Mary, list: My apologies for suggesting that all or even many, in the literary and philosophical realms view/use Peirce in a linear reductionist manner. Some do - and I refer to those people, whereas, it is almost impossible for someone in the sciences - IF, IF, they do use Peirce, to use him in a linear mechanical manner. They don't need Peirce to do that!!! They need Peirce to explain complex innovative adaptive networking - which can't be dealt with by the old mechanical reductionism.
Thanks for your comments on my clarity on Peirce. I appreciate it - Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Mary Libertin To: Edwina Taborsky Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 2:18 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking I agree with Edwina in her discussion here, but I disagree with her statement that people in the"literary philosophical realms" use "linear mechanical reductionism." Certainly many do but not most -- and of the very very few in literature who use Peirce most don't fit that description. I'm not sure that you should disparage philosophical realms since philosophy and science are more akin than many believe. I think Peirce said even Clodhoppers could get his philosophy, in this rough paraphrase. I am perhaps defensive because I am of the literary ilk, and for that my apologies. I strongly agree with your clear and precise explanation of Peirce. Mary Libertin On Tuesday, September 13, 2016, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: Clark- yes, I think that the disagreements in interpretation of Peirce go beyond semantics. The way I see it, there are some who view the Peircean framework in a linear, mechanical reductionist sense; i.e., 'this ..followed by ..this..followed by..this..and... That's where you get the focus on the representamen alone being called 'the sign' - and you get the loss of the triadic frame which, in my view, is one of the two basic formats of the Peircean framework. [The other is the three categories]. Those people who use Peirce in the sciences, i.e., within the biological and physico-chemical realms, reject linear mechanical reductionism - but - such a view continues to hold on in the literary and philosophical realms. Since I focus on the triad as THE basic semiosic unit, which I call the Sign [capital S], then, for me, I see the representamen as mediation - and - as noted in the ten classes of such triads, it can function in any one of the three categories. I also think that it is 'limiting' if we confine Mind to human thinking, for, as Peirce notes, it operates in 'the work of bees and of crystals'. This means - since these bees, their work and those crystals are all semiosic Signs, which is to say, they are all triadic interactions...in dynamic interaction with other bees and natural matter...that Mind is taking place in these interactions. What is thought? What is Mind? Certainly, it is not consciousness. Again, my reading of Peirce, with that focus on the irreducible necessity of the triad and the three categories, is that Mind/Thought must operate within the full triad and has the option of all three categories in this operation. Mind cannot exist without that full triad - and the fact that its actions can make use of all categories, in their 'genuine and degenerate modes' gives Mind the adaptive and innovative power that it has. But - to reduce Mind to only ONE part of the triad, and only one category, is, to my view, a misreading of Peirce. But - that's my view. Edwina ----- Original Message ----- From: Clark Goble To: Peirce-L Sent: Tuesday, September 13, 2016 12:30 PM Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking While I couldn’t find the Peirce quote I was searching for I did find this from Joe Ransdell: Qualities are not what philosophers sometimes call "the given" to which "interpretation" is somehow to be added to form cognitive units; for qualities are not objects of predication but rather that which is (monadically) predicated of objects, though not considered AS predicated since that would involve conceptual recourse to the other categories. [Note: this is treacherous territory: I am inclined at present to say, though, that quality is, first of all, predicable content not regarded as predicated though regardable in that way as well, and, second, when so regarded (via hypostatic abstraction) they are regarded as properties, in which case certain further things can be said of them considered as such. I do not think this means that he simply uses the term "quality" sloppily or even ambiguously. I think he regards it as legitimate to speak of quality sometimes as a matter of firstness and sometimes as a matter of thirdness depending on which way of regarding it is intended, as should be clear enough from the context if one is aware of the two different kinds of regard for it.) While he’s more talking about the myth of the given I think he is getting at the idea by Peirce that all thought is mediated. Working the details of this out relative to something like “the given” (and its myths) can be tricky. I’m not entirely sure of it myself. My guess is that for any sign there is an experience of the sign before us. But in terms of the raw feeling of that sign there is this new example of firstness. That in turn, to think upon, ends up being thought in terms of thirdness. However where the confusion pops up is that it’s very easy to then think that thinking is just a series of representations before the mind. I’m not sure Peirce makes that move although it remains the dominant paradigm in psychology and probably cognitive science. (I confess I can never quite make sense of that distinction although most people I encounter who self-identify as cognitive scientists seem much more open to non-representational views) Having said that though here there may be more disagreement over how to read Peirce. I know some do read Peirce as entailing a kind of representationalism. So perhaps somewhat against my earlier comment that this is all semantics there may be a deeper disagreement between the sides. I suspect the question can be productively be formed as whether the experience of a quality is a thought or whether it is just the experience of the mediation of a quality that is a thought. Part of the issue appears to be that firstness proper is in a sense ineffable. To make it effable is to represent it in a sign but then it’s no longer firstness. Is it only thought when in the sign? That’s fundamentally the issue. While yesterday this seemed primarily a semantic issue now I’m just not quite so sure. The main argument I think is that Peirce distinguishes thought from mind in a few places. I think for thought he’s talking of proposition-like entities. The mode of being of the composition of thought, which is always of the nature of the attribution of a predicate to a subject, is the living intelligence which is the creator of all intelligible reality, as well as of the knowledge of such reality. It is the ENTELECHY, or perfection of being. (CP 6.339-341;1908) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
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