of determining an >>>>> interpretant sign. Fourthly, a sign sufficiently complete must in some >>>>> sense correspond to a real object. A sign cannot even be false unless, >>>>> with some degree of definiteness, it specifies the real object of which >>>>> it is false. That the sign itself is not a definite real object has been >>>>> pointed out under “firstly”. It is only represented. Now either it must >>>>> be that it is one thing to really be and another to be represented, or >>>>> else it must be that there is no such thing [a]s falsity. This involves >>>>> no denial that every real thing may be a representation, or sign, but >>>>> merely that, if so, there must be something more in reality than mere >>>>> representation. Since a sufficiently complete sign may be false, and also >>>>> since it is not any replica or collection of replicas, it is not real. >>>>> But it refers to a real object. Consequently, a sign cannot have a sign >>>>> as its sole object; though it may refer to an object through >>>>> a sign; as if one should say, “Whatever the Pope, as such, may declare >>>>> will be true,” or as a map may be a map of itself. But supposing the Pope >>>>> not to declare anything, does that proposition refer to any real object? >>>>> Yes, to the Pope. But, fifthly, even if there were no pope, still, like >>>>> all other signs sufficiently complete, there is a single definite object >>>>> to which it must refer; namely, to the ‘Truth,’ or the Absolute, or the >>>>> entire Universe of real being. Sixthly, a sign may refer, in addition, >>>>> and specially, to any number of parts of that universe. Seventhly, every >>>>> interpretant of a sign need not refer to all the real objects to which >>>>> the sign itself refers, but must, at least, refer to the Truth. Eighthly, >>>>> an interpretant may refer to an object of its sign in an indefinite >>>>> manner. Thus, given the sign, ‘Enoch was a man, and Enoch was >>>>> translated,’ an interpretant of it would be ‘Some man was translated.’ >>>>> Ninethly, a sign may refer to its interpretant in such a way that, in >>>>> case the former sign is incomplete, the interpretant, being an >>>>> interpretant of the completer sign, may refer to a sign to which the >>>>> first sign does not specially refer, but only generally refers. Thus, the >>>>> sign ‘Any man there may be is mortal’ does not refer to any real man, >>>>> unless it so happens that it is a part of a sign which otherwise refers >>>>> to such a real thing. But if it be a part of a sign of which another part >>>>> is ‘some man sings,’ the sign ‘some man is mortal’ becomes an >>>>> interpretant of it. This may be more conveniently expressed by speaking >>>>> of an ‘utterer’ and an ‘interpreter.’ Then the utterer says to the >>>>> interpreter, “you are at liberty to understand me as referring to any man >>>>> [of] whom you can get any indication, and of him, I say, ‘he is mortal.’” >>>>> Tenthly, a sign sufficiently complete must signify some quality; and it >>>>> is no more important to recognize that the real object to which a sign >>>>> refers is not a mere sign than to recognize that the quality it signifies >>>>> is not a mere sign. Take the quality of the odor of attar. There is no >>>>> difficulty in imagining a being whose entire consciousness should consist >>>>> in this alone. But, it may be objected, if it were contrasted with >>>>> nothing could it be recognized? I reply, no; and besides, such >>>>> recognition is excluded by the circumstance that a recognition of the >>>>> smell would not be the pure smell itself. It may be doubted by some >>>>> persons, however, whether the feeling could exist alone. They are the >>>>> persons whom it ought to be easiest for me to convince of my point. For >>>>> they, at least, must admit that if such pure homogeneous quality of >>>>> feeling were to exist alone, it would not be a sign. Everybody ought to >>>>> admit it because it would be alone, and therefore would have no object >>>>> different from itself. Besides, there would be no possible replica of it, >>>>> since each of two such things would be nonexistent for the other; nor >>>>> could there be any third who should compare them. So, then, the whole >>>>> question of whether such a quality is a sign or not resolves itself into >>>>> the question of whether there could be such a tinge upon the >>>>> consciousness of a being, supposing the being could be conscious (for I >>>>> shall show presently that the fact that he would be asleep is only in my >>>>> favor). In order to decide this question, it will be sufficient to look >>>>> at any object parti-colored in bright red and bright blue and to ask >>>>> oneself a question or two. Would there be any possibility of conveying >>>>> the idea of that red to a person who had no feeling nearer to it than >>>>> that blue? Plainly not, the quality of the red is in the red itself. The >>>>> proximity of the blue heightens the shock up[on] the seer[']s organism, >>>>> emphasizes it, renders it vivid, perhaps slightly confuses the feeling. >>>>> But the red quality is altogether positive and would remain if the blue >>>>> were not there. If every other idea were removed, there would be no >>>>> shock, and there would be sleep. But the quality of that sleep would be >>>>> red, in this sense, that if it were taken away frequently and brought >>>>> back so as to wake the being up, the tinge of his consciousness would be >>>>> of that quality. A quality, in itself, has no being at all, it is true. >>>>> It must be embodied in something that exists. But the quality is as it is >>>>> positively and in itself. That is not true of a sign, which exists only >>>>> by bringing an interpretant to refer to an object. A quality, then, is >>>>> not a sign. Eleventhly, we may assume that this is as true of what is, >>>>> with excusable inaccuracy, called a composite quality as of a simple one. >>>>> In itself, one quality is as simple as another. A person who should be >>>>> acquainted with none but the spectral colors would get no idea of white >>>>> by being told that it was the mixture of them all. One might >>>>> as well tell him to make a mixture of water, patriotism, and the