List, Kirsti: > On Jun 16, 2016, at 9:12 AM, [email protected] wrote: > > It is not that I found Kelly Parker's book disappointing as such. I found it > mislabelled.
Yes, the title of the book is misleading as often happens for various reasons. But, the essence of my post does not relate to that aspect of the book. I wrote: "In particular, Parker’s separation of the logic of the semeiotic into: The logic of icons The logic of indices The logic of symbols. My questions are: How do Parker's separation of the forms of CSP logics relate to FS's views of Natural Propositions? Can one find an illation between Parker’s reading of CSP and FS’s reading of CSP’s propositional functions?” End quote. What I seek to understand is THE NATURE OF THE PROPOSITIONAL FUNCTIONS. How do the nature of the propositional functions for the “logic of icons”, the "logic of indices", and the "logic of symbols” DIFFER? What is the distinction between these three terms such that each embraces a separate logic? In other words, what is the premise that generates the conclusion that the semiosis of ‘icon, index, symbol’ must necessarily be three clear and distinct logics? I do not discern the "difference that makes a difference” between them. I do not discern how this semiotic structure relates to FS / “Natural Propositions”. It seems to me that this is a very critical question for a vast range of philosophical “narratives” that often appear here. Further, it seems to me that this premise, whatever it is, could also contribute to expressing one of the philosophical keystones that organize CSP thinking. Given the many imaginative posters who contribute to this list, can anyone propose such a premise? Cheers Jerry
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