1) Jon - When you say that some of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and 
not reasonably disputable - again, this is your opinion. I happen to disagree 
with your view of Peirce's view on 'god- as 'creator of the three universes. 
You have your opinion - and again, I think it is incorrect for you to declare 
that you 'read' Peirce 'exactly correctly'. 

2) Now - when you write:
"My example was a qualisign, which as a quality (as well as an icon and rheme) 
is entirely in the mode of Firstness, but as a sign--at least, according to 
Peirce in CP 1.480--can only belong to the third Universe."

I completely disagree with you on the above. The whole triad - a rhematic 
iconic qualisign - is entirely in the mode of Firstness and is a sign. And does 
NOT belong to the third Universe. There is no such thing as a single relation 
i.e.,the Representamen-Object,  existing on its own. The triad of all three 
relations is irreducible. O-R; R-R; R-I.  None of these exist on their own but 
within the triad. A Qualisign is a quality, a feeling - and is not in the 
'third Universe'.

A quality IS a qualisign! There is no such thing as something operating outside 
of the triad. There is no such thing as a 'quality' in itself. 
The definition of a sign is its triadic set of Relations: That between the 
Representamen and the Object; that of the Representamen in itself; that between 
the Representamen and the Interpretant. The Representamen acts as mediation - 
and can be in a mode of Firstness.  An Interpretant is not an Object but is an 
'output' interpretation linked by the Representamen to the stimuli of the 
Object. 

And again - of the ten classes of SIGNS, four of them do NOT have their 
Representamen operating in a mode of Thirdness. That includes the genuine sign 
of a rhematic iconic qualisign; and the Dicent Indexical Sinsign...
And yet - these are legitimate SIGNS.  They have no Thirdness in them at all.
See 2.227 and on.

Again, the triad is basic to semiosis; it does not necessarily require 
Thirdness in its component [again, see the ten classes 2.227..] and ..there is 
no such thing as a 'quality' or indeed anything, functioning outside of the 
semiosic triad.

Edwina






  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
  To: Edwina Taborsky 
  Cc: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 5:42 PM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Edwina, List:


    ET:  We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have the 
right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'.


  Those are your words, not mine; I have never claimed to be "one with Peirce." 
 What I have claimed is that some of Peirce's positions are perfectly clear and 
not reasonably disputable, whether I happen to agree with him or not.  That he 
believed in the Reality of God as Ens necessarium, Creator of all three 
Universes of Experience, is one of those--and I do happen to agree with him 
about that.  At the same time, this is not to say that his entire "view of Mind 
and creation" was identical to my own; I am quite certain that it was not.


    ET:  I think that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my 
comments - and make up their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him.


  On this, we are in complete agreement.


    ET:  I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the 
mathematical reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure 
ideational - which would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic 
legisign argment O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.


  Again, this conflates the mode of a sign with the Universe of Experience to 
which it belongs, although I am not even sure that all mathematical reasoning 
should be assigned to the Universe of Ideas.  My example was a qualisign, which 
as a quality (as well as an icon and rheme) is entirely in the mode of 
Firstness, but as a sign--at least, according to Peirce in CP 1.480--can only 
belong to the third Universe.


    ET:  I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a mode of Firstness - 
has any 'active power to establish connections between different objects' and 
therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that it belongs to 
'Thirdness'.


  If something does not have "active power to establish connections between 
different objects," then it is not a sign at all--in this case, it is merely a 
quality, rather than a qualisign.  The very definition of what it means to be a 
sign is that it is able to connect different objects--specifically, an object 
with an interpretant.


    ET:  With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of 
'genuine triads'.


  Yes, he does; but he also goes on to say that "a triad if genuine cannot be 
in the world of quality nor in that of fact," which means that all three kinds 
of genuine triads can only be "in the universe of representations."  Again, 
this is not about the mode of the sign, which can be in any of the three 
categories, but about the Universe of Experience where it belongs.  Peirce then 
adds, "Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad.  For it 
involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating 
between an object and an interpreting thought.  Now this is neither a matter of 
fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is 
living."  Here we see that all representation--i.e., all sign-action, all 
semeiosis--necessarily involves a genuine triad, which can only be in the third 
Universe precisely because it mediates between an object and interpretant.  We 
also see that "thought is general" and "thought is living," which is another 
way of saying that thought is Thirdness--which makes sense, since all thought 
is in signs.


