Edwina, list:
The *Divine* in Beauty, Goodness, Truth has a very particular position; you could even say ordinality. From Lawrence Dewan on ST. THOMAS AND THE RENEWAL OF METAPHYSICS: As Thomas says: The appetitive power moves [us] to inspect something, whether sensibly or intelligibly, sometimes because of the love of the thing seen: because, as Matthew 6 [21] says: "where your treasure is, there also is your heart"; but sometimes because of a love of the knowledge itself which results from such inspection. “Every inquiry whatsoever takes its rise in the observation…” ":-- O wonderful being, and to what are you looking?” Best, Jerry Rhee On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 2:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote: > Nice outline, Helmut. But I'll quibble with a few terms. > > For example, your theist claims that 'an intelligent system is a person' > while an atheist would never anthropomorphise intelligence in that way. > > An atheist might well consider that this 'quasi-Mind' or Mind functions to > prevent the 'horror vacui - i.e., to prevent entropic dissipation of matter > but this doesn't mean that achieving this result, along with > its complexity, requires a supreme intelligence, which is the view of the > theist. > > And Jeff adds evaluative terms, such as 'beauty, goodness and truth' and > adds a 'divine character' to its nature. I'm not sure what the latter term > [divine character] means and the first three - I think need some > clarification, at least, in my view. > > Edwina > > ----- Original Message ----- > *From:* Helmut Raulien <[email protected]> > *To:* [email protected] > *Cc:* Gary Richmond <[email protected]> ; Peirce-L > <[email protected]> > *Sent:* Friday, September 23, 2016 3:28 PM > *Subject:* Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Jeff, list, > you wrote: " Whether we call that embodied system of Ideas and Ideals > "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow to appreciate > the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character." > I think the same. Somebody wrote some weeks ago, that there is a saying > that philosophers spend most of their time not elaborating theories, but > discussing about the meanings of terms. I guess, this also applies to > theologists, the medieval scholastics too, and that "God" is such a term. I > also think, that the discussion between atheists and theists is not about > whether God exists or not, but what the term "God" means. And, presuming it > means that He is a person, then the discussion perhaps is mostly about the > meaning of the term "person": An atheist might say: Nature and evolution > are nonpersonal, but nevertheless quite intelligent systems, and a theist > might answer: But an intelligent system is a person, so why should I not > call it "God". An atheist might claim, that everything is only based on a > simple principle: The "Horror Vacui" of nature. Then a theist might answer: > The simpler the tools are, that achieve great complexity, the greater must > be the intelligence that has invented these tools. I can think of a > discussion between an atheist and a theist, like a theater play, and in the > end comes out, that both share exactly the same philosophy, just the > atheist does not want to say "God", and the theist does. > Best, > Hlmut > 23. September 2016 um 20:32 Uhr > "Jeffrey Brian Downard" <[email protected]> wrote: > > Hi Gary R., Ben U., List, > > Yes, with respect to " Ben's "quibble" to the effect that "Peirce said > that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that every > inference is valid as a pattern of inference", the point is well taken. > > We'll see if any of the critics of the Humble or the larger Neglected > Argument want to take up the question raised at the end of the post. For my > part, I don't think that Dennett or Dawkins have much to offer by way of a > response to the question. > > Here are two options that are open to a critic: (1) offer an alternate > hypothesis that can perform the grand totalizing and synthesizing function > that has traditionally be supplied by a conception of a personal God that, > in his Ideas and Ideals, embodies and gives life to all of the laws of > logic, metaphysics and nature. Or, (2) reject the need for such a grant > totalizing and synthesizing hypotheses. > > One of Peirce's point is that many thoughtful and reflective human beings > (such as Plato and Emerson) have recognized the need for the Ideas and > Ideals embodied in this sort of hypothesis--and Peirce recognizes the same > need. He is asking each of us to reflect on some basic operations of our > own feelings, imagination and thought, and then ask ourselves--do we > recognize a similar need? Like Schiller, I think that aim of further > cultivating our habits of feeling, action that thought does indeed seem to > call out for the kinds of Ideas and Ideals that will be sufficient to offer > us hope as we seek to bring the conflicting tendencies in our personal and > social lives into better harmony. Whether we call that embodied system of > Ideas and Ideals "Nature" or "God" matters little to me--so long as we grow > to appreciate the Beauty, Goodness and Truth of its Divine character. > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354 > ________________________________________ > From: Gary Richmond [[email protected]] > Sent: Friday, September 23, 2016 10:56 AM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > Ben, Jeff, List, > > Ben, I think your 'quibble' is well taken, and I agree with your analysis. > > Jeff, I'm hoping that critics of the 'Humble Argument' as well as the N.A. > as a whole will respond to the good question at the end of your post: > > JD: So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God > involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the > inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The > Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is > the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the > alternate hypotheses? > > Best, > > Gary R > > > [Gary Richmond] > > Gary Richmond > Philosophy and Critical Thinking > Communication Studies > LaGuardia College of the City University of New York > C 745 > 718 482-5690 > > On Fri, Sep 23, 2016 at 12:48 PM, Benjamin Udell <[email protected] > <mailto:[email protected]>> wrote: > > Jeff, Edwina, list, > > I've just a few quibbles, nothing major. > > Jeff, you wrote: > > Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a pattern of > inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that appear to be > invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, but the > appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. > [End quote] > > Some of that is very close to what Peirce said in his articles in _Journal > of Speculative Philosophy_ in 1868, but with a