Dear Jon
I have discussed this with Edwina before. I think the correct label for Peirce
is a Hylozoism or Hylopathism inspired by Aristotle, which only indicates that
matter is alive and in combination with his synechism that matter is a living
field.
Peirce writes: Has Time, or has Space, any limit or node? Is hylozoism an
opinion, actual or conceivable, rather than a senseless vocable; and if so,
what is, or would be, that opinion? What is consciousness or mind like;
meaning, is it a single continuum like Time and Space, which is for different
purposes variously broken up by that which it contains; or is it composed of
solid atoms, or is it more like a fluid? Has truth, in Kantian phrase, any
"material" characteristics in general, by which it can, with any degree of
probability, be recognized? Is there, for example, any general tendency in the
course of events, any progress in one direction on the whole? CP6.6) and
furthermore
The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so prominent in
Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance, will hardly find
defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some form of hylopathy,
otherwise called monism. Then the question arises whether physical laws on the
one hand and the psychical law on the other are to be taken --
(a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but which I
would name neutralism; or,
(b) the psychical law as derived and special, the physical law
alone as primordial, which is materialism; or,
(c) the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law
alone as primordial, which is idealism.
The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant to
scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose that a
certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis absolutely
irreducible to reason -- an ultimate, inexplicable regularity; while the only
possible justification of any theory is that it should make things clear and
reasonable.
Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim known
as Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be supposed
than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of substance on a
par, it seems to render both primordial.
25. The one intelligible theory of the universe is that of
objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits becoming
physical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself capable of
explaining the tri-dimensionality of space, the laws of motion, and the general
characteristics of the universe, with mathematical clearness and precision; for
no less should be demanded of every philosophy. (CP 6.24)
Best
Søren
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 11. oktober 2016 21:22
To: Helmut Raulien
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Re: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Helmut, List:
My understanding of "pantheism" is that it entails that God is "immanent in
nature," so Peirce's explicit denial of this in three different drafts of "A
Neglected Argument" is pretty decisive evidence against deeming him a
pantheist. It seems to me that Edwina's adjustment--stating that Mind (rather
than God) is immanent in nature--is more properly classified as panpsychism,
and I do not believe that it is terribly controversial to apply that particular
label to Peirce. At least some of the other formulations that you offered
sound to me more like panentheism than pantheism, but my impression is that
there are a lot of different varieties, and I am not personally familiar with
the nuances.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 12:26 PM, Helmut Raulien
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>> wrote:
List,
Regarding the question, whether Peirce was a pantheist or not, I was thinking
about the meaning of "immanent". If it means that something is contained
(nonlocally in this case), like as an epiphenomenon or a trait of something,
then something "immanent" implies not being the creator of this thing. But if
God is the creator, and still is present everywhere and everywhen, i.e.
nonlocally and nontemporally, might this still be pantheism, though without
immanence? In this case the universe does not contain God, but the other way
round. And the immanence is also the other way: God is not immanent in the
universe (or the three of them), but the universe is immanent in God? No, maybe
one cannot say so, if one believes in creation as a process, because then in
the beginning there must have been a God without a universe. But on the other
hand, this might be a too anthropocentric concept of God and of creation: Maybe
it is not a linear process, like a carpenter making a chair?
About possibilities: Are they creative or privative? Is a possibility an
invention, or something that remains when a lot of other items in question have
been identified as, or turned out to be, impossibilities? With God as
firstness, it should be the first (creative possibility) , I guess. But this
might be a hen-and-egg-question, which suggests that there was a beginning:
Either a nothing, or an everything. But maybe there was no beginning (like eg.
buddhists claim).
Best,
Helmut
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