> On May 6, 2016, at 8:16 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > There’s no question that scarlet is a determination of red and red a > determination of color. That’s just another way of saying that scarlet is a > specific shade of red and red is a specific class of color. But I don’t see > how this is a case of one abstraction determining another. Even if we call > scarlet, red and color “abstractions” (which I would not do), it would make > no sense to say that scarlet determines red, or that red determines either > scarlet or color. > > Whenever determination occurs (as a process), something gets determined to be > more determinate than it was, and something else does the determining.
An other way of putting this is we have to distinguish a logical analysis from other types of analysis. With regards to the question of “determination” my sense is that those asking aren’t asking in terms of logical entailment. Rather they’re asking more in terms of Peirce’s semiotic realism as a kind of foundational ontological process. Am I right in that? While I’ve not followed the discussion carefully it seems that the questions as raised are somewhat ambiguous. The question of how an object determines an interpretant seems just wrapped up in where Peirce discusses signs ontologically.
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