Clark, List: Thank you for this response--it is very insightful, and will require some serious pondering on my part, especially with respect to my ongoing attempt to apply Peirce's ideas to my profession of engineering. It brings to mind his well-known remark that "we ought to say that we are in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289n1). If a diagrammatic representation is virtually in its object, then the task of the modeler is to *discern* it, which is consistent with my notion of exercising judgment to identify the *significant* relations that need to be embodied.
As for your last comment, I almost wonder if we should talk about the actual/virtual objects, rather than the dynamic/immediate objects, as well as the virtual/actual/habitual interpretants, rather than the immediate/dynamic/final or emotional/energetic/logical interpretants. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 8:51 AM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > > On Aug 18, 2016, at 1:22 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > wrote: > > I am not sure how a computer model/representamen fits here. An > analytical model of a structure does not seem to have the *efficiency* of > the actual structure. However, looking at a later definition written by > Peirce ("Essays Toward the Interpretation of our Thoughts. My Pragmatism," > 1909), it does have "the characteristic behaviour and properties of" the > actual structure--but only to the extent that it embodies the significant > relations among its parts, and is manipulated in accordance with the rules > of a representational system that simulates the real laws of nature. > > I think he’s following Scotus here. That’s why I included that one quote > from Scotus. It’s backwards from our cultural way of speaking of models and > representations as we think of them as arising from the interpreter whereas > Peirce follows Scotus and thinks of them as arising from the object > represented. So the relation of a sphere to a circle is the circle must be > virtually in the sphere. Likewise a model of some phenomena or object must > be virtually in that original object. > > More generally a dynamic object contains virtually the immediate object. >
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