Jeffrey, list: Your post outlines the three 'pure' triads where the Relations
between the Object-Representamen-Interpretant are all of one mode; all in the
mode of Firstness or Secondness or Thirdness. These are only three of the ten -
and the function of the non-genuine or degenerate modes is, in my view, to
provide the capacity for evolution, adaptation and change. That is, Firstness
linked to Secondness and Thirdness, as in the vital, vital triad of the
Rhematic Indexical Legisign - introduces novelty to actuality to habit. That's
quite something.
My point is that the modal categories have no 'per se' reality [Jon considers
that both Firstness and Thirdness have such a reality] but are modes of
organization and experience of matter/concepts within ongoing events, i.e,
'matter is effete Mind'. As such the categories only function within the triad
- the O-R-I triad.
I don't see either that the 'pure or genuine Thirdness' - the Symbolic Legisign
Argument [O-R-I] can be an 'ens necessarium' because I consider that our
universe requires both Firstness and Secondness and I therefore reject such a
pre-existent 'Platonic creator of all three modes or universes'. That is - I'm
aware that Jon bases his reading of Peirce also within his belief in Genesis
and God - but I can't see this same view within the writings of Peirce.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: Peirce-L
Sent: Thursday, October 13, 2016 12:08 PM
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Hello Jon S, Gary R., List,
What more might we say about Peirce's account of what "would-be"--where the
focus is on the conceptions of of generality, potentiality and
possibility--when we consider Peirce's suggestion that continuity is relational
generality?
It helps, I think, to consider the difference between Peirce's account of the
operation of different kinds of generals in genuine triadic relations in "The
Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." There,
he distinguishes between those genuine triads that have the character of a law
of qualitative similarity, versus those that have the character of a law of
metaphysics, or a law of space or time, versus those triadic relations that
have the character of thoroughly genuine triads--i.e., the laws governing
processes of representation.
Here is what he says about the difference between triadic relations that are
genuine, such as the laws of quality and the laws of fact, versus those that
are thoroughly genuine:
Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in
the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or
regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated
entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations.
Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a
sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an
object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since
thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living. CP
1.515
The laws of fact govern what would-be with a "fixed" sort of necessity. That
is, they are necessary laws or, if we move to the second order, they may be
necessarily necessary in some respects. The laws governing processes of
representation are, at the second, contingent as necessities. In virtue of
these features of how continency and necessity come together in what is
thoroughly genuine in its triadic character as representation, these forms of
order have the character of what is final and not merely efficient. That is,
they are living and growing as forms of order.
As a side note, these richer modal notions gives us a very different sense of
what might be at work in Peirce's understanding of how possibility, actuality
and necessity might be related as prominent characteristics of the three
universes--and how the conception of what is an ens necessarium might be
thought of as creator of all three.
--Jeff
Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Wednesday, October 12, 2016 8:01 PM
To: Gary Richmond
Cc: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Gary R., List:
Zalamea's book has already started paying off. In a footnote on page 7, he
references a 1989 Transactions article by Brian Noble, "Peirce's Definitions of
Continuity and the Concept of Possibility." The title seemed promising for
insight into the relation between possibility/Firstness and
continuity/Thirdness, so I took a look. Sure enough, Noble provided this very
helpful passage on page 170.
Throughout this discussion of the concept of possibility it has been
assumed that there is a close relationship between the concepts of possibility
and continuity. This relationship is that of Firstness to Thirdness. Since
possibility and continuity have reference to future events, both must be
general because our knowledge of the future can only be general. But each is
general in different respects. Possibility is general because it is a mere
may-be, while continuity is general because it is a would-be. What is
distinctive of may-be's is that the principle of contradiction does not apply
... What is distinctive of a would-be is that the principle of excluded middle
does not apply ... Whereas a may-be is the expression of a possibility, a
would-be is the expression of a continuity.
The difference between a may-be/possibility and a would-be/continuity then
is the difference between the categories of Firstness and Thirdness. A
would-be has reference to a whole range of possibilities which it asserts to be
alike in a certain respect. A would-be embodies the conditions of possibility:
indeed, that is what makes it truly continuous. Continuity qua Thirdness has
as its Firstness, possibility which, as Firstness, can be prescinded from
continuity and considered in itself. But continuity necessarily presupposes
possibility and cannot, therefore, be prescinded from it.
Noble argued that Peirce came to this new understanding of possibility and
continuity in late 1896 or early 1897--precisely the same time frame when Fisch
believed that he finally became a "three-category realist."
