Gary R: Your post appears to me to propose serious contrary assertions to CSP’s views as well as your own.
It appears to me that your post rejects your basic thesis of vector analysis. It also appears to me that you insist and persist on the rejection of the consistency of the semiotic relationships between sign and the ancient notion of “antecedent- consequence” which is one of the essential grounding of CSP's logic, and indeed, a radix of all of logic. What can you propose to be consistent with your long historical record of posts on firstness, secondness and thirdness where the order of the symbols is supposed to determine the validity of the argument? Are you asserting that the spectulative grammar of icon, index, and symbol infer order of antecedent-consequence? At the moment, and I could be totally wrong on this, it appears to me that you have completely abandoned the basic thesis of CSP's of sign - object - interpretant that is necessary for the concept of antecedent-consequence. Please help me understand your reasoning, preferably, in terms of diagrammatic reasoning, in relation to propositional diagrams, which lie at the core of CSP’s later thinking. Finally, why do you assert that that this is a “quintessential” question of logic? In my view, it is rather remote from CSP’s assertion that the classic essence of logic is a semiotic system of thought. What is your thinking on how your view interlace with the propositional functions of Russell and Whitehead? Cheers Jerry > On Jun 18, 2016, at 8:39 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > > Jeff, Jerry R, list, > > Jeff I am substantially in agreement with your analysis, while I do have a > few questions. > > Jerry R wrote: > > “Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes > concerning its first principles, although it is probably about to do so. > Nearly a hundred definitions of it have been given. > > It will, however, generally be conceded that its central problem is the > classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into > one division, and those which are good into another, these divisions being > defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the arguments > are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by > recognizable marks into those which have different orders of validity, and > has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments.” > > > How can a 66-fold classification ever promote a coming to agreement on “an > adequate account of the laws that govern synthetic forms of inference”? when > we argue over terms such as “logic” and “determination” without a perfect > foundation? > > > > Peirce makes the normative sciences the second (and, so, central) science of > the three cenoscopic (philosophical) sciences, viz. phenomenology, normative > science, and metaphysics. > > In this very same sense of second and central, he will argue (as he does in > the quotation you offered just above), that logic as semiodtic has for "its > central problem. . . the classification of arguments. This branch of logic > (what he sometimes terms 'critical logic" or "logic as logic") is, naturally, > a very dualistic science in the sense of its determining "whether the > arguments are good or bad." But, as Peirce makes clear, as important as it > is, its focus is really quite narrow. > > Obsistent logic, logic in the narrow sense, or Critical Logic CSP (first > emphasis added by GR) > > But while critical logic forms the central (center) piece of logic as > semiotic, it is preceded, as Jeff noted, by a science, theoretical grammar, > and is followed by the last of the semiotic sciences (and so the culmination > of semiotic) by a third branch, namely, methodeutic, or, theoretical rhetoric > (it is here that many Peirce scholars place Peirce's theory of inquiry which > includes as its centerpiece, the pragmatic maxim, and by extension, the whole > of pragmaticism). > > So, returning to that first branch of logic as semiotic, viz. philosophical > grammar. folk like Jeff Downard, Vinicius Romanini, myself and, in fact, > quite a few other scholars, find inquiry into fhis first, quasi-foundational > science of theoretical grammar of considerable import--as clearly did Peirce, > as he made extensive researches into it and, as a result, made extraordinary > contributions to it. As Jeff Downard wrote: > > JD: In any area of inquiry . . . it will be quite difficult to provide any > sort of adequate account of the laws governing the phenomena in the absence > of a sufficiently developed natural classification of the different kinds of > things that constitute the objects of inquiry. (emphasis added; by the way, > this would seem to define 'grammar' in any and all disciplines). > > Note, for just one simple, but perhaps quintessential example, the division > of signs into icons, indices, and symbols. One might ask, how could semiotics > have expected to make any significant progress without this grammatical > trichotomy (say, were it to follow a Saussurean == dyadic theory?0 But more > to the point, as Jeff wrote: > > JD: Prior to Peirce's groundbreaking work in logic, we really didn't have an > adequate account of the laws that govern synthetic forms of inference--or of > the inter-relationships between synthetic inference patterns and the > different forms of deductive