Hi Jeff,
If you’re after a common sense perspective, then you’d have to look at Greek philosophy since for Socrates, his "turn to the study of human things was based...upon a new approach to the understanding of all things...a “return to ‘sobriety’ and ‘moderation’ from the ‘madness’ of his predecessors…he did not separate wisdom from moderation...one can describe the change in question as a return to ‘common sense’ or to ‘the world of common sense.’ That to which the question ‘What is?’ points is the eidos of a thing, the shape or form or character or ‘idea’ of a thing…” ~Leo Strauss. So, what does this have to do with Peirce? Well, there’s a common thread in that both emphasize the breadth and depth: “no Sign is absolutely precise…” and “indefiniteness is of two kinds, indefiniteness as to what is the Object of the sign, and indefiniteness as to its Interpretant, or indefiniteness in Breadth and Depth” (4.543). and “The problem inherent in the surface of things, and only in the surface of things, is the heart of things...The heart of things being the precise and the surface being the comprehensive.” ~Strauss So, setting bounds is related to the problem of vagueness or a logic of completeness. So, if we ask “what is determination” to Peirce, I would say he offers abduction as a method to clearness, where you would then simply invoke CP 5.189. The bounds are set by completing the argumentation where C = what is determination/breadth and A = determination is/depth… We identify the breadth of C and depth of A and mediate between the two. The goodness of mediation and ultimate end can simply be seen as an outside observer with the aid of the structure of abduction, which has a logical form. But there is a logic of esthetics, ethics and logic (icon, index, symbol). So, if determination is an act at the end of logical inference, then there are at least three different places where we can determine things; at the level of logic of icon, logic of index as well as logic of symbols. So, determination can mean different things but is an act that we perform in context of inference, which is a mediation. Again, anyone can willy-nilly determine anything and pick out little bits and pieces but this is intended to satisfy genuine doubt and the community of inquirers, so it should be systematic. There is an emphasis on wholeness and completeness in both Greek and Peircean philosophy which must be respected. Besides, why not this? Best, Jerry R On Sun, Apr 24, 2016 at 6:49 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard < [email protected]> wrote: > List, > > The first question I'd like to address is: what is Peirce's general > account of the concept of "determines"? In searching for a general account, > I'm not looking for a conception that is developed solely for use in some > specific area of inquiry--such as the study of dynamics in physics, or the > study of formal logical systems in mathematical logic. Rather, I'm trying > to follow Peirce's lead in MS 612. There, he starts with an explanation of > how we use the concept of "determine" in ordinary experience when > explaining what it is for a person to make a decision and form an intention > about how they will act. Then, he says that his aim is to broaden this > concept so that it will have a considerably wider use. > > That, I believe, is Peirce's methodological strategy for working with a > number of conceptions in philosophy. Where there is a special need > for technical terminology, he looks to see how other philosophers have been > using a conception (i.e., the conceptions of breadth, depth, connotation > and denotation). If there is nothing in the prior works in philosophy that > adequately captures the conception he is trying to develop, then he > introduces a technical term (i.e., a qualisign). In some cases, there is > no need for such technical terminology--such as when we are developing an > account of self-control and need to employ concepts such as "decision" and > "intention." As Peirce sets up his normative theories of aesthetics, > ethics and semiotics, he is working from a conception of "determines" that > is drawn--first and foremost--from common experience. He adopts the same > approach when refining and using other key conceptions, such as > the concept "cause." Here is what Peirce says about his use of that > concept: > > Everybody will make slips in the use of words that have been on his lips > from before the time when he learned to think; but the practice which I > endeavor to follow in regard to the word *cause *is to use it in > the Aristotelian sense of an *efficient cause,* in all its crudeness. In > short, I refuse to use it at all as a philosophical word. When my conception > is of a dynamical character, I endeavour to employ the accepted terminology > of dynamics; and when my idea is a more general and logical one, I prefer > to speak of the *explanation. *(CP 6.600) > > In saying that he intends to use the "Aristotelian sense of an *efficient > cause,* in all its crudeness," I believe he is saying that Aristotle's > conception of efficient cause was drawn from ordinary experience and common > sense. So, with that short explanation of the strategy I believe Peirce > is employing in working out a general account of the conception of > "determines", let's compare what he says says in the early pages of MS > 612 to the definitions he provides for the Century Dictionary. Starting > with the general idea of what it is for a person to form a determination, > he engages in a dialogue about what having such a determination seems to > involve. As such, he is working from a use of determines that matches the > 8th definition of the transitive meaning of "determines," or the 1st > definition of the intransitive meaning. > > > > Determine > > > I. Transitive > > > 1. To fix the bounds of, mark off, settle, fix, establish > > 2. To limit in space or extent; for the limits of; bound; shut in: as > yonder hill determines our view. > > 3. To ascertain or state definitely; make out; find out; settle; decide > upon as after consideration or investigation: as to determine the species > of any animal or a plant; to determine the height of a mountain, or the > quantity of nitrogen in the atmosphere. > > 4. In logic, to explain or limit by adding differences. > > --5. To bring to a conclusion; put to an end; end > > --6. To find, as the solution of a problem; end, as a dispute, by judicial > or other final decision: as, the court *determined* the cause. > > 7. To fix or settle definitely; make specific or certain; decide the state > or character of. > > 8. To come to a definite intention in respect of; resolve on; decide: as > he determined to remain. > > 9. To give direction or tendency to; decide the course of; as impulse may > *determine* a moving body to this or that point. > > 10. To influence the choice of; cause to come to a conclusion or > resolution: as, this circumstance determined him to the study of law. > > > II. Intransitive > > > 1. To come to a decision or resolution; settle definitely on > some line of conduct. > 2. To come to a close; end terminate. > 3. To come to a determinate end in time, reach a fixed or > definite limit; cease to exist or to be in force. > > Determined: > > > 1. Limited, restricted; confined within bounds; circumscribed > 2. Definite; determinate; precisely marked. > 3. Characterized by or showing determination or fixed purpose; > resolute: as a determined many; a determined countenance: a determined > effort > 4. Unfaltering; unflinching, unwavering > > Determining: > > > 1. Having the power of fixing; directing, regulating, or controlling: as > determining influences or conditions. > > Jon Awbrey refers us to work he has done on the function of > logical constraints in Peirce's account of information as extension x > comprehension. Jon's nicely developed remarks are helpful in a number of > ways. Given my goal of trying to arrive at a clearer understanding of > Peirce's general account of "determines," however, I plan to hold off on > questions about the concepts of "definition", "information" and the like in > the science of logic. Rather, I'd like to focus on the more > general question of how we should work from a nominal definition, to a > logical definition, to a real definition of "determines" that will meet our > needs in the normative sciences generally. The aim, as I've suggested > before, is to see how we might use the pragmatic maxim to help us arrive at > a third grade of clarity about the meaning of the conception of > "determines". That will help us understand how the conception might be > used to formulate explanatory hypotheses in philosophy--such as the > hypotheses that Peirce offers of what it is for an object to *determine* a > sign, or for a sign to *determine* an interpretant, etc. > > Yours, > > Jeff > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > > > ------------------------------ > *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard > *Sent:* Wednesday, April 20, 2016 10:31 AM > *To:* Peirce List > *Subject:* Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination > > Gary F., Ben, Jon, List, > > Jon has supplied us with a number of passages that characterize what it is > for a sign to determine an interpretant—and he draws our attention to two > definitions that are published in the NEM. Let’s note that both of those > definitions are incomplete. The key idea that is omitted is made clear if > we compare those definitions to the following passage: > > First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its > widest limits, as *anything which, being determined by an object, > determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same > object*), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, > either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the > sign an *Icon*; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence > connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an *Index*; > thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted > as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as > including a natural disposition), when I call the sign a *Symbol*. (CP, > 4.531) > > So, there are three relations of determination that we need to examine: > > a) A sign is anything that is determined by an object so that > b) an interpretant is determined by the sign and so that > c) the interpretant comes to have a determination through the sign by the > same object. > > Based on what Peirce says in this passage, it appears that order of > determination in the relations between sign, object and interpretant are as > follows: the object determines sign, the sign determines interpretant, the > same object that determines the sign also determines the interpretant > through the mediation of the sign. > > With that much said, let’s try to frame a set of questions that we’d like > to answer. Here are four questions that stand out in my mind. > > 1. What is Peirce’s general account of determination? > 2. How does the general account apply to the relations between > possibilities, existing individuals and general rules so that: > > a. possibilities only determine other possibilities; > b. general rules are only determined by other general rules, but general > rules can determine both possibilities and the characters of existing > individuals, although general rules cannot determine individual objects to > exist; > c. individual existing objects determine the possibilities of the > characters that they possess, and the order of the characters of existing > objects may be determined by general rules, although only existing > individuals can determine other individual objects to exist? > > 3. How