square >>>>> root of minus one. Find a man who has had no idea of patriotism; and if >>>>> you tell him that it is the love of one's country, if he knows what love >>>>> is, and what a man's country, in its social sense, is, he can make the >>>>> experiment of connecting ideas in his imagination, and noting the quality >>>>> of feeling which arises upon this composition. Tell him this in the >>>>> evening, and he will repeat the experiment several times during the >>>>> night, and in the morning he will have a fair idea of what patriotism >>>>> means. He will have performed an experiment analogous to that of mixing >>>>> colored lights in order to get an idea of white. If a treasure is buried >>>>> in the midst of a plain, and there are four signal poles, the place of >>>>> the treasure can be defined by means of ranges, so that a person who can >>>>> take ranges and set up new poles can find the treasure. In like manner >>>>> the name of any color may be defined in terms of four color disks so that >>>>> a person with a color-wheel can experimentally produce the color and >>>>> thereafter be able to use the name. Every definition to be understood >>>>> must be treated as a precept for experimentation. The imagination is an >>>>> apparatus for such experimentation that often answers the purpose, >>>>> although it often proves insufficient. No point on the plain where the >>>>> treasure is hid is more simple than other. Colors may be defined by >>>>> various systems of coördinates, and we do not know that one color is in >>>>> itself simpler than another. It is only in a limited class of cases that >>>>> we can define a quality as simply a mixture of two qualities. In most >>>>> cases, it is necessary to introduce other relations. But even when that >>>>> is the case, if a quality is defined as being at once a and b, there will >>>>> always be another way of defining it as that which is at once c and d. >>>>> Now all that is either a or c will have a certain quality p, common and >>>>> peculiar to that class; the class of possible objects that are b or c >>>>> will be similarly related to a quality, r; and the class of possible >>>>> objects that are either b or d will be similarly related to a quality, s. >>>>> Then that quality which was defined as, at once, a and b, can be more >>>>> analytically defined as that which is at once p, q, r, and s; and so on >>>>> ad infinitum. We may not be able to make out these qualities; but there >>>>> is reason to believe that any describable class of possible objects has >>>>> some quality common and peculiar to it. It is certain that a pure >>>>> quality, in its mode of being as a pure quality, does not cease to be >>>>> because it is not embodied in anything. Every situation in life appears >>>>> to have its peculiar flavor. This flavor is what it is positively and in >>>>> itself. For the experiment by which it may be reproduced an adequate >>>>> prescription may be given; but the definition will not itself have that >>>>> flavor. To say that a flavor, or pure quality, is composed of two others, >>>>> is simply to say that on experimentally mixing these others in a >>>>> particular way, that first flavor will be reproduced. Every sufficiently >>>>> complete sign determines a sign to the effect that on a certain occasion, >>>>> that is, in a certain object a certain flavor or quality may be observed. >>>>> This attempt to begin an analysis of the nature of a sign may seem to be >>>>> unnecessarily complicated, unnatural, and ill-fitting. To that I reply >>>>> that every man has his own fashion of thinking; and if such is the >>>>> reader's impression let him draw up a statement for himself. If it is >>>>> sufficiently full and accurate, he will find that it differs from mine >>>>> chiefly in its nomenclature and arrangement. [Not unlikely he might >>>>> insist on distinctions which I avoid as irrelevant.] He will find that, >>>>> in some shape, he is brought to recognize the same three radically >>>>> different elements that I do. Namely, he must recognize, first, a mode of >>>>> being in itself, corresponding to my quality; secondly, a mode of being >>>>> constituted by opposition, corresponding to my object; and thirdly, a >>>>> mode of being of which a branching line Y is an analogue, and which is of >>>>> the general nature of a mean function corresponding to the sign. >>>>> §2. Partly in hopes of reconciling the reader to my statement, and partly >>>>> in order to bring out some other points that will be pertinent, I will >>>>> review the matter in another order. >>>>> The reference of a sign to the quality which is its ground, reason, or >>>>> meaning appears most prominently in a kind of sign of which any replica >>>>> is fitted to be a sign by virtue of possessing in itself certain >>>>> qualities which it would equally possess if the interpretant and the >>>>> object did not exist at all. Of course, in such case, the sign could not >>>>> be a sign; but as far as the sign itself went, it would be >>>>> all that [it] would be with the object and interpretant. Such a sign >>>>> whose significance lies in the qualities of its replicas in themselves is >>>>> an icon, image, analogue, or copy. Its object is whatever that resembles >>>>> it its interpretant takes it to be the sign of, and [it is a] sign of >>>>> that object in proportion as it resembles it. An icon cannot be a >>>>> complete sign; but it is the only sign which directly brings the >>>>> interpretant to close quarters with the meaning; and for that reason it >>>>> is the kind of sign with which the mathematician works. For not only are >>>>> geometrical figures icons, but even algebraical arrays of letters have >>>>> relations analogous to those of the forms they represent, although these >>>>> relations are not altogether iconically represented. >>>>> The reference of a sign to its object is brought into special prominence >>>>> in a kind of sign whose fitness to be a sign is due to its being in a >>>>> real reactive relation,—generally, a physical and dynamical >>>>> relation,—with the object. Such a sign I term an index. As an example, >>>>> take a weather-cock. This is a sign of the wind because the