inference. > > So, a definition: > > Originalian logic, or Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general > conditions of symbols and other signs having the significant character. CSP > > Here 'significant' means, of course, 'signifying'. This Speculative (or > theoretical) Grammar is, in Peirce's view, a quintessential science. Of > course besides the icon/index/symbol triad (the sign in its relation to the > object, both immediate and dynamic), there are many, many other trichotomies > in semiotic grammar, including the very sign relation: object -> > representamen -> interpretant. And there is (ongoing) work being done in > consideration of the relation of the sign to the interpretant > (rheme/dicent/argument), and Frederik Stjernfelt's work in this area, which > prompted Gary Furhman and me to initiate an almost year and a quarter slow > read of his book, Natural Propositions, suggests just how valuable this facet > of semiotic may prove to be. > > Meanwhile, in my opinion, work has hardly begun in consideration of the > trichotomy involving the sign as sign, that is, the sign in relation to > itself (qualisign/sinsign/legisign). I'm not saying that important work has > not been done here, but in my opinion, the focus of all too many semioticians > and pragmatists (and thieves of Peirce) has been on the icon/index/symbol > trichotomy, neglecting, most especially, the last mentioned trichotomy > (qualisign, etc.) Many of the discussions in many a literature on > icon/index/symbol seem to me to misinterpret Peirce's vast semiotic project, > reducing it to what is, albeit an important part of it, yet but a part of it. > This (as well as the 'vulgar pragmatisms' we've seen in our time and earlier) > tend to obscure Peirce's fuller and deeper contribution to semiotics. > > So, yes, semiotic grammar includes such divisions as just mentioned, as well > as the classification of signs into 10 and 66 classes. Now, not everyone is > intensely interested in this branch of semiotic, but to argue against its > important is, to my mind, wrong-directed. It may be that theoretical rhetoric > and critical logic (the first two branches of semiotic) are, finally but > preparations for the third and final logical science, theoretical > methodology, or philosophical rhetoric, but they are essential ones, imo. > > Turning to that third branch of semiotic, Jeff again provided a Peircean > defintion: > > Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is substantially what > goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. It is the > doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other > Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine. . . ." (CP, 2.93) > > This "aim to determine" is precisely why the term Speculative Rhetoric is > appropriately suggestive in describing this branch of science since, as a > cenoscopic philosopher (and, in Peirce's understanding, virtually everyone on > this list is), one wants finally to persuade others to the truth of any > matter we inquire into, a question which has been examined both by individual > philosophers as well as by the scientific community using the optimal > methodology liable to lead to that 'truth', namely, pragmaticism. > > Jeff's (and Vinicius's) inquiries into the 66 signs may present themselves as > a kind of "minute logic"--and as such not of much interest to some > Peirceans--but it is important, even essential, research in my opinion. I > should at once admit that I am not personally passionately moved by inquiry > into the 66 sign types, but I have followed reseacjinto this matter closely > and am not only convinced of its value, but have learned much in reflecting > on it. Finally, I suppose it should go without saying, as a pragmatic > principle one shouldn't act to block the road of inquiry. > > As for Peirce's (somewhat passing) distinction between logics of the icon, > index, and symbol, I think Jeff nails it in this comment. > > JD. . . Kelly Parker's remarks about the "logic of icons," "logic of > indices" and "logic of symbols" is better (because it is more complete) > thought of as three levels of sign relations, where the iconic sort of > relation that holds between sign and object is assured--in its relationships > to the normal interpretant--by a matter of instinct, whereas the indexical > sort of relation is assured by a matter of experience, and whereas the symbol > sort of relation is assured by a matter of form. > > And so one begins to grasp the logic behind Peirce's tripartite division of > logic in consideration of the sign's relaiton to its object. And yes, Jeff, > that does help. I will have to give further consideration to your conclusion > before I comment muxh on it as I'm not certain exactly what you mean in > saying that the "tricky part" comes when we "consider all the relations > (e.g., of determnation, or of representation) that hold between the three > levels. Your intended meaning here is a bit obscure for me. Jeff continued > and concluded: > > JD: This, I think, gets a the heart of Peirce's aim in providing a more > general theory of what is really necessary for different sorts of signs to > function in valid inference patterns. His aim is to see what kind of logic > might hold when we move from the relatively straightforward and clear case of > the level of necessities (3 above) to the levels of actualities and > possibilities. The tricky part comes in when we need to consider all the > relations (e.g., of determination, or of representation) that hold between > the three levels. > > Again, this was a most helpful post, Jeff, and I hope it will further a > fruitfull discussion on this, in my opinion, quintessential logical matter. > > Best, > > Gary R > > > > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 8:02 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jeff, list; > > > Thanks for that probably very correct detailing of Peirce’s ideas. You > mistake my intention in saying that I don’t find a lifelong effort to develop > a classification of signs to be not a remarkably fruitful area of inquiry. > > > The reason for my quoting Kristi is to bring attention to what you just did. > Even though it may be very correct, it doesn’t even matter for the problem of > liberal education, which can be said to be liberation from vulgarity. People > won’t even bother to read it* and there are other inquiries from which we can > develop better our own skills at calculation; for example, by actually doing > science or writing and engaging in the process of solving real world problems. > > * This fact naturally brought along an entire situation sufficient to > discourage me from troubling a printer to set up what no man would read. What > little I could print had to be brief and fragmentary. I must select subjects > concerning which what I had to say would be intelligible without previous > studies.|62| > > http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm > <http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/library/bycsp/L75/ver1/l75v1-01.htm> > ___________ > > Here’s another problem: > > You said, > > “His aim is to see what kind of logic might hold when we move from the > relatively straightforward and clear case of the level of necessities (3 > above) to the levels of actualities and possibilities.” > > > Here is Peirce’s entry in Baldwin’s dictionary under the term, “logic”. > > http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Baldwin/Dictionary/defs/L4defs.htm > <http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Baldwin/Dictionary/defs/L4defs.htm> > > “Logic is a science which has not yet completed the stage of disputes > concerning its first principles, although it is probably about to do so. > Nearly a hundred definitions of it have been given. > > It will, however, generally be conceded that its central problem is the > classification of arguments, so that all those that are bad are thrown into > one division, and those which are good into another, these divisions being > defined by marks recognizable even if it be not known whether the arguments > are good or bad. Furthermore, logic has to divide good arguments by > recognizable marks into those which have different orders of validity, and > has to afford means for measuring the strength of arguments.” > > > How can a 66-fold classification ever promote a coming to agreement on “an > adequate account of the laws that govern synthetic forms of inference”? when > we argue over terms such as “logic” and “determination” without a perfect > foundation? > > > Best, > Jerry Rhee > > > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 5:41 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Hello, > > > Unlike Jerry R. and Kristi, I find Peirce's lifelong efforts to develop a > classification of signs to be a remarkably fruitful area of inquiry. In any > area of inquiry (e.g., chemistry, biology, psychology) it will be quite > difficult to provide any sort of adequate account of the laws governing the > phenomena in the absence of a sufficiently developed natural classification > of the different kinds of things that constitute the objects of inquiry. What > is true for each of the special sciences is especially true when it comes to > the normative science of logic as semiotic. Prior to Peirce's groundbreaking > work in logic, we really didn't have an adequate account of the laws that > govern synthetic forms of inference--or of the inter-relationships between > synthetic inference patterns and the different forms of deductive inference. > > > > The division between the main areas of study in the theory of semiotics is, > on Peirce's account, based on the following: > > > > Logic is the science of the general necessary laws of Signs and especially > > of Symbols. As such, it has three departments. Obsistent logic, logic in the > narrow sense, or Critical Logic, is the theory of the general conditions of > the reference of Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, > it is the theory of the conditions of truth. Originalian logic, or > Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general conditions of symbols and > other signs having the significant character. It is this department of > general logic with which we are, at this moment, occupying ourselves. > Transuasional logic, which I term Speculative Rhetoric, is substantially what > goes by the name of methodology, or better, of methodeutic. It is the > doctrine of the general conditions of the reference of Symbols and other > Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to determine. . . ." (CP, 2.93) > > So, for the sake of clarity, let's note that each of the three main