Gary, Edwina, List: But if Esposito is right that Peirce "distinguished the virtual from the actual and both the former from the real," is "virtual reality" any more legitimate a term than "virtual existence"? Do either of these substitutions into Peirce's definition make sense?
"A virtual existent is something, not an existent, which has the efficiency (*virtus*) of an existent.” "A virtual reality is something, not a reality, which has the efficiency ( *virtus*) of a reality.” Thanks, Jon On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 1:56 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Yes, agreed - and yes, Mind is a 'virtual reality'. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> > *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 18, 2016 2:46 PM > *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and > Determination/Causation > > Jon, Edwina, list, > > Yes, I was thinking the same thing. So my conjecture would better be given > as the immediate object having a virtual *reality* (not an existence). I > think Peirce is saying in the quotes I sent that Mind itself is a virtual > reality. > > Best, > > Gary R > > [image: Gary Richmond] > > *Gary Richmond* > *Philosophy and Critical Thinking* > *Communication Studies* > *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York* > *C 745* > *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>* > >
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