ET: We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have the
right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.
Those are your words, not mine; I have *never *claimed to be "one with
Peirce." What I *have *claimed is that *some *of Peirce's positions are
perfectly clear and not reasonably disputable, whether I happen to agree
with him or not. That he believed in the Reality of God as *Ens
necessarium*, Creator of all three Universes of Experience, is one of
those--and I *do *happen to agree with him about that. At the same time,
this is not to say that his entire "view of Mind and creation" was
identical to my own; I am quite certain that it was not.
ET: I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my
comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.
On this, we are in complete agreement.
ET: I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
Again, this conflates the *mode *of a sign with the Universe of Experience
to which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all mathematical
reasoning should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas. My example was a
qualisign, which as a *quality* (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely
in the mode of Firstness, but as a *sign*--at least, according to Peirce in
CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe.
ET: I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness -
has any 'active power to establish connections between different objects'
and therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
If something does not have "active power to establish connections between
different objects," then it is not a *sign *at all--in this case, it is
merely a *quality*, rather than a *qualisign*. The very definition of what
it means to *be *a sign is that it is able to connect different
objects--specifically, an object with an interpretant.
ET: With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of
Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine cannot be
in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means that all three
kinds of genuine triads can only be "in the universe of *representations*."
Again, this is not about the *mode *of the sign, which can be in any of
the three categories, but about the *Universe of Experience *where it
belongs. Peirce then adds, "Indeed, representation necessarily involves a
genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind,
outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting
thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general,
nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living." Here we see that *all*
representation--i.e., all sign-action, all semeiosis--necessarily involves
a genuine triad, which can only be in the third Universe precisely *because
*it mediates between an object and interpretant. We also see that "thought
is general" and "thought is living," which is another way of saying that
thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought is in *signs*.
On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong inthis,
> then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of Peirce - and
> thus - interpreters. We each read him a different way and I don't think
> that you have the right to self-define yourself as someone who
> is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think that many others have to read Peirce - and -
> your and my comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we
> interpret him.
> For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm not
> sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions within the
> physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and
> don't need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is effete mind'.
> I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the
> mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure
> ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic
> legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.
> So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three categories. The
> quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode
> of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of
> Experience, as something "*whose being consists in active power to
> establish connections between different objects"* (CP 6.455). .....I
> consider that this *quote **refers to Thirdness*. And therefore - I don't
> see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - has any
> 'active power to establish connections between different objects' and
> therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to
> With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of
> 'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in* A* quality
> and in* A* fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of
> Firstness; it is a 'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a
> genuine triad*' which involves generality or Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent
> Sinsign is a triad in a total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but
> it is not the same as a *thoroughly genuine triad* which involves
> generality or Thirdness. So, again, a triad in a mode of Firstness does
> not, in my readings of Peirce, belong in 'the Third universe'; there is *no
> generality*. Firstness has no capacity to 'make connections', to mediate,
> to connect. That is the nature of Firstness - its isolate vividness.
> So- we disagree in our readings.
> As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it remains
> your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and creation - is quite
> different from yours.
> ----- Original Message -----
> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
> *Cc:* Peirce-L <email@example.com>
> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
> Edwina, List:
> I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than myself,
> those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his
> writings--things that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize to be
> HIS views, as expressed in those writings. I do not subscribe to the
> approach that all interpretations are equally valid; while there can
> certainly be legitimate differences, there are also objectively
> *incorrect* readings, assuming (as Gary F. once put it) that Peirce said
> what he meant and meant what he said. Of course, I am (very) fallible, so
> I may (and probably do) overreach in some cases. I even conceded in my
> last post, "We might quibble about these particular assignments of the
> labels, which are just off the top of my head." The overall point
> remains--Peirce *did not* limit the categories to semeiosis, as you
> apparently do. If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong about
> this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.
> There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the word
> "mode." I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness
> [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a *mode* of
> representation," I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of
> Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of Experience,
> as something "whose being consists in active power to establish connections
> between different objects" (CP 6.455). In some contexts, the categories do
> correspond to modes, such as possible/actual/habitual; but not always. In
> any case, what I said is perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP
> 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if
> genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact ... But a
> *thoroughly* genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and
> exists in the universe of *representations*." So I am not the only one
> claiming that "it belongs primarily to the third Universe"--Peirce did, as
> well. If I am wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
> Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce
> believed in the Reality of God as *Ens necessarium* and Creator of all
> three Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452. If I am
> wrong about this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> Jon, you wrote:
>> "For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function within the O-R-I
>> triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his architectonic
>> arrangement of the sciences!"
>> PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of Peirce.
>> Therefore, please write something like: ' *In my [Jon Alan Schmidt]
>> interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only function within the
>> O-R-I triad...etc etc.*
>> Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear that what
>> I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I had the
>> direct or correct view of Peirce.