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 5:04 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Gary R., List:
GR: This question of whether to consider "a continuum of possibilities"
as expressing 3ns or 1ns is a thorny one which is still being considered, for
example, by Fernando Zalamea and others.
Coincidentally, I just found out that Zalamea's book, Peirce's Logic of
Continuity, is waiting for me at the local public library. Hopefully I can
swing by and pick it up on the way home this evening.
GR: So, as I see it, the three categories are irreducible in this
universe, which is to say that no one of them can be said to constitute reality
in itself nor be prior to any of the others in this universe; since once a
universe (and it would seem to me that this would be so for any possible
universe), once, say, our universe is in the semiosic process of forming
itself, all three categories are necessarily required.
Yes, I am perceiving a need to make a distinction between "eternal"
Thirdness, God as "pure mind," and "created" Thirdness, the third Universe of
Experience that "comprises everything whose being consists in active power to
establish connections between different objects, especially between objects in
different Universes" (CP 6.455). This seems consistent with God being the
Creator of all three Universes of Experience and everything in them, without
exception, while yet being entirely independent of only two of them; created
Thirdness partakes of eternal Thirdness in some sense.
GR: Yet, again, the theater of that formation is this ur-continuity,
this "pure mind" which in my last post I called the Mind of God.
And again, my current working hypothesis is that "Pure mind, as creative of
thought" (CP 6.490) is the Person who conceives the possible chalk marks and
then draws some of them on the blackboard, rather than the blackboard itself as
a "theater" where chalk marks somehow spontaneously appear; instead, the
blackboard represents created Thirdness. However, I will tentatively grant
that your analysis may be closer to what Peirce himself had in mind.
GR: It seems to me that there might be good reason to consider this
ur-continuity as representing pure potential as 3ns, distinguished from pure
possibility as 1ns.
Distinguishing possibility (Firstness) from potentiality (Thirdness) is
where my thinking seems to be headed, as well, although it is still pretty
fuzzy to me at this point how to do so. In The Cambridge Companion to Peirce,
John Boler describes Firstness as "pure possibility and so different from
potentiality which is Thirdness" (p. 72), although he does not elaborate on
this and even says in an accompanying note, "I admit to not having a very firm
grip on Firstness" (p. 84 n. 74). Perhaps the following passage is relevant,
especially since the blackboard makes another appearance.
CSP: The zero collection is bare, abstract, germinal possibility. The
continuum is concrete, developed possibility. The whole universe of true and
real possibilities forms a continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual
Existence is, by virtue of the essential Secondness of Existence, a
discontinuous mark--like a line figure drawn on the area of the blackboard.
(NEM 4.345; 1898)
Here the array of chalk marks seem to represent "this Universe of Actual
Existence," rather than a Platonic world, while the blackboard represents the
continuum of "true and real possibilities."
Regards,
Jon
On Wed, Oct 12, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
Jon, List,
Catching up with list posts returning from my trip South I apparently
missed at least your post in response to Gary F.
In my message yesterday I hope I made it clear that I associate
ur-continuity (the blackboard metaphor) with 3ns not 1ns. Peirce is quite
explicit about this as I hope the brief quotations from RLT I provided show.
So, I would tend to strongly agree with your argumentation here:
JS: Peirce's statement was not that one of the categories created all
three Universes, but that all three Universes--or at any rate, two of the
three--have a Creator who is independent of them. I take this to mean that the
Creator might not be entirely independent of one of the three Universes. Of
course, my basic argument is that Peirce unambiguously described God as "pure
mind" and the Universe that corresponds to Thirdness as that of "Mind," so the
alignment seems pretty clear.
As I see it this ur-continuity represents a kind of aboriginal 3ns, that
is to say one involving the potential of the other categories coming into
being, one involving them potentially, which is another way of saying that the
categorial triad is potentially always-already *there* in that ur-continuity.
So as chance possibilities (1nses) emerge and eventually interact (2nses) with
others forming habits (3nses) of interaction, that a universe (say, this
universe) may come into being. Yet, as I see it, those 3nses of habit formation
are 'later' expressions (were Time, but in this proto-cosmos there is not yet
Time) of that aboriginal continuity. For this reason I have consistently said
(or at least implied) that the argument that the early cosmos 'begins' with 1ns
is, in my thinking, tantamount to saying that the universe comes out of
nothing, while, as I see it, nihil fit ex nihilo.
This brings me to your interesting group of questions regarding "a
continuum of possibilities."
