Søren, List:

It is interesting that you mentioned Edwina and quoted CP 6.24-25 at
length.  As you may recall, she and I discussed that same passage
extensively a couple of months ago, in the thread on "Peirce's Objective
Idealism."  Unfortunately, we were unable to reach agreement on whether he
rejected all three forms of hylopathy/monism that he described, and then
adopted a fourth option (her reading); or only rejected two of
them--neutralism and materialism--in favor of the third, idealism (my
reading).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 6:53 PM, Søren Brier <[email protected]> wrote:

> Dear Jon
>
>
>
> I have discussed this with Edwina before. I think the correct label for
> Peirce is a Hylozoism or Hylopathism inspired by Aristotle, which only
> indicates that matter is alive and in combination with his synechism that
> matter is a living field.
>
>
>
> Peirce writes: *Has Time, or has Space, any limit or node? Is hylozoism
> an opinion, actual or conceivable, rather than a senseless vocable; and if
> so, what is, or would be, that opinion? What is consciousness or mind like;
> meaning, is it a single continuum like Time and Space, which is for
> different purposes variously broken up by that which it contains; or is it
> composed of solid atoms, or is it more like a fluid? Has truth, in Kantian
> phrase, any "material" characteristics in general, by which it can, with
> any degree of probability, be recognized? Is there, for example, any
> general tendency in the course of events, any progress in one direction on
> the whole?* CP6.6) and furthermore
>
>                 *The old dualistic notion of mind and matter, so
> prominent in Cartesianism, as two radically different kinds of substance,
> will hardly find defenders today. Rejecting this, we are driven to some
> form of hylopathy, otherwise called monism. Then the question arises
> whether physical laws on the one hand and the psychical law on the other
> are to be taken -- *
>
> *                (a) as independent, a doctrine often called monism, but
> which I would name neutralism; or,*
>
> *                (b) the psychical law as derived and special, the
> physical law alone as primordial, which is materialism; or,*
>
> *                (c) the physical law as derived and special, the
> psychical law alone as primordial, which is idealism.*
>
> *                The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as repugnant
> to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to suppose
> that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a hypothesis
> absolutely irreducible to reason -- an ultimate, inexplicable regularity;
> while the only possible justification of any theory is that it should make
> things clear and reasonable.*
>
> *                Neutralism is sufficiently condemned by the logical maxim
> known as Ockham's razor, i.e., that not more independent elements are to be
> supposed than necessary. By placing the inward and outward aspects of
> substance on a par, it seems to render both primordial.*
>
> *                25. The one intelligible theory of the universe is that
> of objective idealism, that matter is effete mind, inveterate habits
> becoming physical laws. But before this can be accepted it must show itself
> capable of explaining the tri-dimensionality of space, the laws of motion,
> and the general characteristics of the universe, with mathematical
> clearness and precision; for no less should be demanded of every
> philosophy.* (CP 6.24)
>
>
>
>                 Best
>
>                                          Søren
>
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