Jeff,
I'm not following you here:
[[ He says that scarlet is a determination of red, just as red is a
determination of color. As such, I propose that we take this as a limiting
kind of case of how one abstraction--as expressing a range of possibility
hues--might determine another. ]]
There's no question that scarlet is a determination of red and red a
determination of color. That's just another way of saying that scarlet is a
specific shade of red and red is a specific class of color. But I don't see
how this is a case of one abstraction determining another. Even if we call
scarlet, red and color "abstractions" (which I would not do), it would make
no sense to say that scarlet determines red, or that red determines either
scarlet or color.
Whenever determination occurs (as a process), something gets determined to
be more determinate than it was, and something else does the determining.
For instance, given the vague knowledge that mercuric iodide is red, one
might carry out a procedure to produce a pure sample of it, observe its
color, and thereby determine that it is in fact scarlet. More ambitiously,
one might try to investigate what subatomic factors determine that mercuric
iodide will reflect that particular color. In either case scarlet is a
determination of red, but I don't see one abstraction determining another
here. How can an abstraction act as a determiner, in the way that a sign can
act upon a quasi-mind to determine it to an interpretant, or a fact can
determine another fact?
Gary f.
} Each person wears a different uniform. [gnox] {
<http://gnusystems.ca/wp/> http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs
gateway
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 5-May-16 21:08
To: 'Peirce List' <[email protected]>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Peirce on the Definition of Determination
Hi Gary F, List,
First, you offered to share a list of passages in which Peirce uses or
describes the concept of determines. I'd like to see that list.
Second, it isn't obvious to me how we should go about clarifying the claims
Peirce makes about possibility and determination. For now, my aim is to see
what might done by way of filling in a more complete answer the first
question I raised: what is Peirce's general account of the conception of
"determines"? Having said that, I am trying to keep in mind the second
question: what is it for possibilities, actualities and laws to determine
one another?
For my part, I think it is clear that Peirce is applying the concept of
determination to the relationship between relate and correlate in a dyadic
relation, just as he is applying it to the relationship between the three
correlates in a triadic relation. In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt
to develop my categories from within" he considers the relationship between
scarlet and red as a limiting and degenerate case of a essential dyadic
relation, just as he considers the relationship between scarlet, red and
color as a limiting case of a degenerate essential triadic relation.
He says that scarlet is a determination of red, just as red is a
determination of color. As such, I propose that we take this as a limiting
kind of case of how one abstraction--as expressing a range of possibility
hues--might determine another. As far as I can see, it matters little
whether the relations of determination are, in this limiting case, essential
dyads or essential triads. The determination in each case is, at root, the
same. The relation of determination in this simple case is that of one
range of possible hues being contained within another, larger, range of
hues.
With this idea in hand, I'd like to turn to some points he makes about
different kinds of possibilities--including two ways of thinking about
logical possibility Given the complications involved in that logical
distinction, I'll wait to raise those points until I see if there are any
questions or concerns about the remarks I've made about one one color (as an
abstract possibility of a monadic sort) being determined by another.
One might say, as a retort, that there is no determination until the colors
are embodied in actual things, but that seems to run contrary to what he
explicitly says about the determination of correlated in an essential dyad
or triad.
--Jeff
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
