Dear Ben, list:


Ben quoted Peirce via Chiasson:



*But of the myriad forms in which a proposition may be translated, what is
that one which is to be called its very meaning? *



*It is, according to the pragmaticist, that form in which the proposition
becomes applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special
circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that special design, but
that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every
situation and to every purpose.*



*If* meaning is that form in which the proposition becomes applicable to
human conduct…that form which is most directly applicable to self-control
under every situation and to every purpose,



*then* who among us, who claims knowledge about the NA, is brave enough to
state that proposition regarding the Reality of God, which meets all the
stated criteria regarding esthetic meandering and applicability to conduct
of life and such?

______



That which any true proposition asserts is real…

Now, it is well known that propositions in formal logic go in pairs, the
two of one pair being controvertible into another by the interchange of the
ideas of *antecedent and consequent, subject and predicate*, etc…



The preliminary propositions had better be stated forthwith.

The difficulty in doing this is that no formal list of them has ever been
made…



Philosophers of very diverse stripes propose that philosophy shall take its
start from one or another state of mind in which no man, least of all a
beginner in philosophy, actually is.

One proposes that you shall begin by doubting everything…

Another proposes that we should begin by observing “the first impressions…



But in truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can “set out,”
namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the
time you do “set out”- a state in which you are laden with an immense mass
of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you
would; and who knows whether, if you could, you would not have made all
knowledge impossible to yourself?

*~* Peirce, *What Pragmatism Is*



When the objects of an inquiry, in any department, have principles,
conditions, or elements, it is through acquaintance with these that
knowledge, that is to say scientific knowledge, is attained. For we do not
think that we know a thing until we are acquainted with its primary
conditions or first principles, and have carried our analysis as far as its
simplest elements. Plainly therefore in the science of Nature, as in other
branches of study, our first task will be to try to determine what relates
to its principles.

The natural way of doing this is to start from the things which are more
knowable and obvious to us and proceed towards those which are clearer and
more knowable by nature; for the same things are not 'knowable relatively
to us' and 'knowable' without qualification. So in the present inquiry we
must follow this method and advance from what is more obscure by nature,
but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature.

~Aristotle, *Physics*





one two three...sign object interpretant...object sign interpretant.


This is why formulating a good hypothesis is *hard*.

One expects reaction and encounters difficulty with making perfect
statements.

Yet, one is expected to begin with an earnest attempt at applying the
scientific method, which includes not only the adoption of the habit of
mind but also the putting forth a clear statement of the hypothesis.