areas of > semiotics is focused on a different set of questions: > > > > 1. Speculative Grammar, is the doctrine of the general conditions of symbols > and other signs having the significant character. > > 2. Critical Logic is the theory of the general conditions of the reference of > Symbols and other Signs to their professed Objects, that is, it is the theory > of the conditions of truth. > > 3. Speculative Rhetoric is the doctrine of the general conditions of the > reference of Symbols and other Signs to the Interpretants which they aim to > determine. > > > > For the sake of providing a more adequate account of the laws governing > abductive, inductive and deductive patterns of inference, Peirce thought that > he needed a considerably richer classification of the different kinds of > signs that function as the parts of those different patterns of inference. A > cursory look at the different theories of logic that have dominated the > philosophical discussion in the 20th century strongly confirms, I believe, > the need for a more robust classification of signs based on the nature of the > signs, objects and interpretants that function in different sorts of > inference patterns--and the different sorts of relations that hold between > those signs, objects and interpretants. > > > > Jerry C. has asked a set of questions about the relations that hold between > Peirce's division between icon, index and symbol, and his account of the > proposition. He finds it puzzling that Parker suggests there is a different > sort of logic that holds for the icon, and another that holds for indices and > another that holds for symbols--and he doesn't see how these three sorts of > "logics" might be mapped onto the interpretation of the proposition that > Stjernfelt provides in Natural Propositions. > > > > Let us recall that, on the one hand, the division between icon, index and > symbol is based on the relations between signs and the dynamical objects. On > the other hand, the division between rheme, dicisign and argument is based > on the relations between signs and their normal interpretants. Peirce makes > it clear in a number of places (e.g., Nomenclature and Division of Triadic > Relations) that the tri-fold divisions in the classification of signs is > grounded on the differences between signs, objects and interpretants (or the > things to which they refer) having the character of possibilities, > actualities or necessities. > > > > So, to simplify matters, let's consider the 10-fold classification of signs > that Peirce provides in the essay mentioned above, and let's focus on the > most straightforward cases where the three correlates in the sign relations > are all possibilities, and where they are all actualities, and where they are > all necessities. In these three simplest cases, we have the following > division: > > > > 1. The three correlates are all possibilities: qualisign, icon, rheme > > 2. The three correlates are all actualities: sinsign, index, dicisign > > 3. The three correlates are all necessities: legisign, symbol, argument > > > > One of the really helpful things that Peirce suggests is that we can think of > these three sorts of cases (1, 2, 3) as being three "strata," (i.e., layers > or levels) of relations. (CP 2.94) > > > > This doesn't provide any kind of full answer to the question that Jerry C. > has raised, but I think that a fuller answer can be fleshed out by > considering more of the relations that Peirce works out in the larger 66-fold > classification of signs. If we keep the idea of the three strata as a kind > of guiding figure, then we can consider the different sorts of assurance that > are provided in various sorts of inferences. Some inferences are > self-controlled arguments, and the assurance in the triadic relation is a > matter of form. Other inferences lack such self-control, and the assurance > in the triadic relation is a matter of experience. Yet other inferences are > still less self-controlled, and the assurance in the triadic relation is a > matter of instinct. If we line this division between the types of assurance > up with the 3 strata in the relations between signs, objects and > interpretants, then we'll see that assurance of instinct belongs on the level > of possibility, the assurance of experience belongs on the level of > actuality, and the assurance of form belongs on the level of necessity. > > > > So, the more direct answer to Jerry's C. questions is that Kelly Parker's > remarks about the "logic of icons," "logic of indices" and "logic of symbols" > is better (because it is more complete) thought of as three levels of sign > relations, where the iconic sort of relation that holds between sign and > object is assured--in its relationships to the normal interpretant--by a > matter of instinct, whereas the indexical sort of relation is assured by a > matter of experience, and whereas the symbol sort of relation is assured by a > matter of form. > > > > This, I think, gets a the heart of Peirce's aim in providing a more general > theory of what is really necessary for different sorts of signs to function > in valid inference patterns. His aim is to see what kind of logic might hold > when we move from the relatively straightforward and clear case of the level > of necessities (3 above) to the levels of actualities and