does the general account of determination apply to the different > sorts relations that hold between signs, objects and interpretants in the > process of semiosis? For instance, how do the different sorts of > relations of determination a help us to clarify and explain the relations > of: > > a. similarity so that the icon partakes of the characters of the objects; > b. connection between the token index and individually existing object; > c. the habit that determines with more or less certainty that the symbol > will be interpreted as denoting the object? > > 4. How might the general account of determination help us clarify what he > says about the relations of reference that are central in his account of > the categories, that is, the relations of: > > a. reference to ground, > b. reference to object, > c. and reference to interpretant? > > > Let me know if I’ve omitted questions that we should consider or if any of > the questions are poorly framed. For starters, let’s focus our attention > on the first question: What is Peirce’s general account of determination? Once > we’ve made some progress on that front, we can turn to the other questions, > one at a time. > > Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; we can > first recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses it > into comparison with an object which possesses it not. (CP 5.294) Having > examined a number of places where Peirce describes different sorts of > determination, one of the clearest sets of definitions and explanations are > found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In particular, MS 612 contains > a detailed analysis of the meaning of “determination,” “determined to > accord,” and “determined after.” Here are links to the manuscript pages and > (as yet unedited) transcriptions of the relevant passages in FromThePage: > > http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=9&work_id=149 > http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149 > > What Peirce is doing in these passages. As far as I can tell, he starts > with a nominal definition of how we use the word in a relatively narrow > context. Then, he provides a formal definition that is designed to be > adequate to the more general meaning of the conception. That is, the > procedure is to work from the first to the second level of clarity. As > such, more work is needed to arrive at a definition of the conception of > determination that will be adequate for the scientific employment of the > conception in philosophical explanations—such as in a speculative grammar. > That is, we still need to apply the pragmatic maxim in order to arrive at a > third grade of clarity in our understanding of the conception of > determination. My hunch is that the definitions of "determined to accord" > and "determined after" are needed for such an application of the pragmatic > maxim. > > Yours, > > Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> > Sent: Friday, April 8, 2016 11:00 AM > To: Peirce List > Subject: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on Definition and Determination > > Peircers, > > I was trying to spare a few gray cells by looking up > the discussions we had on this subject the last time > it came up but it looks like that occurred during the > last half of 2012 when the List was migrating between > different servers and a lot of the Gmane archives from > that time are missing. > > It was my custom until recently (when the Arisbe Dev and > Inquiry List servers went down for maintenance or forever, > not sure which) to cross-post my Peirce List messages there, > so a lot of older material survives in the WayBak archives of > those two lists. I subbed the archive links in the post below. > > At any rate, it appears I first posted that collection of > excerpts to the Peirce List back in May and August of 2001. > Internal evidence, like the quote from Prigogine, tells me > that the assemblage goes back to 1997 or so, in the period > when I had gone back to grad school in systems engineering > and was cudgeling my brains to think about Peirce's theories > of signs, information, and inquiry in systems-theoretic terms. > > Good times ... > > Jon > > On 5/28/2012 10:46 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: > > Note 1 > > > > Peircers, > > > > It looks like we might be due for one of our recurring reviews > > on the closely related subjects of definition and determination, > > with especial reference to what Peirce himself recurrently wrote > > about them. > > > > Here is a set of excerpts that I collected in regard to determination, > > mostly from Peirce, but with a few thoughts from other thinkers, both > > before and after him, due to the larger questions of determinacy that > > I was pursuing at the time. > > > > Arisbe List Archive (serial thread) > > > http://web.archive.org/web/20030619214031/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-May/thread.html#489 > > > http://web.archive.org/web/20030619212516/http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2001-August/thread.html#942 > > > > MyWikiBiz Page (all in one section) > > • http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Determination > > > > One naturally looks to the Baldwin and Century dictionaries for > > Peirce-connected definitions of definition, but I would like to > > start with a series of texts that I think are closer to Peirce's > > own thoughts on definition, where he is not so duty-bound to give > > a compendious account of every significant thinker's point of view. > > > > It may be a while before I get these all copied out: > > > > • http://www.mywikibiz.com/Directory:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS#Definition > > > > Regards, > > > > Jon > > > > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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