JS: [Peirce] steadfastly associated possibility with Firstness and
continuity/generality with Thirdness, but his mathematical definition of a
continuum evolved toward the notion of an infinite range of indefinite
possibilities. Is a continuum of possibilities more properly considered to be
an example of Thirdness (as a continuum) or Firstness (as possibility)?
This question of whether to consider "a continuum of possibilities" as
expressing 3ns or 1ns is a thorny one which is still being considered, for
example, by Fernando Zalamea and others. It seems to me that the jury is still
out, but that in any case that this is essentially a mathematical question
concrning this existent universe, not the early cosmology which we've been
considering. This proto-cosmological 'sporting' of 1ns (those individiual chalk
marks in the blackboard example) may point to a underlying continuum of
possibilities (and qualities, etc.) which will be selected. But while they
'play' within (or upon, or in some way are created by) that ur-continuity, they
do in themselves respresent a continuum (at least not *yet*).
So when one asks, if the tendency to take habits arose by chance, I think
(1) it is that second kind of 3ns, viz., habit-taking, that so arises from the
original continuity (3ns), and that (2) there would be no possibility of ours
or any actual universe existing were this 'tendency' not to arise, and that
saying it "arose by chance" is just a "manner of speaking" given the
ur-continuity.
So, as I see it, the three categories are irreducible in this universe,
which is to say that no one of them can be said to constitute reality in itself
nor be prior to any of the others in this universe; since once a universe (and
it would seem to me that this would be so for any possible universe), once,
say, our universe is in the semiosic process of forming itself, all three
categories are necessarily required. Yet, again, the theater of that formation
is this ur-continuity, this "pure mind" which in my last post I called the Mind
of God.
I'll conclude by responding to another of your good questions. It seems
to me that there might be good reason to consider this ur-continuity as
representing pure potential as 3ns, distinguished from pure possibility as 1ns.
But I'm still not completely clear on this.
Best,
Gary R
Gary Richmond
Philosophy and Critical Thinking
Communication Studies
LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
C 745
718 482-5690
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 3:07 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt
<jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote:
Gary F., List:
GF: I think it would be less of a stretch to identify the contents
of those Universes as Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, i.e. as subjects or objects
in which Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (respectively) inhere.
I have generally been reluctant to talk about Firsts/Seconds/Thirds,
rather than Firstness/Secondness/Thirdness. I am not sure that the former
terminology is completely appropriate and consistent with Peirce's usage,
especially late in his life, although I am open to being convinced otherwise.
In fact, he seems to have shifted toward discussing "Universes" rather than
"categories," perhaps in order to emphasize that they are objective
constituents of reality, not mere labels that we apply to organize our
experience.
GF: This leaves open the possibility of identifying one of the
categories as Creator of all three Universes.
Peirce's statement was not that one of the categories created all three
Universes, but that all three Universes--or at any rate, two of the three--have
a Creator who is independent of them. I take this to mean that the Creator
might not be entirely independent of one of the three Universes. Of course, my
basic argument is that Peirce unambiguously described God as "pure mind" and
the Universe that corresponds to Thirdness as that of "Mind," so the alignment
seems pretty clear.
GF: To me it seems logical enough to regard this insubstantial
Being, this capacity, as the Creator of all three Universes.
Again, it is not that the Creator is identified with one Universe or
its contents, it is that He might not be entirely independent of one Universe.
And "mere capacity for getting fully represented" does not strike me as
equivalent to "capacity for creation," especially of other Universes. In "A
Neglected Argument," the only description of a Universe that mentions the other
two is that of the third.
GF: This would be somewhat analogous to regarding abduction as
Creator of the hypothesis which, my means of deduction, creates a theory which
through inductive testing becomes more and more substantial. As we all know,
abduction is the only source of new ideas; perhaps Firstness is the only source
of Ideas. Likewise we might regard the dreamer as Creator of the dream and of
the fact of the dream and of whatever might be predicated of it (i.e. of its
meaning, if it has any).
But abduction is not the creator of the hypothesis, it is the reasoning
process by which a person creates the hypothesis. Reasoning is thought, which
is Thirdness. Peirce characterized a person as a symbol or as a continuum,
both of which are Thirdness. Likewise, the dreamer who creates the dream, the
fact of it, and whatever might be predicated of it is a person (again,
Thirdness).
GF: But I think you will agree that possibility is the logical
equivalent of Firstness, not Thirdness. Peirce at this stage in his thinking
often identified continuity with generality, and he wrote c.1905 that “The
generality of the possible” is “the only true generality” (CP 5.533). So I
don’t think continuity is confined to Thirdness ...
