Gary F, Jon A,List,
Let's take a closer look at Peirce's logical definition of "determines" in MS 612. Here is what he says: In doing so I must use, in a more general sense, a word which I have just now used in a special sense, and must carefully explain this more general sense, inasmuch as it is one of the most important terms in every branch of science: it is the word Determination. Before a man has Determined what his conduct shall be, it may on one occasion be of one sort and on another of another sort. It may at one time, for example, be just, so far as he can discern what justice would dictate, while another time it may be such that the man shall say to himself, What I am going to do will not be just; but I don't care for that: it will be a satisfaction to me to do it, and I will do it." But if that man ever becomes determined to do what is just so far as he can make out what would be the just course, so long as that Determination lasts he will never wittingly do what is unjust. We may state the matter thus: Let there be two Characters, or suchnesses (in this case, the being such as justice permits and the being such as justice forbids,) which are Incompossible, i.e., are such that they can both be possessed only by something whose being consists in a mere possibility and cannot actually be carried out without some restriction, while that which actually occurs singly, as well as that which is General, i.e., which allows some latitude in its actualization can at most possess but one of these characters. The two characters to be instanced are further to be together Exhaustive, i.e. only that which whose being consists in something General can fail to possess one or the other of them, and that which is either Actual or merely Possible must possess one. In short the two Characters are to be in the relation of Contradictories, each of the other; i.e., they are to be at once Incompossible and Exhaustive. That being the case, any General Subject, a Subject being anything concerning which an assertion may be made or proposed, if it possesses neither of these characters is said to be Indeterminate in respect to them, while it it possesses one but not both, it is said to be Determined in that respect. If a mere Possibility possesses both characters, it is said to be Indefinite in respect to them. (MS 612, Nov 11, pp. 29-30). See: http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149 Let's try to parse the key sentences where he provides a logical analysis of the general conception of "determines". Here is a list of the points he makes. We may state the matter thus: 1. Let there be two Characters, or suchnesses (in this case, the being such as justice permits and the being such as justice forbids,) which are Incompossible, i.e., are such that they can both be possessed only by something whose being consists in a mere possibility and cannot actually be carried out without some restriction, while that which actually occurs singly, as well as that which is General, i.e., which allows some latitude in its actualization can at most possess but one of these characters. 2. The two characters to be instanced are further to be together Exhaustive, i.e., only that which whose being consists in something General can fail to possess one or the other of them, and that which is either Actual or merely Possible must possess one. 3. In short the two Characters are to be in the relation of Contradictories, each of the other, i.e., they are to be at once Incompossible and Exhaustive. 4. That being the case, (a) if it possesses neither of these characters it is said to be Indeterminate in respect to them, (b) while if it possesses one but not both, it is said to be Determined in that respect. (c) If a mere Possibility possesses both characters, it is said to be Indefinite in respect to them. So, for the sake of more clearly separating the three clauses in (4) let's distinguish between three cases: First, a general subject X is indeterminate if there are two characters that are incompossible and X does not have one or the other. Second, a general subject X' is determinate in some respect if there are two characters that are incompossible, and X' has one character and not the other. Third, a general possibility Y is indefinite if it possesses both characters. As such, something is determine just if it goes from being indeterminate (X) in some respect to a more determinate (X'). Furthermore, on this analysis, general subjects are determined in a manner that mere possibilities are not. Indefinite possibilities be possess two incompossible characters. As such, we're going to need a different analysis of "determines" for cases in which one possibility determines another possibility than is provided here for general subjects. Or, so it would seem. This analysis of "determines" fits nicely with the account of the fundamental law of logic that Peirce provides in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." Here is an outline of what he says there: The general law of logic has likewise its three clauses. i. The monadic clause is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with respect to each predicate. ii. The dyadic clause is that there are two and but two possible determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by the double prescription; 1. first that the possibilities are two at least, and 2. second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the other. 