“*Whether this be a correct account of the matter or not…that all conceptions must be given substantially in perception, three objections will be started. Namely, in the first place, it may be said that even if this be the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction ought to conform*…”
~ CP 5.189, EP 2, p.231 Jon, my point here is to show that to determine the goodness of what a good definition of abduction should consist in, we need to determine the class membership of what C (Peirce's theory of abduction, semiotic) should entail at the outset. You do this in your response; that you are after the “bare essentials of Peirce’s semiotics”. But all you’re after is already considered and contained in CP 5.189, in one, two, three..C, A, B. Importantly, perceptual judgment is part of abduction, it ought to be, regardless of whether you accuse it of being pithy or not. If you dismiss this part, you dismiss a major aspect of Peirce’s pragmaticism because ethics depends on esthetics and logic on ethics; "spiritedness privileged over appetite as the ally of reason” (paraphrased from Moss and others, c.f., *Republic*). As for its “pith”, why do you think I promote examining phi spiral abduction where the icon, index and symbol is stated explicitly? It is precisely in anticipation of criticisms of “pith”. It is an example that contains responses and imaginations to questions at its limit for *all who investigate* before they even start but I’m supposed to defend why it’s beyond your comprehension, too. Why it isn't a matter of genuine doubt to you because I can't make you see why this perception is relevant. So, you walk away and it’s my fault. So goes the world… Best, Jerry R On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 8:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Inquiry Blog: > • > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/ > > Peirce List: > •• http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18569 > JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18634 > JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18635 > JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18636 > > Jerry, List, > > For now I'm just focused on the bare essentials of Peirce's semiotics, > specifically, the minimally adequate definition of a sign relation as > it figures into Peirce's definition of logic along with the necessary > concepts of triple correspondence and triadic determination on which > all the rest depends. > > To Wit: > > http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/ > > It would take a while to get from there to his full theory of inquiry, > involving the interplay of abductive, deductive, and inductive styles > of inference, but first things first, as they say. > > Just as a side note, though, I'm sure every writer who ever attempted > to introduce a complex subject to a new audience has tried the tactic > of seeking out the simplest possible capsule summary of its main gist. > The pithy epitome of abduction you cite below is a perfect example of > just such a capsule and I have seen vast literatures in several areas > spring from its pith and moment only to have their currents turn awry > from its oversimpletonations. Let's not get addicted to this capsule! > > A better idea of the rich interplay among the three styles of reasoning > and how they work in tandem to reinforce one another in genuine inquiry > may be had from the study I carried out back when I was working to view > Peirce's theories of inference, information, and inquiry from a systems > analysis perspective on a systems engineering platform. > > Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy > > http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy > > Regards, > > Jon > > > On 4/12/2016 4:48 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: > >> Hi Jon and list, >> How about a test of our understanding? >> If there is one statement that can determine what is meant by Peirce’s >> theory of abduction, then is the following an over or under-determination? >> Is it exact and complete? >> Is it perfect? >> Why or why not? >> The surprising fact, C, is observed. >> But if A were true, then C would be a matter of course. >> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189) >> Best, >> Jerry R >> >> On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 1:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Inquiry Blog: >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/ >>> >>> Peirce List: >>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18569 >>> JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18598 >>> >>> Jeff, List, >>> >>> Let me go back to this point in the discussion and emphasize >>> a few points that appear to have gotten lost in what followed. >>> >>> I thought my first paragraph made it clear that I would be >>> focusing on “the meaning of determination as it figures in >>> Peirce's definition of a sign relation”. If I get a chance >>> to revise that second paragraph I'll add a word to reinforce >>> that focus, say, as follows: >>> >>> Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce >>>> List, I think the most important and frequently missed point >>>> is that concepts like correspondence and determination in >>>> Peirce['s semiotics] refer to triadic forms of correspondence >>>> and determination, and that these do not reduce to the dyadic >>>> structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms. >>>> >>> >>> Okay, I hope that much is clear now. >>> >>> By “Peirce's definition of a sign relation” I really mean the >>> select number of his best definitions, not mere descriptions, >>> the definitions that are strong enough to bear the load of >>> a consequential and consistent theory of sign relations. >>> >>> The best candidates I can think of in that regard >>> are the 2 variants from NEM 4, quoted on this page: >>> >>> >>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/ >>> >>> I'll have to break here as I've got plumbers coming to fix some pipes ... >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> >>> On 4/4/2016 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >>> >>> Peircers, >>>> >>>> The subject of determination comes up from time to time. >>>> Here is a link to an assortment of excerpts I collected >>>> back when I was first trying to understand the meaning >>>> of determination as it figures in Peirce's definition >>>> of a sign relation. >>>> >>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS >>>> >>>> Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List, >>>> I think the most important and frequently missed point is that >>>> concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer >>>> to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that >>>> these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic >>>> to the more reductionist paradigms. >>>> >>>> In this more general perspective, the family of concepts including >>>> correspondence, determination, law, relation, structure, and so on >>>> all fall under the notion of constraint. Constraint is present in >>>> a system to the extent that one set of choices is distinguished by >>>> some mark from a larger set of choices. That mark may distinguish >>>> the actual from the possible, the desired from the conceivable, or >>>> any number of other possibilities depending on the subject in view. >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> >>> >> > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >
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