Dear Helmut

I think your problem is solved by Panentheism, which accept the divine to be 
both transcendent and immanent. Thus the Tohu va Bohu or pure Zero is the 
transcendent, which as the first step in creation produces Firstness as real 
possibilities of forms of existence, combined with the tendency to take habits, 
which could be interpreted as The holy Ghost, which when stabilized produces 
real Secondness and goes on to order it through the self-organizing drive of 
thirdness. Now God = the Father in this scenario ,  is not a person because it 
is pure potential. A person or a subject need both Secondness and thirdness to 
manifest with a consciousness and a will. (Peirce writes: Since God, in His 
essential character of Ens necessarium, is a disembodied spirit, and since 
there is strong reason to hold that what we call consciousness is either merely 
the general sensation of the brain or some part of it, or at all events some 
visceral or bodily sensation, God probably has no consciousness. CP 6.489) The 
manifestation could be The son, which can both manifest as a person like  
Christ and/or Krishna  and as our inner awareness. As Meister Eckhart says the 
Sons is born again and again in every person and it is only through the birth 
of the son in our consciousness that the way to Gods is possible. This 
interpretation is pretty Gnostic and pure mystical and as such fits with  much 
Cristian mysticism, Taoism, Advaita Vedanta, Rumi’s  Sufism and so on collected 
in what is usually called the Perennial philosophy. This view on the divine has 
been ad odds with most theistic religion that works with a personified creator.

         Best
                                Søren

From: Helmut Raulien [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 11. oktober 2016 19:26
To: [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology

List,
Regarding the question, whether Peirce was a pantheist or not, I was thinking 
about the meaning of "immanent". If it means that something is contained 
(nonlocally in this case), like as an epiphenomenon or a trait of something, 
then something "immanent" implies not being the creator of this thing. But if 
God is the creator, and still is present everywhere and everywhen, i.e. 
nonlocally and nontemporally, might this still be pantheism, though without 
immanence? In this case the universe does not contain God, but the other way 
round. And the immanence is also the other way: God is not immanent in the 
universe (or the three of them), but the universe is immanent in God? No, maybe 
one cannot say so, if one believes in creation as a process, because then in 
the beginning there must have been a God without a universe. But on the other 
hand, this might be a too anthropocentric concept of God and of creation: Maybe 
it is not a linear process, like a carpenter making a chair?
About possibilities: Are they creative or privative? Is a possibility an 
invention, or something that remains when a lot of other items in question have 
been identified as, or turned out to be, impossibilities? With God as 
firstness, it should be the first (creative possibility) , I guess. But this 
might be a hen-and-egg-question, which suggests that there was a beginning: 
Either a nothing, or an everything. But maybe there was no beginning (like eg. 
buddhists claim).
Best,
Helmut

 11. Oktober 2016 um 16:59 Uhr
 [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> wrote:

Jon, list,

On the question of which of the three Universes may not “have a Creator 
independent of it,” I’d like to offer an argument that it could be the Universe 
of Firstness rather than Thirdness. However I won’t have time this week to 
construct an argumentation as thoroughgoing as your argument for Thirdness as 
Creator; so instead, I’ll just insert a few comments into your post, below. 
I’ll put Peirce’s words in bold.

Gary F

} God himself culminates in the present moment, and will never be more divine 
in the lapse of all the ages. [Thoreau] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway


From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: 9-Oct-16 22:45

List:
As I mentioned a few weeks ago when I started the thread on "Peirce's Theory of 
Thinking," there is an intriguing paragraph about cosmology in the first 
additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God."  It did not 
actually accompany the article originally, but nevertheless is in the Collected 
Papers as CP 6.490.  Before discussing it directly, a few preliminaries are in 
order.
In the very first sentence of the published article itself, Peirce stated, "The 
word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the definable proper 
name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator of all three 
Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2.434).  In the second additament, the 
one that did appear in The Hibbert Journal, he added, "It is that course of 
meditation upon the three Universes which gives birth to the hypothesis and 
ultimately to the belief that they, or at any rate two of the three, have a 
Creator independent of them …" (CP 6.483, EP 2.448).  Furthermore, in three 
different manuscript drafts of the article that are included in R 843, Peirce 
explicitly denied that God is "immanent in" nature or the three Universes, 
instead declaring (again) that He is the Creator of them:

