Jon,

As Peirce uses the term, I would say that the immediate object has a
*virtual* existence.

Best,

Gary R

[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*C 745*
*718 482-5690*

On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]
> wrote:

> Edwina, Helmut, List:
>
> Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object *exists*?
> As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it
> falls under Firstness (possibility).
>
> Thanks,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]>
> wrote:
>
>> Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality,
>> doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the
>> semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate
>> within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final
>> causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind.
>>
>> Edwina
>>
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]>
>> *To:* [email protected]
>> *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L
>> <[email protected]>
>> *Sent:* Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM
>> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs.
>> CP 6.469
>>
>> Jerry, Jon, list,
>> I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in
>> accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness
>> and deduction thirdness.
>> So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does
>> it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be
>> irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with
>> each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on
>> causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a
>> causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with
>> an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical
>> object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say,
>> that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a
>> causation backwards in time?
>> Best,
>> Helmut
>>
>>
>
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