Jon, rather than repeat what you've said umpteen times before in this "very 
old" discussion, I'd suggest that you read BOTH passages that I quoted (you 
ignored the second one) in their original context. It might call into question 
your assertion about what Peirce's existential graphs "serve to represent." You 
might even see that they do NOT represent the triadic relation of 
sign-object-interpretant, which is NOT analogous to a predicate with three 
subjects; rather the transformations of the graphs represent the triadic action 
of an argument, i.e. of inference. They are “moving pictures of thought,” not 
static diagrams of relations. You might also take a fresh look at the 
“Prolegomena to an Apology for Pragmaticism” as an explanation of what these 
graphs actually represent, and why Peirce considered them much superior to his 
logical algebras for that purpose.

 

Gary f. 

 

-----Original Message-----
From: Jon Awbrey [mailto:[email protected]] 
Sent: 6-Apr-16 09:21
To: [email protected]; 'Peirce List' <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: Systems Of Interpretation

 

Gary, List,

 

That is a very familiar passage and the discussion that always follows is a 
very old discussion among all the usual cherry-pickers.

 

The short shrift is something like this.  It is obvious from the context that 
Peirce is using the word “calculus”

in some specialized 19th century sense most likely common among professional 
computers.  That is all well and good.

We should remember that it once had that special sense.

 

On the other hand, I am using the word “calculus” in the sense that is commonly 
used today, for instance, as it occurs in the studies of the “differential and 
integral calculus” or the “propositional calculus”, and none of these studies 
have anything to do with skipping over steps of analysis, indeed, quite the 
opposite.

 

Of course, people are free to keep using words in peculiar senses, just so long 
as they understand that they will be misunderstood.

When people insist on doing that, the usual remedy is finding other words for 
the intended senses.  In this case, one may substitute words like “formal 
language” or “formal system”

for “calculus”.  It just costs a few more syllables and most people will 
gradually weary of that, eventually reverting to the common idioms.

 

Regards,

 

Jon

 

On 4/6/2016 8:30 AM,  <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] wrote:

> Jon wrote,

> 

> [[ Peirce's existential graphs are a general calculus for expressing 

> the same subject matter as his earlier logic of relative terms and 

> thus they serve to represent the structures of many-place relations. 

> ]]

> 

> 

> 

> Peirce wrote,

> 

> [[[ this system is not intended as a calculus, or apparatus by which 

> conclusions can be reached and problems solved with greater facility 

> than by more familiar systems of expression. Although some writers 

> have studied the logical algebras invented by me with that end 

> apparently in view, in my own opinion their structure, as well as that 

> of the present system, is quite antagonistic to much utility of that 

> sort. The principal desideratum in a calculus is that it should be 

> able to pass with security at one bound over a series of difficult 

> inferential steps. What these abbreviated inferences may best be, will 

> depend upon the special nature of the subject under discussion. But in 

> my algebras and graphs, far from anything of that sort being 

> attempted, the whole effort has been to dissect the operations of 

> inference into as many distinct steps as possible.  —CP 4.424 (c.1903) 

> ]]]

> 

> 

> 

> [[[ The sheet of the graphs in all its states collectively, together 

> with the laws of its transformations, corresponds to and represents 

> the Mind in its relation to its thoughts, considered as signs. … The 

> scribed graphs are determinations of the sheet, just as thoughts are 

> determinations of the mind; and the mind itself is a comprehensive 

> thought just as the sheet considered in all its actual 

> transformation-states and transformations, taken collectively, is a 

> graph-instance and taken in all its permissible transformations is a 

> graph. Thus the system of existential graphs is a rough and 

> generalized diagram of the Mind, and it gives a better idea of what 

> the mind is, from the point of view of logic, than could be conveyed 

> by any abstract account of it. —CP 5.482, 1906 ]]]

> 

> 

> 

> Gary f.

> 

> 

> 

> -----Original Message----- From: Jon Awbrey [ <mailto:[email protected]> 
> mailto:[email protected]] 

> Sent: 5-Apr-16 18:00 To:  <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]; 
> 'Peirce List' 

> < <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected]> Subject: 
> [PEIRCE-L] Re: Systems Of 

> Interpretation

> 

> 

> 

> On 4/5/2016 9:11 AM,  < <mailto:[email protected]> 
> mailto:[email protected]>  <mailto:[email protected]> [email protected] 
> wrote:

> 

>> 

> 

>> By the way, since Jon’s diagram is nothing like an Existential Graph,  

>> > I don't know why Jon refers to the central unit in it as a “spot.”

> 

>> Peirce uses that term only in the context of Existential Graphs,  > 

>> which are also not diagrams of the sign-object-interpretant  > relation.

> 

>> 

> 

> 

> 

> Gary, List,

> 

> 

> 

> Peirce's existential graphs are a general calculus for expressing the 

> same subject matter as his earlier logic of relative terms and thus they 
> serve to represent the structures of many-place relations.

> 

> Cast at that level of generality, there is nothing to prevent them 

> from being used to express the special cases of relative terms that we 

> need in a theory of triadic sign relations, for example, terms like “s 

> stands to i for o” or “__ stands to __ for __” depending on the form 

> one prefers.  People sometimes get wigged out about the fact that we have to 
> use sign relations in order to mention sign relations, but the fact is that 
> we do that all the time whether we are using Peirce's semiotics or not.  
> Peirce just makes the process a whole lot clearer than most others do.

> 

> 

> 

> Regards,

> 

> 

> 

> Jon

> 

> 

> 

> 

 

 

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