Edwina, Jon, list,
first, thank you, Edwina, for clearing the determination thing. Before I had never understood, why the object should determine the sign. But that the immediate object does so, I see.
Discrete existence, I would say, is being there in the world, like the dynamical object. The immediate object exists in the semiosic process alone, that is, I guess I might say, in a communication it exists as the common understanding of the sign. Is this common understanding the subset of the concepts of eg. a term, both the speaker and the hearer have of a term? "Subset" in case these concepts differ. And if there is a complete misunderstanding (eg. a biologist says: "My culture is contaminated", meaning something that has happened in his Petri-dish, but the hearer thinks that he is talking about the country he was born in), then there is no immediate object, and neither a dynamical, I guess. Is that so?
Best,
Helmut
 
 18. August 2016 um 20:22 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" <[email protected]> wrote:
 
Jon , List
I understand existence to mean particular, individual, discrete spatiotemporal existentiality; i.e., it has an objective or external reality. I consider that the Immediate Object is internal to the semiosic process, and has no discrete existence.
 
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:12 PM
Subject: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
 
Edwina, Helmut, List:
 
Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object exists?  As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it falls under Firstness (possibility).
 
Thanks,
 
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
 
On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind.
 
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM
Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. CP 6.469
 
Jerry, Jon, list,
I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness and deduction thirdness.
So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a causation backwards in time?
Best,
Helmut
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