  Regards,


  Jon


  On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 3:55 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

    Jon- I don't think you can move into saying 'If I [Jon] am wrong inthis, 
then Peirce was wrong]. We remain, all of us, readers of Peirce - and thus - 
interpreters. We each read him a different way and I don't think that you have 
the right to self-define yourself as someone who is 'one-with-Peirce'. I think 
that many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up 
their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him. 

    For example - I consider that EVERYTHING is semiosic - whereas, I'm not 
sure what meaning you assign to the word. For me - all actions within the 
physico-chemical, biological and socioconceptual world are semiosic - and don't 
need human agency to be such. Again, 'matter is effete mind'.

    I read 6.455 differently than you do - I don't see that eg the mathematical 
reasoning is in a categorical mode of Firstness. It IS pure ideational - which 
would be, in the ten classes, a pure Argument [symbolic legisign argment 
O-R-I]; that is - ENTIRELY IN THIRDNESS.

     So, i don't equate the three universes to match the three categories. The 
quotation you provide "I said that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of 
Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) belongs to the third Universe of Experience, as 
something "whose being consists in active power to establish connections 
between different objects" (CP 6.455). .....I consider that this quote refers 
to Thirdness. And therefore - I don't see that a qualisign - one entirely in a 
mode of Firstness - has any 'active power to establish connections between 
different objects' and therefore, I simply don't see how you can declare that 
it belongs to 'Thirdness'.

    With regard to your reading of 1.480- Peirce refers to THREE kinds of 
'genuine triads'. I read a genuine triad as operational in A quality and in A 
fact. So- 1-1-1, a qualisign, is a triad in a total mode of Firstness; it is a 
'feeling of redness' but it is NOT the same as a thoroughly genuine triad' 
which involves generality or Thirdness. A 2-2-2 or Dicent Sinsign is a triad in 
a total mode of Secondness, eg, a weathervane - but it is not the same as a 
thoroughly genuine triad which involves generality or Thirdness. So,  again, a 
triad in a mode of Firstness does not, in my readings of Peirce, belong in 'the 
Third universe'; there is no generality. Firstness has no capacity to 'make 
connections', to mediate, to connect. That is the nature of Firstness - its 
isolate vividness.
    So- we disagree in our readings. 

    As for your interpretation of God and Peirce - I maintain that it remains 
your interpretation and that Peirce's view of Mind and creation  - is quite 
different from yours.

    Edwina
      ----- Original Message ----- 
      From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
      To: Edwina Taborsky 
      Cc: Peirce-L 
      Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 4:13 PM
      Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


      Edwina, List: 


      I try to be careful about only attributing to Peirce, rather than myself, 
those things that strike me as incontrovertibly clear in his writings--things 
that the vast majority of Peirce scholars recognize to be HIS views, as 
expressed in those writings.  I do not subscribe to the approach that all 
interpretations are equally valid; while there can certainly be legitimate 
differences, there are also objectively incorrect readings, assuming (as Gary 
F. once put it) that Peirce said what he meant and meant what he said.  Of 
course, I am (very) fallible, so I may (and probably do) overreach in some 
cases.  I even conceded in my last post, "We might quibble about these 
particular assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head."  
The overall point remains--Peirce did not limit the categories to semeiosis, as 
you apparently do.  If you are right to do so, then not only am I wrong about 
this, but Peirce was also wrong about it.