Best,

Jerry Rhee

On Tue, Sep 20, 2016 at 9:49 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> The best outline is in Some Consequences of Four Incapacities, where he
> writes:
>
> "We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the
> prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of
> philosophy....5.265 And see 5.265..."We have no power of Intuition, but
> every cognition is determined logically by previous cognitions'.
>
> http://www.peirce.org/writings/p27.html
>
> But he repeats these views - and his rejection of 'pure doubt' throughout
> his writings.
>
> Edwina
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Ben Novak <trevriz...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce-L <peirce-L@list.iupui.edu>
> *Sent:* Tuesday, September 20, 2016 6:09 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>
> Dear List:
>
> Fifteen or sixteen years ago, I had the Intelex Past Masters version of
> the works of Peirce, and often have reason to recall a passage where Peirce
> explicitly talks about the importance--necessity--of belief to the conduct
> of science. As I recall, he argued that belief was necessary because the
> scientist had to believe that the universe was reasonable, and necessary to
> believe that our minds were capable of apprehending that reasonableness;
> otherwise, there was no use in pursuing it. The principal point of the
> passage, as I recall, is that for the scientist, belief was necessary.
>
> I would greatly appreciate it if someone might provide that passage.
> Perhaps it may be helpful in our discussions. Perhaps not, but I can't know
> until I see the passage again...
>
> By way of explanation, unfortunately Intelex changed their method of
> delivering their product, and the CDs I got from them no longer work. See a
> partial explanation here:
> http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/menu/links/intelex.htm
>
> It is not worth going further into why--unless someone knows a way to get
> around the disabling of Intelex CDs as a result of their change. The point
> is that I no longer have my former Intelex access to Peirce's works. That
> is why I am asking for your  help in finding the passage referred to above.
>
> Thanks,
>
> Ben N.
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> *Ben Novak <http://bennovak.net>*
> 5129 Taylor Drive, Ave Maria, FL 34142
> Telephone: (814) 808-5702
>
> *"All art is mortal, **not merely the individual artifacts, but the arts
> themselves.* *One day the last portrait of Rembrandt* *and the last bar
> of Mozart will have ceased to be—**though possibly a colored canvas and a
> sheet of notes may remain—**because the last eye and the last ear
> accessible to their message **will have gone." *Oswald Spengler
>
> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 3:35 PM, Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> Edwina, list:
>>
>> Yes, what you say is correct.
>>
>> This is why I disdain the lawn example so much, and for many other
>> reasons besides.
>>
>> As per the community and experience...there's also that!
>>
>> So, quid sit deus?  What would God be?
>>
>> :)
>>
>> Best,
>> Jerry R
>>
>> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 2:19 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> wrote:
>>
>>> Not sure of your point ,Jerry. Since I am sure you know that your
>>> example is a fallacy [fallacy of affirming the consequent]...After all, we
>>> all know that your grass is wet because you left the sprinkler on all
>>> night.....
>>>
>>> The problem I have with a truth defined as the I-O being similar to the
>>> R-O, is ..well....it requires that the Representamen be somehow 'untouched'
>>> or unaffected by experience. That is, can we trust the Representamen?  I
>>> think the community-of-scholars is necessary in this situation, but even
>>> so..wasn't it Tolstoy who said that 'wrong does not cease to be wrong just
>>> because the majority shares in it'...
>>>
>>> Edwina
>>>
>>> ----- Original Message -----
>>> *From:* Jerry Rhee <jerryr...@gmail.com>
>>> *To:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
>>> *Cc:* Peirce-L <PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>
>>> *Sent:* Monday, September 19, 2016 2:52 PM
>>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking
>>>
>>> Dear list:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> What you say sounds all well and good but I’m confused.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> In a description for the abductive process, an inadequate version can be
>>> given:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> “The grass is wet, therefore, it must have rained last night.
>>>
>>> For *if *it rained last night, *then* the grass ought to be wet.”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So, if
>>>
>>> “Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know
>>> a thing till they have grasped the 'why' of it (which is to grasp its
>>> primary cause);”
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> then my question is ‘Why the Reality of God’ and not “lawn is wet”?
>>>
>>> Also, what does this have to do with not only Truth-searching, but
>>> Truth-finding?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> That is, if Truth is, as Edwina says:
>>>
>>> “…is it rather the case that this semiosis activity must continue on,
>>> for some time *until that I-O relation does indeed correlate with the
>>> R-O Relation?  Isn't this what Peirce meant by eventually arriving at the
>>> truth?”*
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> then as Jon says, the hypothesis or the proposition should matter.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> So, what is O?  What is R?  What is I?
>>>
>>> That is, how can the R-O relation meet the I-O without the premisses?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I think without this, there is no getting at the Truth or Reality of
>>> things, since
>>>
>>> “The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who
>>> investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in
>>> this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain reality”.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I believe this, irrespective of the attitude I adopt, since it is the
>>> method, which also must be adopted.  For without a method, then we’re right
>>> back to arguing with no course for how to determine a good hypothesis from
>>> a bad one.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Best,
>>>
>>> Jerry Rhee
>>>
>>> On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 12:33 PM, Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>>
>>>> On Sep 19, 2016, at 9:14 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>>> wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Clark- thanks for your very nice outline of the NA - I certainly agree
>>>> with your view, that as Chiasson says, it's not just about a 'belief in
>>>> God', because it's not deductive but is, as noted, abductive. Abduction
>>>> inserts freedom and spontaneity - attributes outside of the range of a God.
>>>> And agreed - the NA doesn't offer 'compelling reasons for why we should
>>>> call this *ens necessarium* as god. I, as an atheist, prefer his
>>>> outline of Mind as the *ens necessarium*.
>>>>
>>>> As Mind is an action of Reasoning [within all three modes], then, I
>>>> think that ethics is grounded within it. You don't, in my reading, require
>>>> a God, for ethics.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>> It’s worth noting the connection here between Peirce and Spinoza. Of
>>>> course that could be indirect since many of the early German idealists like
>>>> Hegel were highly influenced by Spinoza. But I’ve long thought the direct
>>>> influence was significant.
>>>>
>>>> For a good paper on the influence see
>>>>
>>>> http://www.commens.org/sites/default/files/biblio_attachment
>>>> s/peirce_and_spinozas_pragmaticist_metaphysics.pdf
>>>>
>>>> Spinoza of course explicitly calls his unity God and ties it to ethics.
>>>> However the Jewish rabbis disagreed and thought him an atheists leading to
>>>> his excommunication.
>>>>
>>>> That gets again to my point that the *name* God seems to be the dispute
>>>> rather than the content. That said though many post Peircean figures
>>>> strongly want to call God as God while giving his nature freedom and
>>>> spontaneity. The process theology movement that started with Whitehead
>>>> being the most obvious philosophical example although there were others.
>>>> Later process theologians were explicitly influenced by Peirce despite many
>>>> of Peirce’s writings being difficult to find at the time.
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
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