3. A third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one. (CP 1.485) The dyadic clause seems of particular relevance for gaining a clearer understanding of what is involved in the relation of one thing "determining" another. As such, I recommend that we take a closer look at the dyadic clause in its relation to the analysis of "determines" that he provides in MS 612. The third limiting form of determination appears to be of particular importance for the sake of understanding how a singular or a general subject might determine some possibility. What is more, I suspect it will shed some light on how one possibility can determine another possibility. At the very least, it is hard to ignore the fact that Peirce's analysis of determination applies to modes of existence that might vary, continuously, from some determinate value (say a value of 1), to a lower value of zero. It is not obvious to me how this account of determination is supposed to work in the case of the characters of possibilities. As such, I appreciate any assistance others might be able to provide in sorting this out. Yours, Jeff 1. W MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) | FromThePage MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) - read work. MS 611-15 Read more...<http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149> Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: [email protected] <[email protected]> Sent: Monday, May 2, 2016 7:04 AM To: 'Peirce List' Subject: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination Jeff D., List, I’ve been too sick to think straight for the past week, so pardon my belated response to your post, Jeff. My replies are inserted below. — gary f. From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]] Sent: 24-Apr-16 19:49 List, The first question I'd like to address is: what is Peirce's general account of the concept of "determines"? In searching for a general account, I'm not looking for a conception that is developed solely for use in some specific area of inquiry--such as the study of dynamics in physics, or the study of formal logical systems in mathematical logic. Rather, I'm trying to follow Peirce's lead in MS 612. There, he starts with an explanation of how we use the concept of "determine" in ordinary experience when explaining what it is for a person to make a decision and form an intention about how they will act. Then, he says that his aim is to broaden this concept so that it will have a considerably wider use. Gf: I’ve been perusing those pages in MS 612 and hope others are doing the same; “From the Page” is shaping up to be a great resource for students of Peirce, and I hope others will get involved in the transcription project. (The links you gave previously are included below, near the bottom of this post). Of course, we are not going to find “Peirce's general account of the concept of "determines"” in the form of an explicit text, either in his manuscripts or anywhere else, nor will we be able to produce a definitive one, because it’s something that each reader has to work out inductively from many experiences and experiments with of Peirce’s actual usage of the concept. But I think you’ve pointed the way to how that process should work. Naturally we start with the dictionary definitions (which you quoted below from the Century) and whatever other explicit definitions we can find in Peirce, but the real work is to develop a robust and refined sense of how the concept functions implicitly to play its exact role in determining the logical interpretants of the propositions and arguments within which it actually functions. That, I believe, is Peirce's methodological strategy for working with a number of conceptions in philosophy. Where there is a special need for technical terminology, he looks to see how other philosophers have been using a conception (i.e., the conceptions of breadth, depth, connotation and denotation). If there is nothing in the prior works in philosophy that adequately captures the conception he is trying to develop, then he introduces a technical term (i.e., a qualisign). Gf: I think you mean e.g. rather than i.e. — i.e. you are giving “qualisign” as an example of a technical term. “Determine” is of course not a technical term in that sense, as Peirce’s usage does not depart from the standard usage of the word in the sciences, or even from more common usage, although as usual with him he tries to use it as exactly as possible. He also tries to give an analysis (i.e. a definition) of “determination” but finds it extremely difficult (as witness EP2:362, for instance). So when I did my own investigation of what Peirce means by “determines” (especially in his definitions of “sign”), I ended up collecting many instances of Peirce’s usage of the concept in various contexts that throw some light (for me) on how it functions implicitly. In some cases, there is no need for such technical terminology--such as when we are developing an account of self-control and need to employ concepts such as "decision" and "intention." As Peirce sets up his normative theories of aesthetics, ethics and semiotics, he is working from a conception of "determines" that is drawn--first and foremost--from common experience. He adopts the same approach when refining and using other key conceptions, such as the concept "cause." Here is what Peirce says about his use of that concept: Everybody will make slips in the use of words that have been on his lips from before the time when he learned to think; but the practice which I endeavor to follow in regard to the