Yes, agreed - and yes, Mind is a 'virtual reality'. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Gary Richmond To: Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 2:46 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation
Jon, Edwina, list, Yes, I was thinking the same thing. So my conjecture would better be given as the immediate object having a virtual reality (not an existence). I think Peirce is saying in the quotes I sent that Mind itself is a virtual reality. Best, Gary R Gary Richmond Philosophy and Critical Thinking Communication Studies LaGuardia College of the City University of New York C 745 718 482-5690 On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 2:31 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> wrote: Edwina, List: That is what I was thinking when I asked the question; but you had written, "the immediate object [which exists only within the semiosic interaction]" (emphasis added). What would be a more accurate way to express what you intended? Perhaps, "the immediate object [which has being only within the semiosic interaction]"? I have in mind Peirce's distinction between being real (all three categories) and existing (Secondness only). Regards, Jon On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 1:22 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Jon , List I understand existence to mean particular, individual, discrete spatiotemporal existentiality; i.e., it has an objective or external reality. I consider that the Immediate Object is internal to the semiosic process, and has no discrete existence. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Jon Alan Schmidt To: Edwina Taborsky Cc: Helmut Raulien ; [email protected] ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 12:12 PM Subject: Dynamic/Immediate Object and Determination/Causation Edwina, Helmut, List: Just wondering--is it right to say that the immediate object exists? As object, it falls under Secondness (actuality); but as immediate, it falls under Firstness (possibility). Thanks, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Thu, Aug 18, 2016 at 10:41 AM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Helmut, list - the dynamic object, i.e., an objective existentiality, doesn't determine the immediate object [which exists only within the semiosic interaction] ONLY via efficient causality [which does operate within a linear temporality in that semiosic interaction] , but via final causality - which operates as a continuity of the process of Mind. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Helmut Raulien To: [email protected] Cc: Jon Alan Schmidt ; Peirce-L Sent: Thursday, August 18, 2016 10:20 AM Subject: Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Abductive Form of Inference - CP 5.189 vs. CP 6.469 Jerry, Jon, list, I think that this example shows, that ordinality is not necessarily in accord with categoriality, because categorically induction is secondness and deduction thirdness. So, what is ordinality? Does it merely mean the sequence in time, or does it mean the causation / determination sequence? This question would be irrelevant, if both causation and temporality always were in accord with each other. But: There is a temporality possible, which is not based on causation: The temporal sequence of contingent events. And: May there be a causation backwards in time, like with an anticipation? Is it so, that with an anticipation, though the immediate object yet is existing, the dynamical object is anticipated, i.e. exists in the future merely, so if you say, that the dynamical object too determines the sign, this would be a causation backwards in time? Best, Helmut ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm . ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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