This brings up one of the great puzzles for me in Peirce's writings.
He steadfastly associated possibility with Firstness and continuity/generality
with Thirdness, but his mathematical definition of a continuum evolved toward
the notion of an infinite range of indefinite possibilities. Is a continuum of
possibilities more properly considered to be an example of Thirdness (as a
continuum) or Firstness (as possibility)? Should we perhaps distinguish
possibility as Firstness from potentiality as Thirdness? If so, on what basis?
GF: ... and I think Gary Richmond has argued that the ur-continuum
or tohu bohu represented by the blackboard in Peirce’s famous cosmology lecture
is the first Universe, which comprises “vague possibilities.”
From browsing through the List archives, I took Gary R. to be
suggesting that the blackboard or "ur-continuum" is Thirdness, consistent with
my initial post in this thread. Perhaps he can weigh in on this himself.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Tue, Oct 11, 2016 at 9:59 AM, <g...@gnusystems.ca> wrote:
Jon, list,
On the question of which of the three Universes may not “have a
Creator independent of it,” I’d like to offer an argument that it could be the
Universe of Firstness rather than Thirdness. However I won’t have time this
week to construct an argumentation as thoroughgoing as your argument for
Thirdness as Creator; so instead, I’ll just insert a few comments into your
post, below. I’ll put Peirce’s words in bold.
Gary F
} God himself culminates in the present moment, and will never be
more divine in the lapse of all the ages. [Thoreau] {
http://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs gateway
From: Jon Alan Schmidt [mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com]
Sent: 9-Oct-16 22:45
List:
As I mentioned a few weeks ago when I started the thread on "Peirce's
Theory of Thinking," there is an intriguing paragraph about cosmology in the
first additament to "A Neglected Argument for the Reality of God." It did not
actually accompany the article originally, but nevertheless is in the Collected
Papers as CP 6.490. Before discussing it directly, a few preliminaries are in
order.
In the very first sentence of the published article itself, Peirce
stated, "The word 'God,' so 'capitalized' (as we Americans say), is the
definable proper name, signifying Ens necessarium; in my belief Really creator
of all three Universes of Experience" (CP 6.452, EP 2.434). In the second
additament, the one that did appear in The Hibbert Journal, he added, "It is
that course of meditation upon the three Universes which gives birth to the
hypothesis and ultimately to the belief that they, or at any rate two of the
three, have a Creator independent of them …" (CP 6.483, EP 2.448).
Furthermore, in three different manuscript drafts of the article that are
included in R 843, Peirce explicitly denied that God is "immanent in" nature or
the three Universes, instead declaring (again) that He is the Creator of them:
a.. "I do not mean, then, a 'soul of the World' or an intelligence
is 'immanent' in Nature, but is the Creator of the three Universes of minds, of
matter, and of ideal possibilities, and of everything in them."
b.. "Indeed, meaning by 'God,' as throughout this paper will be
meant, the Being whose Attributes are, in the main, those usually ascribed to
Him, Omniscience, Omnipotence, Infinite Benignity, a Being not 'immanent in'
the Universes of Matter, Mind, and Ideas, but the Sole Creator of every content
of them, without exception."
c.. "But I had better add that I do not mean by God a being merely
'immanent in Nature,' but I mean that Being who has created every content of
the world of ideal possibilities, of the world of physical facts, and the world
of all minds, without any exception whatever."
These passages shed light not only on Peirce's concept of God--he was
clearly a theist, not a pantheist or panentheist, at least as I understand
those terms--but also on what exactly he had in mind with his three Universes
of Experience that the article describes as consisting of Ideas, Brute
Actuality, and Signs. These evidently correspond respectively to (1) ideal
possibilities, matter, and minds; (2) Ideas, Matter, and Mind; and (3) ideal
possibilities, physical facts, and minds. Of course, it is barely a stretch,
if at all, to identify these with his categories of Firstness, Secondness, and
Thirdness.
[GF: ] I think it would be less of a stretch to identify the contents
of those Universes as Firsts, Seconds and Thirds, i.e. as subjects or objects
in which Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (respectively) inhere. This
leaves open the possibility of identifying one of the categories as Creator of
all three Universes. As you have pointed out already, Peirce begins by defining
“Idea” as “anything whose Being consists in its mere capacity for getting fully
represented, regardless of any person's faculty or impotence to represent it.”