      There seems to be a particular terminological difficulty with the word 
"mode."  I did not say "that a pure or genuine triad in a mode of Firstness 
[O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a mode of representation," I said 
that a thoroughly genuine triad in a mode of Firstness (i.e., a qualisign) 
belongs to the third Universe of Experience, as something "whose being consists 
in active power to establish connections between different objects" (CP 6.455). 
 In some contexts, the categories do correspond to modes, such as 
possible/actual/habitual; but not always.  In any case, what I said is 
perfectly consistent with what Peirce wrote in CP 1.480 (not CP 1.515, as I 
indicated in my response to Jeff)--"a triad if genuine cannot be in the world 
of quality nor in that of fact ... But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated 
entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations."  So 
I am not the only one claiming that "it belongs primarily to the third 
Universe"--Peirce did, as well.  If I am wrong about this, then Peirce was also 
wrong about it.


      Finally, there is nothing to debate with respect to whether Peirce 
believed in the Reality of God as Ens necessarium and Creator of all three 
Universes of Experience--he says so plainly in CP 6.452.  If I am wrong about 
this, then Peirce was also wrong about it.


      Regards,


      Jon 


      On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 2:36 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
wrote:

        Jon, you wrote:

         "For Peirce, the categories do not only function within the O-R-I 
triad--for one thing, they are everywhere in his architectonic arrangement of 
the sciences!"

        PLEASE - do not write as if you alone are the sole interpreter of 
Peirce. Therefore, please write something like: ' In my [Jon Alan Schmidt] 
interpretation, the categories of Peirce do not only function within the O-R-I 
triad...etc etc.

        Do you see the difference? I am always careful to make it clear that 
what I write is MY interpretation of Peirce. I do not write as if I had the 
direct or correct view of  Peirce.

        Now - to your points - 

        1) With regard to genuine - I don't see that a  pure or genuine triad 
in a mode of Firstness [O-R-I all in a mode of Firstness] belongs in a mode of 
representation - and representation suggests Thirdness or the use of some 
symbolic mediation. I simply don't see how you can claim that "it belongs 
primarily to the Third Universe' [by which I am assuming that you mean to 
Thirdness]??

        Jeff has provided a quote: "For while a triad if genuine cannot be in 
the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or 
regularity, of quality or of fact." 1.515***ET - I cannot find this quote at 
1.515.

        However ,Peirce does write that 'Secondness is an essential part of 
Thirdness...and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness and 
Thirdness' 1.530 - which is why I consider that the three categories are a 
complex embedded function.

        2) Therefore I disagree with your aligning various sciences with the 
categories. I don't think that his differentiation of the various sciences etc 
has any real relationship to the categories. The categories, as I read Peirce, 
refer to the phaneron- "the collective total of all that is in any way or in 
any sense present to the mind quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any 
real thing or not" 1.284

        Jon, you wrote: "For sciences of discovery, mathematics as Firstness, 
philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; "

        I don't see this. Peirce certainly classified the various fields of 
studies - but not within the categories. Mathematics, which refers to 'feelings 
and quality'? Philosophy referring to actual facts?

        But he certainly classified fields of study into 'threes'. - and one 
can see that some of the descriptions of the modal categories can be loosely 
applied  - i.e., abduction does indeed have an element of 'feeling, quality, 
freedom'; and induction does have an element of actual fact; and deduction does 
have an element of necessity. But I think this is a loose description for all 
three are, after all, aspects of reasoning [Thirdness]. 

        3) I don't see that Peirce accepted a pre-existent creator. 
        "Out of the womb of indeterminacy, we must say that there would have 
come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may call a flash. Then 
by the principle of habit there would have been a second flash. Thought time 
would not yet have been, this second flash was in some sense after the first, 
because resulting from it" 1.412. 

        Now - this self-organized complexity didn't need a prior 'ens 
necessarium'. I am aware, Jon, of your view of genesis and god, since you have 
provided your supportive quotations from the Bible - which sees god as an 
agential creator - but - I don't see that this Agential Force is accepted by 
Peirce. Peirce sees 'Mind' as the agential force - an ongoing, evolving, open 
force - and a part of matter - i.e., not separate from matter- and therefore 
not prior to time or matter. [see his discussion in the Reality of God - 6.489 
....

        Edwina
          ----- Original Message ----- 
          From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
          To: Edwina Taborsky 
          Cc: Jeffrey Brian Downard ; Peirce-L 
          Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 2:20 PM
          Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


          Edwina, List: 


            ET:  Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations 
between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode; all in the 
mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness.