possibilities. The > tricky part comes in when we need to consider all the relations (e.g., of > determination, or of representation) that hold between the three levels. > > > > Hope that helps. > > > > --Jeff > > > > > > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 <tel:928%20523-8354> > > From: Jerry Rhee <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> > Sent: Friday, June 17, 2016 1:38 PM > To: Jerry LR Chandler > Cc: Peirce List > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Parker's propositions on the development of CSP's > categories of Logic > > Sounds good Jerry C. > > I will simply leave you with: > > "I have never found divisions of signs (trichotomies) of much use. And I > cannot see how they could work with proposisional functions. So I cannot be > of help in your questions. > Kirsti" > > Best, > Jerry R > > On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 3:36 PM, Jerry LR Chandler > <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > Jerry R: > > Thank you for your thoughts. > > We seem to operate on different wave lengths. > > The purpose of poising a specific question was to seek specific suggestions. > > As I understand your approach, you appear to have a well-honed set of > philosophical generalities which are, for your purposes, applicable > universally. > > So, I suggest we not waste list-reader’s time and close out this thread. > > Cheers > > Jerry > > > >> On Jun 17, 2016, at 3:22 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> >> Jerry C, list: >> >> >> The propositional functions are embedded but you have to recognize the >> beauty to induce the labor. >> >> >> “The little matter of distinguishing one, two, and three --in a word, number >> and calculation: --do not all arts and sciences necessarily partake of them? >> Yes.” ~Republic >> >> >> “This difficulty is to some extent overcome by the fact that one virtue is >> the highest, and that virtue is called knowledge or science… by conceiving >> of knowledge as the calculation of pleasures. We all seek only pleasure, >> that is the assumption. We want a maximum of pleasure without any moral >> conversion, merely by greater shrewdness and calculation, i.e., by greater >> intelligence, by science, a calculus of pleasures. This is the theme of the >> Protagoras.” >> >> ~Leo Strauss on Plato’s Symposium >> >> >> one, two, three…love of honor, love of goodness, love of truth…logic of >> icon, logic of index, logic of symbol… >> >> >> Hth, >> >> Jerry Rhee >> >> >> On Fri, Jun 17, 2016 at 2:29 PM, Jerry LR Chandler >> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >> Jerry R: >> >> >>> On Jun 16, 2016, at 11:47 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> >>> Does this qualify? >>> >>> C = phi spiral and not M51, poet, promise >>> A = FEM model and not Netlogo, scientist, >>> performance >>> B = Structural optimization of corneal stroma, philosopher, truth >>> >> >> Your attempts to decipher the meaning of this critical logic term by >> throwing conjectures at it are a most unusual approach, to say the least. >> >> May I suggest you take a day or two and study the origin and meaning of the >> term “propositional function”? Such a study could add substantially to your >> understanding of your own work. >> >> Cheers >> Jerry C. >> >> >> >>> Best, >>> Jerry R >>> >>> On Thu, Jun 16, 2016 at 11:44 PM, Jerry LR Chandler >>> <[email protected] <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>> Hi Jerry R: >>>> On Jun 16, 2016, at 1:57 PM, Jerry Rhee <[email protected] >>>> <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: >>>> >>>> I've never read FS but if the question is what is it that is being >>>> interpreted by two different interpreters for that which is claimed to be >>>> different but assumed to belong to the same whole, then you ought to >>>> consider the following from Strauss, Bloom and Benardete: >>>> >>> >>> >>> Thank you for considering the query. >>> >>> But, that is not my question. >>> >>> I seek a premise, a propositional function. >>> >>> Cheers >>> >>> Jerry >>> >>> >>> ----------------------------- >>> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >>> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >>> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >>> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >>> <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >>> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >>> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >>> >>> >>> >>> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, >> send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] >> <mailto:[email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm >> <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . >> >> >> >> > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the > line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to > PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] <mailto:[email protected]> with the > line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > <http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm> . > > > > > > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] > . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] > with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at > http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