These are clearly contents of the first Universe, and Peirce certainly asserts
their Reality (after defining that term): “Of the three Universes of Experience
familiar to us all, the first comprises all mere Ideas, those airy nothings to
which the mind of poet, pure mathematician, or another might give local
habitation and a name within that mind. Their very airy-nothingness, the fact
that their Being consists in mere capability of getting thought, not in
anybody's Actually thinking them, saves their Reality.”
[GF: ] I think it is worth noticing that Peirce defines the contents
of the first Universe by quoting from A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Act V – which
is largely a dialogue about reality and dreams; and that his definition of
Reality (in the previous paragraph) uses a dream as an example of something
that is unreal in one sense but real in another: ““Real” is a word invented in
the thirteenth century to signify having Properties, i.e. characters sufficing
to identify their subject, and possessing these whether they be anywise
attributed to it by any single man or group of men, or not. Thus, the substance
of a dream is not Real, since it was such as it was, merely in that a dreamer
so dreamed it; but the fact of the dream is Real, if it was dreamed; since if
so, its date, the name of the dreamer, etc. make up a set of circumstances
sufficient to distinguish it from all other events; and these belong to it,
i.e. would be true if predicated of it, whether A, B, or C Actually ascertains
them or not.”
[GF: ] Peirce is saying that the substance of the dream is not Real,
although the fact of the dream is. But he has just defined “idea” in the
vernacular sense as “the substance of an actual unitary thought or fancy” and
contrasted that sense with “Idea,” defined as “anything whose Being consists in
its mere capacity for getting fully represented, regardless of any person's
faculty or impotence to represent it” – which has the Reality proper to the
first Universe, the Reality of a possibility. (and not the reality of a
substance. Once this “airy nothing” or “anything” does get fully represented,
then it has the Actual (and perhaps substantial) Reality proper to the second
Universe, and if it actually represents something to somebody (insert sop to
Cerberus), then it has the Reality proper to the third Universe. To me it seems
logical enough to regard this insubstantial Being, this capacity, as the
Creator of all three Universes. This would be somewhat analogous to regarding
abduction as Creator of the hypothesis which, my means of deduction, creates a
theory which through inductive testing becomes more and more substantial. As we
all know, abduction is the only source of new ideas; perhaps Firstness is the
only source of Ideas. Likewise we might regard the dreamer as Creator of the
dream and of the fact of the dream and of whatever might be predicated of it
(i.e. of its meaning, if it has any). Thirdness, on the other hand, has
connective rather than creative power: “The third Universe comprises everything
whose Being consists in active power to establish connections between different
objects, especially between objects in different Universes.”
[resuming JAS:] What I quoted above from CP 6.483 and EP 2.448
suggests the possibility that only two of the three Universes have a Creator
independent of them, which raises the question of which one might not. Peirce
provided a major clue in CP 6.490:
A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens
necessarium would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A
disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it
is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time. But
in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking …
Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time,
appear as having a character related to the habit-taking capacity, just as
super-order is related to uniformity.
According to Peirce, then, God is "pure mind," and thus in some sense
may not be completely independent of the Universe of Mind (i.e., Thirdness),
while nevertheless being the independent Creator of the other two Universes--of
Ideas and ideal possibilities (i.e., Firstness), and of Matter and physical
facts (i.e., Secondness).
What does all of this have to do with cosmology? By 1908, Peirce
apparently no longer held (if he ever did) that Firstness came first, so to
speak; God created Firstness (and Secondness), but God Himself is Thirdness.
Furthermore, what exactly did God create when He created Firstness? Peirce
once again supplied the answer in CP 6.490:
In that state of absolute nility, in or out of time, that is,
before or after the evolution of time, there must then have been a tohu-bohu of
which nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally. There
must have been, therefore, a little of everything conceivable.
In other words, there was an infinite range of vague possibilities,
consistent with Peirce's evolving mathematical definition of a continuum, which
is a paradigmatic manifestation of Thirdness.
[GF: ] But I think you will agree that possibility is the logical
equivalent of Firstness, not Thirdness. Peirce at this stage in his thinking
often identified continuity with generality, and he wrote c.1905 that “The
generality of the possible” is “the only true generality” (CP 5.533). So I
don’t think continuity is confined to Thirdness; and I think Gary Richmond has
argued that the ur-continuum or tohu bohu represented by the blackboard in
Peirce’s famous cosmology lecture is the first Universe, which comprises “vague
possibilities.” —Anyway, that’s all I have time for today, so I’ll leave the
rest to you, for now!
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