          I do not believe that Jeff's post was referring to the O-R-I 
relations specifically, but rather to triadic relations in general, since that 
is what Peirce discussed in the quoted paper.  In other words, O-R-I is not the 
only kind of triad, even though it is probably the paradigmatic example of a 
triad.


          In any case, Peirce stated quite clearly that all genuine triads 
belong to the world of representation, and not to the world of quality or the 
world of fact.  These are undoubtedly what he later called the three Universes 
of Experience--quality corresponds to Ideas, fact to Brute Actuality, and 
representation to Signs.  However, this is not to say that all signs are in the 
mode of Thirdness; i.e., Necessitants.  Even a qualisign, which must be iconic 
and rhematic in its relations to its object and interpretant, and thus is 
classified entirely in the mode of Firstness, belongs primarily to the third 
Universe--its "being consists in active power to establish connections between 
different objects."  However, specifically as a qualisign--a quality that is a 
sign--it also, in some sense, belongs to the first Universe.  Likewise, a 
sinsign belongs to both the third Universe as a sign and the second Universe as 
an existent.  I am still thinking through how all of this works, including how 
the R-O and R-I relations fit into the picture, so I would welcome input from 
others on it.


            ET:  As such the categories only function within the triad - the 
O-R-I triad.


          Perhaps this is our fundamental disagreement, at least when it comes 
to this subject.  For Peirce, the categories do not only function within the 
O-R-I triad--for one thing, they are everywhere in his architectonic 
arrangement of the sciences!  For sciences of discovery, mathematics as 
Firstness, philosophy as Secondness, and special sciences as Thirdness; for 
philosophy, phenomenology (phaneroscopy) as Firstness, normative sciences as 
Secondness, and metaphysics as Thirdness; for normative sciences, esthetics as 
Firstness, ethics as Secondness, logic (semeiotic) as Thirdness.  Within 
mathematics, the categories manifest as monads, dyads, and triads; within 
phaneroscopy, as quality, reaction, and representation; within metaphysics, as 
possibility, actuality, and necessity (habituality); within logic, as 
speculative grammar, critic, and methodeutic.  We might quibble about these 
particular assignments of the labels, which are just off the top of my head, 
but the point is that restricting the categories to semeiosis is decidedly 
contrary to Peirce's own approach.


            ET:  I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the 
Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I 
consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I 
therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or 
universes'.


          No one is suggesting that "pure or genuine Thirdness" is identical to 
an Argument; this thread concerns metaphysics in general, and cosmology in 
particular, rather than semeiotic.  Even if "our universe [now] requires both 
Firstness and Secondness," this does not entail that they were also required 
"before" our actual universe came into being.  While you "reject such a 
pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or universes," Peirce quite 
explicitly believed in just such a Creator, and I honestly do not see how any 
legitimate reading of "A Neglected Argument" can deny this.


            CSP:  The word "God," so "capitalized" (as we Americans say), is 
the definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really 
creator of all three Universes of Experience. (CP 6.452)


          Regards,


          Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
          Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
          www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


          On Thu, Oct 13, 2016 at 12:02 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

            Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the 
Relations between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode; 
all in the mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These are only three 
of the ten - and the function of the non-genuine or degenerate modes is, in my 
view, to provide the capacity for evolution, adaptation and change. That is, 
Firstness linked to Secondness and Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad of 
the Rhematic Indexical Legisign - introduces novelty to actuality to habit. 
That's quite something. 

            My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon 
considers that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but are modes 
of organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing events, i.e, 
'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only function within the triad 
- the O-R-I triad.

            I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the 
Symbolic Legisign Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I 
consider that our universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I 
therefore reject such a pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or 
universes'.  That is - I'm aware that Jon bases his reading of Peirce also 
within his belief in Genesis and God - but I can't see this same view within 
the writings of Peirce.

            Edwina


------------------------------------------------------------------------------



  -----------------------------
  PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with 
the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




Reply via email to