Helmut, list: Part of the problem, Helmut, is that you and I are using a completely different meaning of the term 'sign'. I use the term Sign [capital letter] to refer to the whole triadic process of the three Relations of: Object-Representamen; Representamen-in-itself; and Representamen-Interpretant'. To me - this triad is irreducible and is the 'whole semiosic entity' - whether it be a word, an image, a thought, a plant, an atom, a molecule.....
You seem to use the term 'sign' [lower case] as Peirce also often used it, to refer only to the Representamen. I don't think that the Representamen 'exists' per se, by itself. That would be a movement into Platonism. It operates within the triad - in any one of the three modal categories. No, the immediate object, to my understanding, does not function as the common understanding of the sign. It functions as the internal, subjective experience of the external Dynamic Object. A common understanding of the 'sign' [I am assuming that you are referring to the Representamen] - would be...the Representamen, which functions as a generalizing action. Now- if your two individuals hear two different things from the same sentence: My culture is contaminated' - then, there are TWO existent dynamic objects. One is the sentence as spoken by the biologist. The other is the sentence as heard by the listener. And there are two Immediate objects; one = the internal sounds as spoken by the biologist; the other, the internalization of the words as heard by the listener. Then, each of them mediates/transforms these sounds via their Representamen...and ends up with two different Immediate and Dynamic Interpretants! Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Helmut Raulien To: [email protected] Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; [email protected] ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 2:54 PM Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, Jon, list, first, thank you, Edwina, for clearing the determination thing. Before I had never understood, why the object should determine the sign. But that the immediate object does so, I see. Discrete existence, I would say, is being there in the world, like the dynamical object. The immediate object exists in the semiosic process alone, that is, I guess I might say, in a communication it exists as the common understanding of the sign. Is this common understanding the subset of the concepts of eg. a term, both the speaker and the hearer have of a term? "Subset" in case these concepts differ. And if there is a complete misunderstanding (eg. a biologist says: "My culture is contaminated", meaning something that has happened in his Petri-dish, but the hearer thinks that he is talking about the country he was born in), then there is no immediate object, and neither a dynamical, I guess. Is that so? Best, Helmut 18. August 2016 um 20:22 Uhr "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> wrote: Jon , List I understand existence to mean particular, individual, discrete spatiotemporal existentiality; i.e., it has an objective or external reality. I consider that the Immediate Object is internal to the semiosic process, and has no discrete existence. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Helmut Raulien ; [email protected] ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:12 PM Subject: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, Helmut, List: Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object exists? As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it falls under Firstness (possibility). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Helmut Raulien To: [email protected] Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. CP 6.469 Jerry, Jon, list, I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness and deduction thirdness. So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a causation backwards in time? Best, Helmut ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . 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