Jon, list:
I should have been more moderate in my response. Given: The surprising fact, C, is observed. But if A were true, C would be a matter of course. Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. where, C = icon, Peirce’s theory of abduction, semiotic or pragmatism, where pragmatism is “nothing else than the logic of abduction”, and A = index, “2 variants from NEM 4” *or* CP 5.189. then, My inference to the best explanation is CP 5.189 over NEM4 *because* perceptual judgment, which is valued by spiritedness. But this is what is at stake; whether we have the right to say whether perceptual judgment ought to be valued in abduction in the first place. This is decided as a matter of social principles because esthetics. Best, Jerry Rhee On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 1:17 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected]> wrote: > “*Whether this be a correct account of the matter or not…that all > conceptions must be given substantially in perception, three objections > will be started. Namely, in the first place, it may be said that even if > this be the normative form of abduction, the form to which abduction ought > to conform*…” > > ~ CP 5.189, EP 2, p.231 > > > > Jon, > > my point here is to show that to determine the goodness of what a good > definition of abduction should consist in, we need to determine the class > membership of what C (Peirce's theory of abduction, semiotic) should entail > at the outset. You do this in your response; that you are after the > “bare essentials of Peirce’s semiotics”. But all you’re after is already > considered and contained in CP 5.189, in one, two, three..C, A, B. > > > > Importantly, perceptual judgment is part of abduction, it ought to be, > regardless of whether you accuse it of being pithy or not. If you > dismiss this part, you dismiss a major aspect of Peirce’s pragmaticism > because ethics depends on esthetics and logic on ethics; "spiritedness > privileged over appetite as the ally of reason” (paraphrased from Moss and > others, c.f., *Republic*). > > > > As for its “pith”, why do you think I promote examining phi spiral > abduction where the icon, index and symbol is stated explicitly? > > > It is precisely in anticipation of criticisms of “pith”. It is an > example that contains responses and imaginations to questions at its limit > for *all who investigate* before they even start but I’m supposed to > defend why it’s beyond your comprehension, too. Why it isn't a matter of > genuine doubt to you because I can't make you see why this perception is > relevant. So, you walk away and it’s my fault. So goes the world… > > > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Wed, Apr 13, 2016 at 8:40 AM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Inquiry Blog: >> • >> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/ >> >> Peirce List: >> •• http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18569 >> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18634 >> JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18635 >> JR:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18636 >> >> Jerry, List, >> >> For now I'm just focused on the bare essentials of Peirce's semiotics, >> specifically, the minimally adequate definition of a sign relation as >> it figures into Peirce's definition of logic along with the necessary >> concepts of triple correspondence and triadic determination on which >> all the rest depends. >> >> To Wit: >> >> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/ >> >> It would take a while to get from there to his full theory of inquiry, >> involving the interplay of abductive, deductive, and inductive styles >> of inference, but first things first, as they say. >> >> Just as a side note, though, I'm sure every writer who ever attempted >> to introduce a complex subject to a new audience has tried the tactic >> of seeking out the simplest possible capsule summary of its main gist. >> The pithy epitome of abduction you cite below is a perfect example of >> just such a capsule and I have seen vast literatures in several areas >> spring from its pith and moment only to have their currents turn awry >> from its oversimpletonations. Let's not get addicted to this capsule! >> >> A better idea of the rich interplay among the three styles of reasoning >> and how they work in tandem to reinforce one another in genuine inquiry >> may be had from the study I carried out back when I was working to view >> Peirce's theories of inference, information, and inquiry from a systems >> analysis perspective on a systems engineering platform. >> >> Functional Logic : Inquiry and Analogy >> >> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Functional_Logic_:_Inquiry_and_Analogy >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon >> >> >> On 4/12/2016 4:48 PM, Jerry Rhee wrote: >> >>> Hi Jon and list, >>> How about a test of our understanding? >>> If there is one statement that can determine what is meant by Peirce’s >>> theory of abduction, then is the following an over or >>> under-determination? >>> Is it exact and complete? >>> Is it perfect? >>> Why or why not? >>> The surprising fact, C, is observed. >>> But if A were true, then C would be a matter of course. >>> Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true. (CP 5.189) >>> Best, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Tue, Apr 12, 2016 at 1:36 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Inquiry Blog: >>>> >>>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2016/04/04/definition-and-determination-11/ >>>> >>>> Peirce List: >>>> JA:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18569 >>>> JBD:http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/18598 >>>> >>>> Jeff, List, >>>> >>>> Let me go back to this point in the discussion and emphasize >>>> a few points that appear to have gotten lost in what followed. >>>> >>>> I thought my first paragraph made it clear that I would be >>>> focusing on “the meaning of determination as it figures in >>>> Peirce's definition of a sign relation”. If I get a chance >>>> to revise that second paragraph I'll add a word to reinforce >>>> that focus, say, as follows: >>>> >>>> Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce >>>>> List, I think the most important and frequently missed point >>>>> is that concepts like correspondence and determination in >>>>> Peirce['s semiotics] refer to triadic forms of correspondence >>>>> and determination, and that these do not reduce to the dyadic >>>>> structures that are endemic to the more reductionist paradigms. >>>>> >>>> >>>> Okay, I hope that much is clear now. >>>> >>>> By “Peirce's definition of a sign relation” I really mean the >>>> select number of his best definitions, not mere descriptions, >>>> the definitions that are strong enough to bear the load of >>>> a consequential and consistent theory of sign relations. >>>> >>>> The best candidates I can think of in that regard >>>> are the 2 variants from NEM 4, quoted on this page: >>>> >>>> >>>> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2012/06/01/c-s-peirce-%E2%80%A2-on-the-definition-of-logic/ >>>> >>>> I'll have to break here as I've got plumbers coming to fix some pipes >>>> ... >>>> >>>> Regards, >>>> >>>> Jon >>>> >>>> >>>> On 4/4/2016 9:40 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote: >>>> >>>> Peircers, >>>>> >>>>> The subject of determination comes up from time to time. >>>>> Here is a link to an assortment of excerpts I collected >>>>> back when I was first trying to understand the meaning >>>>> of determination as it figures in Peirce's definition >>>>> of a sign relation. >>>>> >>>>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/User:Jon_Awbrey/EXCERPTS >>>>> >>>>> Looking back over many previous discussions on the Peirce List, >>>>> I think the most important and frequently missed point is that >>>>> concepts like correspondence and determination in Peirce refer >>>>> to triadic forms of correspondence and determination, and that >>>>> these do not reduce to the dyadic structures that are endemic >>>>> to the more reductionist paradigms. >>>>> >>>>> In this more general perspective, the family of concepts including >>>>> correspondence, determination, law, relation, structure, and so on >>>>> all fall under the notion of constraint. Constraint is present in >>>>> a system to the extent that one set of choices is distinguished by >>>>> some mark from a larger set of choices. That mark may distinguish >>>>> the actual from the possible, the desired from the conceivable, or >>>>> any number of other possibilities depending on the subject in view. >>>>> >>>>> Regards, >>>>> >>>>> Jon >>>>> >>>>> >>>> >>> >> -- >> >> academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey >> my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ >> inquiry list: http://stderr.org/pipermail/inquiry/ >> isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA >> oeiswiki: http://www.oeis.org/wiki/User:Jon_Awbrey >> facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache >> > >
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