Not sure of your point ,Jerry. Since I am sure you know that your example is a 
fallacy [fallacy of affirming the consequent]...After all, we all know that 
your grass is wet because you left the sprinkler on all night.....

The problem I have with a truth defined as the I-O being similar to the R-O, is 
..well....it requires that the Representamen be somehow 'untouched' or 
unaffected by experience. That is, can we trust the Representamen?  I think the 
community-of-scholars is necessary in this situation, but even so..wasn't it 
Tolstoy who said that 'wrong does not cease to be wrong just because the 
majority shares in it'...

Edwina
  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jerry Rhee 
  To: Clark Goble 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking


  Dear list:



  What you say sounds all well and good but I’m confused.  



  In a description for the abductive process, an inadequate version can be 
given: 



  “The grass is wet, therefore, it must have rained last night.  

  For if it rained last night, then the grass ought to be wet.”



  So, if 

  “Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a 
thing till they have grasped the 'why' of it (which is to grasp its primary 
cause);”



  then my question is ‘Why the Reality of God’ and not “lawn is wet”?

  Also, what does this have to do with not only Truth-searching, but 
Truth-finding?



  That is, if Truth is, as Edwina says:

  “…is it rather the case that this semiosis activity must continue on, for 
some time until that I-O relation does indeed correlate with the R-O Relation?  
Isn't this what Peirce meant by eventually arriving at the truth?”



  then as Jon says, the hypothesis or the proposition should matter.  



  So, what is O?  What is R?  What is I?  

  That is, how can the R-O relation meet the I-O without the premisses?



  I think without this, there is no getting at the Truth or Reality of things, 
since 

  “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who 
investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this 
opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality”.



  I believe this, irrespective of the attitude I adopt, since it is the method, 
which also must be adopted.  For without a method, then we’re right back to 
arguing with no course for how to determine a good hypothesis from a bad one.  



  Best,

  Jerry Rhee



  On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 12:33 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:



      On Sep 19, 2016, at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:


      Clark- thanks for your very nice outline of the NA - I certainly agree 
with your view, that as Chiasson says, it's not just about a 'belief in God', 
because it's not deductive but is, as noted, abductive. Abduction inserts 
freedom and spontaneity - attributes outside of the range of a God. And agreed 
- the NA doesn't offer 'compelling reasons for why we should call this ens 
necessarium as god. I, as an atheist, prefer his outline of Mind as the ens 
necessarium. 

      As Mind is an action of Reasoning [within all three modes], then, I think 
that ethics is grounded within it. You don't, in my reading, require a God, for 
ethics.


    It’s worth noting the connection here between Peirce and Spinoza. Of course 
that could be indirect since many of the early German idealists like Hegel were 
highly influenced by Spinoza. But I’ve long thought the direct influence was 
significant. 


    For a good paper on the influence see


    
http://www.commens.org/sites/default/files/biblio_attachments/peirce_and_spinozas_pragmaticist_metaphysics.pdf
 


    Spinoza of course explicitly calls his unity God and ties it to ethics. 
However the Jewish rabbis disagreed and thought him an atheists leading to his 
excommunication. 


    That gets again to my point that the *name* God seems to be the dispute 
rather than the content. That said though many post Peircean figures strongly 
want to call God as God while giving his nature freedom and spontaneity. The 
process theology movement that started with Whitehead being the most obvious 
philosophical example although there were others. Later process theologians 
were explicitly influenced by Peirce despite many of Peirce’s writings being 
difficult to find at the time.






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