Edwina, List: That is what I was thinking when I asked the question; but you had written, "the immediate object [which *exists* only within the semiosic interaction]" (emphasis added). What would be a more accurate way to express what you intended? Perhaps, "the immediate object [which *has being* only within the semiosic interaction]"? I have in mind Peirce's distinction between being real (all three categories) and existing (Secondness only).
Regards, Jon On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 1:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon , List > I understand *existence* to mean particular, individual, discrete > spatiotemporal existentiality; i.e., it has an objective or external > reality. I consider that the Immediate Object is *internal *to the > semiosic process, and has no discrete existence. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> > *To:* Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > *Cc:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> ; [email protected] ; Peirce-L > <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:12 PM > *Subject:* Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation > > Edwina, Helmut, List: > > Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object *exists*? > As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it > falls under Firstness (possibility). > > Thanks, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, >> doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the >> semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate >> within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final >> causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> >> *To:* [email protected] >> *Cc:* Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L >> <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM >> *Subject:* Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. >> CP 6.469 >> >> Jerry, Jon, list, >> I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in >> accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness >> and deduction thirdness. >> So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does >> it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be >> irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with >> each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on >> causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a >> causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with >> an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical >> object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, >> that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a >> causation backwards in time? >> Best, >> Helmut >> >>
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