>> Now - to your points -
>> 1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a pure or genuine triad in
>> a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a mode of
>> representation - and representation suggests Thirdness or the use of some
>> symbolic mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim that "it belongs
>> primarily to the Third Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean to
>> Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot be in the
>> world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
>> regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot find this quote
>> at 1.515.
>> However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part of
>> Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and
>> Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three categories are a
>> complex embedded function.
>> 2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with the
>> categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various sciences
>> etc has any real relationship to the categories. The categories, as I read
>> Peirce, refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of all that is in any
>> way or in any sense present to the mind quite regardless of whether it
>> corresponds to any real thing or not" 1.284
>> Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as Firstness,
>> philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "
>> I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields of
>> studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers to
>> 'feelings and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts?
>> But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and one can
>> see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be loosely
>> applied - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of 'feeling,
>> quality, freedom'; and induction does have an element of actual fact; and
>> deduction does have an element of necessity. But I think this is a loose
>> description for all three are, after all, aspects of reasoning [Thirdness].
>> 3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator.
>> "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have come
>> something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then
>> by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Thought
>> time would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the
>> first, because resulting from it" 1.412.
>> Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens
>> necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god, since you
>> have provided your supportive quotations from the Bible - which sees god as
>> an agential creator - but - I don't see that this Agential Force is
>> accepted by Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the agential force - an ongoing,
>> evolving, open force - and a part of matter - i.e., not separate from
>> matter- and therefore not prior to time or matter. [see his discussion in
>> the Reality of God - 6.489 ....
>> ----- Original Message -----
>> *From:* Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
>> *To:* Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>> *Cc:* Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> ; Peirce-L
>> *Sent:* Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
>> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
>> Edwina, List:
>> ET: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations
>> between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode; all
>> in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.
>> I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I relations
>> specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general, since that is
>> what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper. In other words, O-R-I is not
>> the *only kind* of triad, even though it is probably the *paradigmatic
>> example *of a triad.
>> In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all *genuine *triads
>> belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of quality or
>> the world of fact. These are undoubtedly what he later called the three
>> Universes of Experience--quality corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute
>> Actuality, and representation to Signs. However, this is not to say that
>> all signs are in the *mode *of Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants. Even a
>> qualisign, which must be iconic and rhematic in its relations to its object
>> and interpretant, and thus is classified entirely in the mode of Firstness,
>> belongs primarily to the third Universe--its "being consists in active
>> power to establish connections between different objects." However,
>> specifically as a *quali*sign--a quality that is a sign--it also, in
>> some sense, belongs to the first Universe. Likewise, a sinsign belongs to
>> both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe as an existent.
>> I am still thinking through how all of this works, including how the R-O
>> and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I would welcome input from
>> others on it.
>> ET: As such the categories only function within the triad - the O-R-I
>> Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it comes to
>> this subject. For Peirce, the categories do not *only *function within
>> the O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are *everywhere *in his
>> architectonic arrangement of the sciences! For sciences of discovery,
>> mathematics as Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as
>> Thirdness; for philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as Firstness,
>> normative sciences as Secondness, and metaphysics as Thirdness; for
>> normative sciences, esthetics as Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic
>> (semeiotic) as Thirdness. Within mathematics, the categories manifest as
>> monads, dyads, and triads; within phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and
>> representation; within metaphysics, as possibility, actuality, and
>> necessity (habituality); within logic, as speculative grammar, critic, and
>> methodeutic. We might quibble about these particular assignments of the
>> labels, which are just off the top of my head, but the point is that
>> restricting the categories to semeiosis is decidedly contrary to Peirce's
>> own approach.
>> ET: I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the
>> Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes
>> or universes'.
>> No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is identical to an
>> Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and cosmology in
>> particular, rather than semeiotic. Even if "our universe [now] requires
>> both Firstness and Secondness," this does not *entail *that they were
>> also required "before" our actual universe came into being. While you
>> "reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or
>> universes," Peirce quite explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I
>> honestly do not see how any *legitimate* reading of "A Neglected
>> Argument" can deny this.
>> CSP: The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is *the
>> proper name, signifying *Ens necessarium*; in my belief Really creator
>> of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>> On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca>
>>> Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the
>>> Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one
>>> mode; all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These are
>>> only three of the ten - and the function of the non-genuine or degenerate
>>> modes is, in my view, to provide the capacity for evolution, adaptation and
>>> change. That is, Firstness linked to Secondness and Thirdness, as in the
>>> vital, vital triad of the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - introduces novelty
>>> to actuality to habit. That's quite something.
>>> My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon
>>> considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but are
>>> modes of organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing
>>> events, i.e, 'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only function
>>> within the triad - the O-R-I triad.
>>> I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic
>>> Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I
>>> consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I
>>> therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes
>>> or universes'. That is - I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of Peirce
>>> also within his belief in Genesis and God - but I can't see this same view
>>> within the writings of Peirce.
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