word cause is to use it in the Aristotelian sense of an efficient cause, in all its crudeness. In short, I refuse to use it at all as a philosophical word. When my conception is of a dynamical character, I endeavour to employ the accepted terminology of dynamics; and when my idea is a more general and logical one, I prefer to speak of the explanation. (CP 6.600) Gf: I’m not sure of the date of CP 6.600, but I assume it must be earlier than 1898, where Peirce departed from the intention stated above by giving a whole lecture on causation (RLT). Anyway your point about Peirce’s method of “refining” such conceptions is well taken. In saying that he intends to use the "Aristotelian sense of an efficient cause, in all its crudeness," I believe he is saying that Aristotle's conception of efficient cause was drawn from ordinary experience and common sense. So, with that short explanation of the strategy I believe Peirce is employing in working out a general account of the conception of "determines", let's compare what he says says in the early pages of MS 612 to the definitions he provides for the Century Dictionary. Starting with the general idea of what it is for a person to form a determination, he engages in a dialogue about what having such a determination seems to involve. As such, he is working from a use of determines that matches the 8th definition of the transitive meaning of "determines," or the 1st definition of the intransitive meaning. Gf: Yes, it’s the transitive usage that predominates in semiotic. I’m also intrigued by the usage “in logic” that Peirce specified in the CD, “to explain or limit by adding differences.” I wonder what would happen if I asked readers to give a specific example or two of “adding differences” as a way of explaining or limiting something. Determine I. Transitive 1. To fix the bounds of, mark off, settle, fix, establish 2. To limit in space or extent; for the limits of; bound; shut in: as yonder hill determines our view. 3. To ascertain or state definitely; make out; find out; settle; decide upon as after consideration or investigation: as to determine the species of any animal or a plant; to determine the height of a mountain, or the quantity of nitrogen in the atmosphere. 4. In logic, to explain or limit by adding differences. --5. To bring to a conclusion; put to an end; end --6. To find, as the solution of a problem; end, as a dispute, by judicial or other final decision: as, the court determined the cause. 7. To fix or settle definitely; make specific or certain; decide the state or character of. 8. To come to a definite intention in respect of; resolve on; decide: as he determined to remain. 9. To give direction or tendency to; decide the course of; as impulse may determine a moving body to this or that point. 10. To influence the choice of; cause to come to a conclusion or resolution: as, this circumstance determined him to the study of law. II. Intransitive 1. To come to a decision or resolution; settle definitely on some line of conduct. 2. To come to a close; end terminate. 3. To come to a determinate end in time, reach a fixed or definite limit; cease to exist or to be in force. Determined: 1. Limited, restricted; confined within bounds; circumscribed 2. Definite; determinate; precisely marked. 3. Characterized by or showing determination or fixed purpose; resolute: as a determined many; a determined countenance: a determined effort 4. Unfaltering; unflinching, unwavering Determining: 1. Having the power of fixing; directing, regulating, or controlling: as determining influences or conditions. Jon Awbrey refers us to work he has done on the function of logical constraints in Peirce's account of information as extension x comprehension. Jon's nicely developed remarks are helpful in a number of ways. Given my goal of trying to arrive at a clearer understanding of Peirce's general account of "determines," however, I plan to hold off on questions about the concepts of "definition", "information" and the like in the science of logic. Rather, I'd like to focus on the more general question of how we should work from a nominal definition, to a logical definition, to a real definition of "determines" that will meet our needs in the normative sciences generally. The aim, as I've suggested before, is to see how we might use the pragmatic maxim to help us arrive at a third grade of clarity about the meaning of the conception of "determines". That will help us understand how the conception might be used to formulate explanatory hypotheses in philosophy--such as the hypotheses that Peirce offers of what it is for an object to determine a sign, or for a sign to determine an interpretant, etc. Gf: As I tried to explain above, a real definition (in the sense you mean) cannot be given as a verbal formulation; it can only be developed as a functional component of the individual reader’s semiotic habit-system. I’d be happy to share some more of the Peirce texts that interest me for the light they throw on the concept of determination, but of course I can’t guarantee that they will be interesting to others. