Hi all,
Instead of just talking about Peirce, why not put him to action? What is…mediation/thought about First? What is…CP 5.189? Is it an object that is observed? Is it Beautiful? What’s your immediate reaction to what it is? Is it what I have been saying or what you have? What is it for us if we’re disagreed? Should it be one thing and not many? Is it ineffable or can we capture it as one conception? What is it at the end of inquiry, one thing or many? Is it simple enough? Is it complex enough? What is the strongest argument that which others cannot displace if not this? Why should this *even* be considered as the normative form? If we can’t apply our knowledge of Peirce to answer confidently and speak univocally on something as critical as what the form of abduction ought to be, then what do we really understand of Peirce’s method? Where is beatific vision? Best, Jerry Rhee On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 12:22 PM, Stephen C. Rose <[email protected]> wrote: > Inevitably if Peirce is to become a basis for a zeitgeist or understanding > -- that we no longer live in a binary world destined for inevitable > conflict -- he will be simplified. That is as certain as that Marx, Freud > and Hegel were simplified. A one two three mode of thinking is better than > a one two mode. It should be obvious that no one even with a partial > knowledge of Peirce believes he is such a linear thinker. And it is > probable what whatever becomes of Peirce may not be to his liking just as > things attributed to Jesus are probably abhorrent to him. The thread that > should run from awareness of complex Peirce to a sense of his broad > significance beyond the academy should be the fruits of understanding him. > > Books http://buff.ly/15GfdqU > > On Tue, Sep 13, 2016 at 1:12 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> > wrote: > >> Clark- yes, I think that the disagreements in interpretation of Peirce go >> beyond semantics. The way I see it, there are some who view the Peircean >> framework in a linear, mechanical reductionist sense; i.e., 'this >> ..followed by ..this..followed by..this..and... >> >> That's where you get the focus on the representamen alone being called >> 'the sign' - and you get the loss of the triadic frame which, in my view, >> is one of the two basic formats of the Peircean framework. [The other is >> the three categories]. >> >> Those people who use Peirce in the sciences, i.e., within the biological >> and physico-chemical realms, reject linear mechanical reductionism - but - >> such a view continues to hold on in the literary and philosophical realms. >> >> Since I focus on the triad as THE basic semiosic unit, which I call the >> Sign [capital S], then, for me, I see the representamen as mediation - and >> - as noted in the ten classes of such triads, it can function in any one of >> the three categories. >> >> I also think that it is 'limiting' if we confine Mind to human thinking, >> for, as Peirce notes, it operates in 'the work of bees and of crystals'. >> This means - since these bees, their work and those crystals are all >> semiosic Signs, which is to say, they are all *triadic* >> interactions...in dynamic interaction with other bees and natural >> matter...that Mind is taking place in these interactions. >> >> What is thought? What is Mind? Certainly, it is not consciousness. Again, >> my reading of Peirce, with that focus on the irreducible necessity of the >> triad and the three categories, is that Mind/Thought must operate *within >> the full triad* and has the option of all three categories in this >> operation. Mind cannot exist without that full triad - and the fact that >> its actions can make use of all categories, in their 'genuine and >> degenerate modes' gives Mind the adaptive and innovative power that it has. >> >> But - to reduce Mind to only ONE part of the triad, and only one >> category, is, to my view, a misreading of Peirce. But - that's my view. >> >> Edwina >> >> ----- Original Message ----- >> *From:* Clark Goble <[email protected]> >> *To:* Peirce-L <[email protected]> >> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 13, 2016 12:30 PM >> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking >> >> While I couldn’t find the Peirce quote I was searching for I did find >> this from Joe Ransdell: >> >> Qualities are not what philosophers sometimes call "the given" to which >> "interpretation" is somehow to be added to form cognitive units; for >> qualities are not objects of predication but rather that which is >> (monadically) predicated of objects, though not considered AS predicated >> since that would involve conceptual recourse to the other categories. >> [Note: this is treacherous territory: I am inclined at present to say, >> though, that quality is, first of all, predicable content not regarded as >> predicated though regardable in that way as well, and, second, when so >> regarded (via hypostatic abstraction) they are regarded as properties, in >> which case certain further things can be said of them considered as such. I >> do not think this means that he simply uses the term "quality" sloppily or >> even ambiguously. I think he regards it as legitimate to speak of quality >> sometimes as a matter of firstness and sometimes as a matter of thirdness >> depending on which way of regarding it is intended, as should be clear >> enough from the context if one is aware of the two different kinds of >> regard for it.) >> >> While he’s more talking about the myth of the given I think he is getting >> at the idea by Peirce that all thought is mediated. Working the details of >> this out relative to something like “the given” (and its myths) can be >> tricky. I’m not entirely sure of it myself. >> >> My guess is that for any sign there is an experience of the sign before >> us. But in terms of the raw feeling of that sign there is this new example >> of firstness. That in turn, to think upon, ends up being thought in terms >> of thirdness. However where the confusion pops up is that it’s very easy to >> then think that thinking is just a series of representations before the >> mind. I’m not sure Peirce makes that move although it remains the dominant >> paradigm in psychology and probably cognitive science. (I confess I can >> never quite make sense of that distinction although most people I encounter >> who self-identify as cognitive scientists seem much more open to >> non-representational views) >> >> Having said that though here there may be more disagreement over how to >> read Peirce. I know some *do* read Peirce as entailing a kind of >> representationalism. So perhaps somewhat against my earlier comment that >> this is all semantics there may be a deeper disagreement between the sides. >> I suspect the question can be productively be formed as whether the >> experience of a quality is a thought or whether it is just the experience >> of the mediation of a quality that is a thought. >> >> Part of the issue appears to be that firstness proper is in a sense >> ineffable. To make it effable is to represent it in a sign but then it’s no >> longer firstness. Is it only thought when in the sign? That’s fundamentally >> the issue. While yesterday this seemed primarily a semantic issue now I’m >> just not quite so sure. The main argument I think is that Peirce >> distinguishes thought from mind in a few places. I think for thought he’s >> talking of proposition-like entities. >> >> The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of >> the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the >> living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as >> well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the ENTELECHY, or >> perfection of being. (CP 6.339-341;1908) >> >> >> >> >> >> ------------------------------ >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> >> ----------------------------- >> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON >> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to >> [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L >> but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the >> BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce >> -l/peirce-l.htm . >> >> >> >> >> >> > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
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