Jon S, list, Here are some quotes on 'virtual' in Peirce.
"A virtual X (where X is a common noun) is something, not an X, which has the efficiency (virtus) of an X." James Mark Baldwin, Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, Macmillan, New York 1902, vol. 2, p. 763. Reprinted in the CP. "I do not say that we are ignorant of our states of mind. What I say is that the mind is virtual, not in a series of moments, not capable of existing except in a space of time - nothing in so far as it is at any one moment." CP 8.248 (Letter to William T. Harris). "A psychologist cuts out a lobe of my brain (nihil animale a me alienum puto) and then, when I find I cannot express myself, he says, 'You see, your faculty of language was localized in that lobe.' No doubt it was; and so, if he had filched my inkstand, I should not have been able to continue my discussion until I had got another. Yea, the very thoughts would not come to me. So my faculty of discussion is equally localized in my inkstand." CP 7.366 (1905) The above quotations were gleaned from Peter Skagestad's excellent paper, Peirce, Virtuality, and Semiotic available at the Arisbe site http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Cogn/CognSkag.htm I do not know if Peirce explicity refers to the virtual nature of the immediate object, and I should have made it clear that that was my conjecture. Best, Gary R [image: Gary Richmond] *Gary Richmond* *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* *Communication Studies* *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* *C 745* *718 482-5690* On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 12:32 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected] > wrote: > Gary R., List: > > Could you please elaborate on what you (and Peirce) mean by "virtual" in > this context? Citations of appropriate passages are sufficient if I just > need to do some rereading. > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 11:17 AM, Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Jon, >> >> As Peirce uses the term, I would say that the immediate object has a >> *virtual* existence. >> >> Best, >> >> Gary R >> >> [image: Gary Richmond] >> >> *Gary Richmond* >> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* >> *Communication Studies* >> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* >> *C 745* >> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* >> >> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 12:12 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < >> [email protected]> wrote: >> >>> Edwina, Helmut, List: >>> >>> Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object *exists*? >>> As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it >>> falls under Firstness (possibility). >>> >>> Thanks, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>>> Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, >>>> doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the >>>> semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate >>>> within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final >>>> causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind. >>>> >>>> Edwina >>>> >>>> ----- Original Message ----- >>>> *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >>>> *To:* [email protected] >>>> *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L >>>> <[email protected]> >>>> *Sent:* Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM >>>> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 >>>> vs. CP 6.469 >>>> >>>> Jerry, Jon, list, >>>> I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in >>>> accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness >>>> and deduction thirdness. >>>> So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or >>>> does it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be >>>> irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with >>>> each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on >>>> causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a >>>> causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with >>>> an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical >>>> object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, >>>> that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a >>>> causation backwards in time? >>>> Best, >>>> Helmut >>>> >>>>
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