Thanks, Gary. More good points. As I have hinted, immediate vs. dynamic object is clearer to me than immediate vs. dynamic vs. final (or emotional vs. energetic vs. logical) interpretant. My impression is that it was also at least somewhat clearer to Peirce himself. The fact that he used these (and other) different terminologies for the three interpretants, and that there is a longstanding and ongoing debate over whether these two are the same or different trichotomies, does not help matters. Given the association of both virtuality and interpretants with Thirdness, is it worthwhile at least to consider describing interpretants as virtual vs. actual vs. habitual?
GR: ... it really was rather difficult even for Peirce to avoid saying that a matter of 3ns (or for that matter 1ns) 'is' such and such. "Is" does not strike me as problematic, since it is just the verb "to be"; and all reality has Being, even if it does not exist. So it does not bother me to say that "there is Objective Reality" like it does to say that "Objective Reality exists." Regards, Jon On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 7:38 PM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, Clark, > > I would tend to strongly agree with Clark that the immediate/dynamic > division is useful exactly for the reasons he gave, > > But it seems to me that there is something even more important to consider > in this matter of 'virtuality'. Turning now to Esposito's article, while it > is certain that in one place Peirce "contrasts actuality (*actualiter*), > habituality (*habitualiter*), and virtuality (*virtualiter*) (CP 5.504), > and in another refers to "Firstness as "virtual variety" because it is > "full of life and variety." [. . .] So it may be fruitful to suppose that > virtuality is an essential character of the universe," yet Esposito will > argue throughout the article that virtuality is a variety of 3ns, that it > is not 1ns. For example, he writes: > > "Virtual states, for Peirce, are generated at every phase of life, > wherein Thirdness rules. They comprise a linked duality, and so also a > triadicity. " > > "A general theory of virtuality may also be a useful theoretical project. > We should keep in mind the link between virtuality and Thirdness and use > Peirce's remarks about the latter to shed light on the former." > > "Virtuality, then, is a special case of Thirdness, which like all > Thirdness "is operative in Nature." > > So while it may be tempting to make a categorial trichotomy out of "( > *actualiter*), habituality (*habitualiter*), and virtuality (*virtualiter*)" > (and as you may surmise, I am always on the look out for trichotomies > wherever I can find them!), yet at least for now I am tending to agree with > Esposito that virtuality "is a special case of Thirdness." Still, I'll have > to think much more on this topic before I'd consider expressing a more > settled opinion in the matter. Snf thank you, Clark, for reminding me of > Esposito's article which I didn't comprehend fully in my first reading > quite a while back. > > Finally, just to quickly address another question Jon posed in an earlier > post addressed to Edwina and me, he wrote, in response to a passage in one > of Edwina's posts: > > I acknowledge the terminological difficulty, which is due to the fact that > "reality" does not have its own verb form in English. I just cannot help > but think that Peirce would reject saying, as you have, "Objective Reality > exists," since he held that existence is a subset of reality. > > > I haven't the time at the moment to hunt up examples of Peirce speaking of > existing realities, but I know that I've sometimes winced in reading them. > There are, I believe, plenty of them. And that kind of 'existential' > language is hard to avoid for the very reason you gave, Jon, that " > 'reality' does not have its own verb form in English." I find myself doing > this sort of thing all too often, and have had to correct myself on a > number of occasions. > > Adding to this that this distinction in its tricategorial form is > something of an innovation of Peirce's (albeit with ancient roots for at > least two of the categories), one can imagine that, given that grammatical > problematic Jon pointed to, it really was rather difficult even for Peirce > to avoid saying that a matter of 3ns (or for that matter 1ns) 'is' such and > such. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > > On Fri, Aug 19, 2016 at 6:34 PM, CLARK GOBLE <[email protected]> wrote: > >> On Aug 19, 2016, at 8:52 AM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >> wrote: >> >> It brings to mind his well-known remark that "we ought to say that we are >> in thought, and not that thoughts are in us" (CP 5.289n1). >> >> That’s an interesting connection I’d not made before. But I think you’re >> right. >> >> As for your last comment, I almost wonder if we should talk about the >> actual/virtual objects, rather than the dynamic/immediate objects, as well >> as the virtual/actual/habitual interpretants, rather than the >> immediate/dynamic/final or emotional/energetic/logical interpretants. >> >> I think the immediate/dynamic division is helpful since you can divide >> any part of the semiotic process nicely in that fashion. As Gary later >> noted, particularly in Peirce’s mature conception of signs there’s signs >> within signs. >> >
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