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354 ________________________________ From: Jeffrey Brian Downard Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2016 10:31 AM To: Peirce List Subject: Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination Gary F., Ben, Jon, List, Jon has supplied us with a number of passages that characterize what it is for a sign to determine an interpretant—and he draws our attention to two definitions that are published in the NEM. Let’s note that both of those definitions are incomplete. The key idea that is omitted is made clear if we compare those definitions to the following passage: First, an analysis of the essence of a sign, (stretching that word to its widest limits, as anything which, being determined by an object, determines an interpretation to determination, through it, by the same object), leads to a proof that every sign is determined by its object, either first, by partaking in the characters of the object, when I call the sign an Icon; secondly, by being really and in its individual existence connected with the individual object, when I call the sign an Index; thirdly, by more or less approximate certainty that it will be interpreted as denoting the object, in consequence of a habit (which term I use as including a natural disposition), when I call the sign a Symbol. (CP, 4.531) So, there are three relations of determination that we need to examine: a) A sign is anything that is determined by an object so that b) an interpretant is determined by the sign and so that c) the interpretant comes to have a determination through the sign by the same object. Based on what Peirce says in this passage, it appears that order of determination in the relations between sign, object and interpretant are as follows: the object determines sign, the sign determines interpretant, the same object that determines the sign also determines the interpretant through the mediation of the sign. With that much said, let’s try to frame a set of questions that we’d like to answer. Here are four questions that stand out in my mind. 1. What is Peirce’s general account of determination? 2. How does the general account apply to the relations between possibilities, existing individuals and general rules so that: a. possibilities only determine other possibilities; b. general rules are only determined by other general rules, but general rules can determine both possibilities and the characters of existing individuals, although general rules cannot determine individual objects to exist; c. individual existing objects determine the possibilities of the characters that they possess, and the order of the characters of existing objects may be determined by general rules, although only existing individuals can determine other individual objects to exist? 3. How does the general account of determination apply to the different sorts relations that hold between signs, objects and interpretants in the process of semiosis? For instance, how do the different sorts of relations of determination a help us to clarify and explain the relations of: a. similarity so that the icon partakes of the characters of the objects; b. connection between the token index and individually existing object; c. the habit that determines with more or less certainty that the symbol will be interpreted as denoting the object? 4. How might the general account of determination help us clarify what he says about the relations of reference that are central in his account of the categories, that is, the relations of: a. reference to ground, b. reference to object, c. and reference to interpretant? Let me know if I’ve omitted questions that we should consider or if any of the questions are poorly framed. For starters, let’s focus our attention on the first question: What is Peirce’s general account of determination? Once we’ve made some progress on that front, we can turn to the other questions, one at a time. Peirce makes the following claim: All determination is by negation; we can first recognize any character only by putting an object which possesses it into comparison with an object which possesses it not. (CP 5.294) Having examined a number of places where Peirce describes different sorts of determination, one of the clearest sets of definitions and explanations are found in an unpublished set of manuscript. In particular, MS 612 contains a detailed analysis of the meaning of “determination,” “determined to accord,” and “determined after.” Here are links to the manuscript pages and (as yet unedited) transcriptions of the relevant passages in FromThePage: http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=9&work_id=149 MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) | FromThePage MS 611-15 (C. S. Peirce Manuscripts) - read work. MS 611-15 Read more...<http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=9&work_id=149> http://fromthepage.com/display/read_work?page=10&work_id=149 What Peirce is doing in these passages. As far as I can tell, he starts with a nominal definition of how we use the word in a relatively narrow context. Then, he provides a formal definition that is designed to be adequate to the more general meaning of the conception. That is, the procedure is to work from the first to the second level of clarity. As such, more work is needed to arrive at a definition of the conception of determination that will be adequate for the scientific employment of the conception in philosophical explanations—such as in a speculative grammar. That is, we still need to apply the pragmatic maxim in order to arrive at a third grade of clarity in our understanding of the conception of determination. My hunch is that the definitions of "determined to accord" and "determined after" are needed for such an application of the pragmatic maxim. Yours, Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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