decisive difference. Peirce > said that every mental action has the form of a valid inference, not that > every inference is valid as a pattern of inference. In "Some Consequences > of Four Incapacities," he said: > > It is a consequence, then, of the first two principles whose results we > are to trace out, that we must, as far as we can, without any other > supposition than that the mind reasons, reduce all mental action to the > formula of valid reasoning. > [CP 5.266, W 2:214, http://www.iupui.edu/~arisbe/ > menu/library/bycsp/conseq/cn-frame.htm ] > > Yes, invalidity of inference arises from mistaking what kind of inference > it is - where "it" refers to the mental action. But saying that every > inference is valid as a pattern of inference sounds confusingly like saying > that there is no invalid inference. > > An unsound deduction is unsound by virtue (or should I say 'vice') of a > falsehood in the premisses, an invalidity in the deductive form, or both. A > valid deduction is unsound if it has one or more false premisses, and is > necessarily unsound if there is an inconsistency (a.k.a. necessary > falsehood) in a premiss or among premisses. A 'forward-only' deduction can > be valid and unsound yet true in its conclusion, e.g., Socrates is a > cro-magnon, all cro-magnons are mortal, ergo Socrates is mortal. (A > particularly vacuous example, based on a necessarily false conjunction of > premisses, is: p&~p, ergo p or ~p.) It's difficult to think of a deduction > whose seeming invalidity boils down to the occurrence of something > contingently or necessarily false in its premisses, maybe that difficulty > is what Edwina was getting at in her reply (I haven't had time to catch up > with this thread). Anyway, whether one can explain seeming invalidity as > unsoundness in non-deductive inference modes depends I guess on how one > defines validity and soundness for them. > > Best, Ben > > On 9/21/2016 5:06 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard wrote: > > Hello Jon, List, > > The argument you are trying to reconstruct could be fleshed out more fully > in a number of ways. Here are a few suggestions for filling in some of the > details a bit more: > > Major premiss: Every inference is, in one way or another, valid as a > pattern of inference, including those that are instinctive. Those that > appear to be invalid are patterns of inference that are, themselves, valid, > but the appearance of invalidity is really due to the fact that we have > misunderstood what kind of inference it is (e.g., we think it is inductive, > when it is really abductive). Or, the apparent invalidity is really just a > lack of soundness in that something in the premisses involves an error on > our part and it is really false. As a form of inference, every retroductive > conjecture that meets certain conditions (e.g., it responds to a question > occasioned by real doubt, it is really explanatory, it is possible to > deduce consequences that can be put to the test, it is possible to make > inductive inferences that will tend to show the hypotheses is confirmed or > disconfirmed by observations, the observations that will be used to test > the hypothesis are not the same observations that will be used to make the > inductive inference, etc.) is a valid abductive inference--and hence has a > logical character. Such arguments can, in time, be the subject of further > development in arguments that are more fully under our conscious control. > As such, they can be made into logical inferences that may rise up to > higher levels of assurance, including those of experience as well as form. > > Minor premiss: The humble argument for the Reality of God is a > retroductive conjecture endorsed by instinctive reason. What is more, it > has in fact be met with the support of large communities of inquirers at > different times and places in human history and culture. In fact, it > appears that the core inferential patterns in the argument are prevalent in > the thought of virtually all reasonable human beings. Over time, different > communities have developed the instinctive hypothesis in a number of > different ways, but the core ideas seem to cut across all such > communities--including those communities that are quite spiritual in > orientation as well as those that claim to be less spiritual in > orientation. Setting aside the particularities of how the conceptions have > been developed in different human communities, and focusing on the core > ideas that appear to be held in common, we can see that those core ideas > can be developed into hypotheses that can be affirmed in a responsible and > self-controlled manner by those who are deeply infused by the desire to > learn and who have a relatively refined sense of how to conduct their > inquires according to experimental methods. > > Conclusion: The humble argument for the Reality of God is logical in all > three senses--according to the assurance of instinct, experience and > according to the exact requirements of good logical form. We should > remember, however, that this is not a claim that the conclusion of the > argument is true. Rather, the claim is that the conclusion is plausible. > While it may lack something by way of security, it possesses much by way of > uberty. In fact, our experience shows that this grand hypothesis--which > serves a remarkable totalizing and synthesizing role in the great economy > of our ideas--both within the realm of our long growing commitments of > common sense and in our most cutting edge inquiries in the special > sciences--has shown and continues to show great uberty in the way that it > informs the healthy growth of our aesthetic feelings, our ethical practices > and in the ongoing logical growth of our thought. > > So, let us ask: does this hypothesis involving the conception of God > involve some kind of confusion on our part about the real character of the > inference, or does it rest on false premisses? Peirce's essay on "The > Neglected Argument" is a sustained effort to show that neither of these is > the case. As such, it is a reasonable hypothesis. Is the same true of the > alternate hypotheses? > > --Jeff > > Jeffrey Downard > Associate Professor > Department of Philosophy > Northern Arizona University > (o) 928 523-8354<tel:928%20523-8354> > ________________________________________ > > From: Jon Alan Schmidt [[email protected]<mailto: > [email protected]>] > Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2016 12:24 PM > To: Peirce-L > Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Theory of Thinking > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, > send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected]<mailto:lis > [email protected]> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the > message. 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