  *   "I do not mean, then, a 'soul of the World' or an intelligence is 
'immanent' in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of 
matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them."
  *   "Indeed, meaning by 'God,' as throughout this paper will be meant, the 
Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to Him, 
Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being not 'immanent in' the 
Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content of 
them, without exception."
  *   "But I had better add that I do not mean by God a being merely 'immanent 
in Nature,' but I mean that Being who has created every content of the world of 
ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world of all 
minds, without any exception whatever."
These passages shed light not only on Peirce's concept of God--he was clearly a 
theist, not a pantheist or panentheist, at least as I understand those 
terms--but also on what exactly he had in mind with his three Universes of 
Experience that the article describes as consisting of Ideas, Brute Actuality, 
and Signs.  These evidently correspond respectively to (1) ideal possibilities, 
matter, and minds; (2) Ideas, Matter, and Mind; and (3) ideal possibilities, 
physical facts, and minds.  Of course, it is barely a stretch, if at all, to 
identify these with his categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness.
[GF: ] I think it would be less of a stretch to identify the contents of those 
Universes as Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, i.e. as subjects or objects in which 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (respectively) inhere. This leaves open 
the possibility of identifying one of the categories as Creator of all three 
Universes. As you have pointed out already, Peirce begins by defining “Idea” as 
“anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully 
represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it.” 
These are clearly contents of the first Universe, and Peirce certainly asserts 
their Reality (after defining that term): “Of the three Universes of Experience 
familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to 
which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local 
habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact 
that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in 
anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality.”
[GF: ] I think it is worth noticing that Peirce defines the contents of the 
first Universe by quoting from A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V – which is 
largely a dialogue about reality and dreams; and that his definition of Reality 
(in the previous paragraph) uses a dream as an example of something that is 
unreal in one sense but real in another: ““Real” is a word invented in the 
thirteenth century to signify having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing to 
identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise attributed 
to it by any single man or group of men, or not. Thus, the substance of a dream 
is not Real, since it was such as it was, merely in that a dreamer so dreamed 
it; but the fact of the dream is Real, if it was dreamed; since if so, its 
date, the name of the dreamer, etc. make up a set of circumstances sufficient 
to distinguish it from all other events; and these belong to it, i.e. would be 
true if predicated of it, whether A, B, or C Actually ascertains them or not.”
[GF: ] Peirce is saying that the substance of the dream is not Real, although 
the fact of the dream is. But he has just defined “idea” in the vernacular 
sense as “the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy” and contrasted 
that sense with “Idea,” defined as “anything whose Being consists in its mere 
capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's faculty or 
impotence to represent it” – which has the Reality proper to the first 
Universe, the Reality of a possibility. (and not the reality of a substance. 
Once this “airy nothing” or “anything” does get fully represented, then it has 
the Actual (and perhaps substantial) Reality proper to the second Universe, and 
if it actually represents something to somebody (insert sop to Cerberus), then 
it has the Reality proper to the third Universe. To me it seems logical enough 
to regard this insubstantial Being, this capacity, as the Creator of all three 
Universes. This would be somewhat analogous to regarding abduction as Creator 
of the hypothesis which, my means of deduction, creates a theory which through 
inductive testing becomes more and more substantial. As we all know, abduction 
is the only source of new ideas; perhaps Firstness is the only source of Ideas. 
Likewise we might regard the dreamer as Creator of the dream and of the fact of 
the dream and of whatever might be predicated of it (i.e. of its meaning, if it 
has any). Thirdness, on the other hand, has connective rather than creative 
power: “The third Universe comprises everything whose Being consists in active 
power to establish connections between different objects, especially between 
objects in different Universes.”
[resuming JAS:]  What I quoted above from CP 6.483 and EP 2.448 suggests the 
possibility that only two of the three Universes have a Creator independent of 
them, which raises the question of which one might not.  Peirce provided a 
major clue in CP 6.490:
A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens necessarium would 
require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given.  A disembodied 
spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it is destined 
to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time.  But in endless 
time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking … Pure mind, as 
creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, appear as having 
a character related to the habit-taking capacity, just as super-order is 
related to uniformity.
According to Peirce, then, God is "pure mind," and thus in some sense may not 
be completely independent of the Universe of Mind (i.e., Thirdness), while 
nevertheless being the independent Creator of the other two Universes--of Ideas 
and ideal possibilities (i.e., Firstness), and of Matter and physical facts 
(i.e., Secondness).
 What does all of this have to do with cosmology?  By 1908, Peirce apparently 
no longer held (if he ever did) that Firstness came first, so to speak; God 
created Firstness (and Secondness), but God Himself is Thirdness.  Furthermore, 
what exactly did God create when He created Firstness?  Peirce once again 
supplied the answer in CP 6.490:
In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before or after 
the evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu-bohu of which nothing 
whatever affirmative or negative was true universally.  There must have been, 
therefore, a little of everything conceivable.
In other words, there was an infinite range of vague possibilities, consistent 
with Peirce's evolving mathematical definition of a continuum, which is a 
paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
[GF: ] But I think you will agree that possibility is the logical equivalent of 
Firstness, not Thirdness. Peirce at this stage in his thinking often identified 
continuity with generality, and he wrote c.1905 that “The generality of the 
possible” is “the only true generality” (CP 5.533). So I don’t think continuity 
is confined to Thirdness; and I think Gary Richmond has argued that the 
ur-continuum or tohu bohu represented by the blackboard in Peirce’s famous 
cosmology lecture is the first Universe, which comprises “vague possibilities.” 
  —Anyway, that’s all I have time for today, so I’ll leave the rest to you, for 
now!
  He continued:
There must have been here and there a little undifferentiated tendency to take 
super-habits.  But such a state must tend to increase itself.  For a tendency 
to act in any way, combined with a tendency to take habits, must increase the 
tendency to act in that way.  Now substitute in this general statement for 
"tendency to act in any way" a tendency to take habits, and we see that that 
tendency would grow.  It would also become differentiated in various ways.
The tendency to take habits is another paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness, 
and Peirce had suggested thirty years earlier in "A Guess at the Riddle" (CP 
1.414, EP 1.279) that "habits of persistency" were precisely what enabled 
substances to achieve permanent existence; i.e., Secondness.
I probably could (and eventually might) say more about CP 6.490, but these 
initial observations are reminiscent of and consistent with the famous 
"blackboard" passage from the last Cambridge Conferences lecture of 1898, "The 
Logic of Continuity" (CP 6.203-209, RLT 261-263).  Peirce offered a clean 
blackboard as "a sort of Diagram of the original vague potentiality," differing 
from it by having only two dimensions rather than "some indefinite multitude of 
dimensions."  A chalk line drawn on the blackboard--by the hand of God, 
perhaps?--represents a brute discontinuity, but it is not really a line itself; 
it is a surface, one whose continuity is entirely derived from and dependent on 
that of the underlying blackboard.  The only true line is the limit between the 
white and black areas, "the reaction between two continuous surfaces into which 
it is separated."
Peirce acknowledged that all three categories--whiteness or blackness 
(Firstness), the boundary between them (Secondness), and the continuity of each 
(Thirdness)--are necessary for the reality of the chalk line.  However, he 
suggested that the continuity of the blackboard (Thirdness) is primordial in 
the sense that its reality somehow precedes and sustains that of anything drawn 
upon it.  A chalk line that persists, rather than being erased, represents the 
establishment of a habit--which is also entirely derived from and dependent on 
the continuity of the underlying blackboard:
This habit is a generalizing tendency, and as such a generalization, and as 
such a general, and as such a continuum or continuity.  It must have its origin 
in the original continuity which is inherent in potentiality.  Continuity, as 
generality, is inherent in potentiality, which is essentially general.
As additional lines are drawn and persist, they join together under other 
habits to constitute a "reacting system."  Eventually, "out of one of these 
Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence 
in which we happen to be."  So Peirce reaffirmed here that the law of mind, 
which is the law of habit, is primordial in the sense that all physical laws 
are derived from it (cf. CP 6.24-25).  Furthermore, according to Peirce, God as 
"pure mind," as well as the universal tendency to take habits and the "Platonic 
worlds" of Ideas and ideal possibilities, were and are real prior to--and hence 
apart from--the world of Matter and physical facts that now exists.  His 
position was an "extreme scholastic realism," indeed!
Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>
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