wind actively >>>>> moves it. It faces in the very direction from which the wind blows. In so >>>>> far as it does that, it involves an icon. The wind forces it to be an >>>>> icon. A photograph which is compelled by optical laws to be an icon of >>>>> its object which is before the camera is another example. It is in this >>>>> way that these indices convey information. They are propositions. That is >>>>> they separately indicate their objects; the weather-cock because it turns >>>>> with the wind and is known by its interpretant to do so; the photograph >>>>> for a like reason. If the weathercock sticks and fails to turn, or if the >>>>> camera lens is bad, the one or the other will be false. But if this is >>>>> known to be the case, they sink at once to mere icons, at best. It is not >>>>> essential to an index that it should thus involve an icon. Only, if it >>>>> does not, it will convey no information. A cry of “Oh!” may be a direct >>>>> reaction from a remarkable situation. But it will convey, perhaps, no >>>>> further information. The letters in a geometrical figure are good >>>>> illustrations of pure indices not involving any icon, that is they do not >>>>> force anything to be an icon of their object. The cry “Oh!” does to a >>>>> slight degree; since it has the same startling quality as the situation >>>>> that compells it. The index acts compulsively on the interpretant and >>>>> puts it into a direct and real relation with the object, which is >>>>> necessarily an individual event (or, more loosely, a thing) that is hic >>>>> et nunc, single and definite. >>>>> A third kind of sign, which brings the reference to an interpretant into >>>>> prominence, is one which is fit to be a sign, not at all because of any >>>>> particular analogy with the quality it signifies, nor because it stands >>>>> in any reactive relation with its object, but simply and solely because >>>>> it will be interpreted to be a sign. I call such a sign a symbol. As an >>>>> example of a symbol, Goethe's book on the Theory of Colors will serve. >>>>> This is made up of letters, words, sentences, paragraphs etc.; and the >>>>> cause of its referring to colors and attributing to colors the quality it >>>>> does is that so it is understood by anybody who reads it. It not only >>>>> determines an interpretant, but it shows very explicitly the special >>>>> determinant, (the acceptance of the theory) which it is intended to >>>>> determine. By virtue of thus specially showing its intended interpretant >>>>> (out of thousands of possible interpretants of it) it is an argument. An >>>>> index may be, in one sense, an argument; but not in the sense here meant, >>>>> that of an argumentation. It determines such interpretant as it may, >>>>> without manifesting a special intention of determining a >>>>> particular interpretant. It is a perfection of a symbol, if it does this; >>>>> but it is not essential to a symbol that it should do so. Erase the >>>>> conclusion of an argumentation and it becomes a proposition (usually, a >>>>> copulative proposition). Erase such a part of a proposition that if a >>>>> proper name were inserted in the blank, or if several proper >>>>> names were inserted in the several blanks, and it becomes a rhema, or >>>>> term. Thus, the following are rhematic: >>>>> Guiteau assassinated ______ >>>>> ______ assassinated ______ >>>>> Logicians generally would consider it quite wrong for me to call these >>>>> terms; but I shall venture to do so. >>>>> >>>>> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf >>>>> Of Sungchul Ji >>>>> Sent: 18-Dec-15 16:22 >>>>> >>>>> Gary F, Jeff, List, >>>>> >>>>> Please excuse my ignorance. >>>>> What is NDTR ? >>>>> >>>>> Thanks in advance. >>>>> >>>>> Sung >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>>>> >>>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>>>> Rutgers University >>>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>>>> 732-445-4701 >>>>> >>>>> www.conformon.net >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> ----------------------------- >>>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>>> BODY of the message. More at >>>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> >>>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>>>> >>>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>>>> Rutgers University >>>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>>>> 732-445-4701 >>>>> >>>>> www.conformon.net >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>>> >>>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>>> Rutgers University >>>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>>> 732-445-4701 >>>> >>>> www.conformon.net >>>> ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" >>>> or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should >>>> go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to >>>> PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" >>>> in the BODY of the message. More at >>>> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >>>> >>>> ----------------------------- >>>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>>> . >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >>> >>> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >>> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >>> Rutgers University >>> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >>> 732-445-4701 >>> >>> www.conformon.net >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >>> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY >>> of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> -- >> Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. >> >> Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology >> Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy >> Rutgers University >> Piscataway, N.J. 08855 >> 732-445-4701 >> >> www.conformon.net > > > > -- > Sungchul Ji, Ph.D. > > Associate Professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Department of Pharmacology and Toxicology > Ernest Mario School of Pharmacy > Rutgers University > Piscataway, N.J. 08855 > 732-445-4701 > > www.conformon.net
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