> On Aug 18, 2016, at 1:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > I am not sure how a computer model/representamen fits here. An analytical > model of a structure does not seem to have the efficiency of the actual > structure. However, looking at a later definition written by Peirce ("Essays > Toward the Interpretation of our Thoughts. My Pragmatism," 1909), it does > have "the characteristic behaviour and properties of" the actual > structure--but only to the extent that it embodies the significant relations > among its parts, and is manipulated in accordance with the rules of a > representational system that simulates the real laws of nature. >
I think he’s following Scotus here. That’s why I included that one quote from Scotus. It’s backwards from our cultural way of speaking of models and representations as we think of them as arising from the interpreter whereas Peirce follows Scotus and thinks of them as arising from the object represented. So the relation of a sphere to a circle is the circle must be virtually in the sphere. Likewise a model of some phenomena or object must be virtually in that original object. More generally a dynamic object contains virtually the immediate object.
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