Jeff,
Personally I doubt that it’s logically possible for a logical possibility to determine another possibility. A possibility can get actualized, a quality can be embodied, and I do think these are species of determination; but what gets determined (becomes more determinate) in these cases has to be some kind of matter (as opposed to form, for instance in CP 4.553). I don’t see a mere possibility as being material enough to get determined. A mind or quasi-mind, on the other hand, clearly is material enough in this sense to get determined by a sign. I think there is a sense in which a possibility can transitively determine something; Peirce seems to say this in one of the Lowell lectures of 1903 (CP 1.536-7): [[[ We have here a first, a second, and a third. The first is a positive qualitative possibility, in itself nothing more. The second is an existent thing without any mode of being less than existence, but determined by that first. A third has a mode of being which consists in the Secondnesses that it determines, the mode of being of a law, or concept. Do not confound this with the ideal being of a quality in itself. A quality is something capable of being completely embodied. A law never can be embodied in its character as a law except by determining a habit. A quality is how something may or might have been. A law is how an endless future must continue to be. 537. Now in genuine Thirdness, the first, the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and third. The first is thought in its capacity as mere possibility; that is, mere mind capable of thinking, or a mere vague idea. The second is thought playing the role of a Secondness, or event. That is, it is of the general nature of experience or information. The third is thought in its role as governing Secondness. It brings the information into the mind, or determines the idea and gives it body. It is informing thought, or cognition. But take away the psychological or accidental human element, and in this genuine Thirdness we see the operation of a sign. ]]] If determination is necessarily triadic action, as I think it is, the “positive qualitative possibility” by which “an existent thing” is “determined” in Peirce’s hypothetical example in 536 is “of the nature of a third, or thought” (537), even though it is first in respect to the other two correlates in the triadic relation. And that, I think, is the only way that a possibility can determine anything. But the subject or matter that gets determined in Peirce’s example is “an existent thing without any mode of being less than existence” — not itself a mere possibility. This pattern is consistent with Peirce’s assertion that “there are ideas in nature which determine the existence of objects,” as he put it in 1902 (CP 1.231; for the context of that, see my blog post at http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2016/05/genesis/ ). However I’m not sure that it’s consistent with your remark “that Peirce's analysis of determination applies to modes of existence that might vary, continuously, from some determinate value (say a value of 1), to a lower value of zero.” But that’s all I can say for today! Gary f. } The meaning of a word is its use in the language. [Wittgenstein] { <http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 2-May-16 19:18 To: 'Peirce List' <[email protected]> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination Gary F, Jon A,List, Let's take a closer look at Peirce's logical definition of "determines" in MS 612. Here is what he says: In doing so I must use, in a more general sense, a word which I have just now used in a special sense, and must carefully explain this more general sense, inasmuch as it is one of the most important terms in every branch of science: it is the word Determination. Before a man has Determined what his conduct shall be, it may on one occasion be of one sort and on another of another sort. It may at one time, for example, be just, so far as he can discern what justice would dictate, while another time it may be such that the man shall say to himself, What I am going to do will not be just; but I don't care for that: it will be a satisfaction to me to do it, and I will do it." But if that man ever becomes determined to do what is just so far as he can make out what would be the just course, so long as that Determination lasts he will never wittingly do what is unjust. We may state the matter thus: Let there be two Characters, or suchnesses (in this case, the being such as justice permits and the being such as justice forbids,) which are Incompossible, i.e., are such that they can both be possessed only by something whose being consists in a mere possibility and cannot actually be carried out without some restriction, while that which actually occurs singly, as well as that which is General, i.e., which allows some latitude in its actualization can at most possess but one of these characters. The two characters to be instanced are further to be together Exhaustive, i.e. only that which whose being consists in something General can fail to possess one or the other of them, and that which is either Actual or merely Possible must possess one. In short the two Characters are to be in the relation of Contradictories, each of the other; i.e., they are to be at once Incompossible and Exhaustive. That being the case, any General Subject, a Subject being anything concerning which an assertion may be made or proposed, if it possesses neither of these characters is said to be Indeterminate in respect to them, while it it possesses one but not both, it is said to be Determined in that respect. If a mere Possibility possesses both characters, it is said to be Indefinite in respect to them. (MS 612, Nov 11, pp. 29-30). See: http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10 <http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149> &work_id=149 Let's try to parse the key sentences where he provides a logical analysis of the general conception of "determines". Here is a list of the points he makes. We may state the matter thus: 1. Let there be two Characters, or suchnesses (in this case, the being such as justice permits and the being such as justice forbids,) which are Incompossible, i.e., are such that they can both be possessed only by something whose being consists in a mere possibility and cannot actually be carried out without some restriction, while that which actually occurs singly, as well as that which is General, i.e., which allows some latitude in its actualization can at most possess but one of these characters. 2. The two characters to be instanced are further to be together Exhaustive, i.e., only that which whose being consists in something General can fail to possess one or the other of them, and that which is either Actual or merely Possible must possess one. 3. In short the two Characters are to be in the relation of Contradictories, each of the other, i.e., they are to be at once Incompossible and Exhaustive. 4. That being the case, (a) if it possesses neither of these characters it is said to be Indeterminate in respect to them, (b) while if it possesses one but not both, it is said to be Determined in that respect. (c) If a mere Possibility possesses both characters, it is said to be Indefinite in respect to them. So, for the sake of more clearly separating the three clauses in (4) let's distinguish between three cases: First, a general subject X is indeterminate if there are two characters that are incompossible and X does not have one or the other. Second, a general subject X' is determinate in some respect if there are two characters that are incompossible, and X' has one character and not the other. Third, a general possibility Y is indefinite if it possesses both characters. As such, something is determine just if it goes from being indeterminate (X) in some respect to a more determinate (X'). Furthermore, on this analysis, general subjects are determined in a manner that mere possibilities are not. Indefinite possibilities be possess two incompossible characters. As such, we're going to need a different analysis of "determines" for cases in which one possibility determines another possibility than is provided here for general subjects. Or, so it would seem. This analysis of "determines" fits nicely with the account of the fundamental law of logic that Peirce provides in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." Here is an outline of what he says there: The general law of logic has likewise its three clauses. i. The monadic clause is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with respect to each predicate. ii. The dyadic clause is that there are two and but two possible determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by the double prescription; 1. first that the possibilities are two at least, and 2. second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the other. 3. A third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one. (CP 1.485) The dyadic clause seems of particular relevance for gaining a clearer understanding of what is involved in the relation of one thing "determining" another. As such, I recommend that we take a closer look at the dyadic clause in its relation to the analysis of "determines" that he provides in MS 612. The third limiting form of determination appears to be of particular importance for the sake of understanding how a singular or a general subject might determine some possibility. What is more, I suspect it will shed some light on how one possibility can determine another possibility. At the very least, it is hard to ignore the fact that Peirce's analysis of determination applies to modes of existence that might vary, continuously, from some determinate value (say a value of 1), to a lower value of zero. It is not obvious to me how this account of determination is supposed to work in the case of the characters of possibilities. As such, I appreciate any assistance others might be able to provide in sorting this out. Yours, Jeff
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