Gary R, list
That's a nice outline. 

With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE has been 
existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even if one defines 
these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s]  as nothing for in a very real 
sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.

With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality of any 
kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the 
Reality of God. [see ** below]...

I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a 
'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require self-organization of 
order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410. That is, order and habit 
emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter. They don't pre-exist. I think 
this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists vs non-theists!

Edwina




  ----- Original Message ----- 
  From: Gary Richmond 
  To: Peirce-L 
  Sent: Monday, October 17, 2016 4:06 PM
  Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


  Jon, Edwina, List,



  I think one way of looking at this Platonic vs Aristotelian question is to, 
at least in a sense and for the purposes of this kind of cosmological 
discussion, restrict Peirce's Platonism (which, imo, ought not be conflated 
with other versions of Platonism) to his consideration of the proto-cosmos;  
then seeing that once there is an actually existent universe, that Peirce's 
attitude becomes at least predominantly Aristotelian.


  This way of looking at the Platonic vs Aristotelian matter is strongly 
suggested--at least to me--by this passage which has occasionally appeared in 
forum discussions, snippets of which I've quoted in this thread, and which was 
given at greater lengh by Jon. For the purpose of this message I'll quote but 
one salient passage from Jon's extended quote:


    In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of evolution 
at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that locus in the 
cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic world, which 
in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too ... At the same 
time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the existing universe, 
but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, to conceive that 
there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one another; until finally 
out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated the particular actual 
universe of existence in which we happen to be. (CP 6.200, 208; 1898)

  So I think it might be helpful in these discussions to clearly distinguish 
between  "the whole Platonic world, which in itself is equally real" and the 
"existing universe" where "finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is 
differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen 
to be." The first is out of (or 'before') time, the latter establishing(?) the 
continuum of time (and space, for that matter) in this universe.


  For those for whom the question as to what came before the putative Big Bang 
the answer is "nothing" (while, as previously mentioned, I personally find the 
Big Bang singularity itself problematic), Peirce's several discussions 
throughout his life concerning his conception of God, will probably have little 
resonance. So I would also like to repeat my sense that it may be 
counter-productive to insert the God of Genesis much into this discussion of 
"the first stages of development, before time yet existed" as all Peirce claims 
is that such discussions "must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of 
the first chapter of Genesis" (emphasis added by me). So, as I suggested by 
introducing the dominant early cosmological myth of Atum in Nun, there are 
other "vague and figurative" ways of conceiving of "the first stages of 
development, before time yet existed."


  On the other hand, if one studiously avoids specific religious allusions, as 
Peirce does, for example, in his discussion of super-order (which, btw, Jon, I 
would say is masterfully analyzed by you such that I think it deserves a 
threaded discussion of its own, one in which I'd be eager to participate), and 
if one is not an atheist, in light not only of the N.A. but of the various 
things Peirce wrote throughout his life regarding God, it is hard not to find 
your argument sound and your conclusion regarding the super-order convincing.


    Jon: Continuity is generality, and generality of any kind is impossible in 
the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the Reality of God. [see ** 
below]


  As Jon suggested, the super-order material is complex and difficult to 
interpret and analyze. But the connection of the God-idea to ur-continuity, 
primordial 3ns, super-order, and super-habit is well worth pursuing for those 
of us who want to get a better grasp of what characterizes Peirce's theism. I 
have already suggested that I do not myself see Peirce as a doctrinaire or 
dogmatic theist, that is, his view of God appears to me very unlike that of any 
theistic sect past or present.


  **[There is a remark on super-order and super-habit in the context of 
Peirce's religious thought in West and Anderson's, Consensus on Peirce's 
Concept of Habit,  but I don't know of any extended discussions of super-order 
and I haven't read much of CPCH yet.]


  Best,


  Gary R


  PS I just read your last post Jon and find your solution to the ur-continuity 
issue promising (although I'll have to further study it). So, this seems to me 
like yet another reason to move this part of the discussion to another thread. 










  Gary Richmond
  Philosophy and Critical Thinking
  Communication Studies
  LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
  C 745
  718 482-5690


  On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 12:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> 
wrote:

    Edwina, List:


      ET:  I consider the two arguments, one that explains the universe is 
self-organized and evolving with its full identity only emerging as the Final 
Interpretant in the future; and the other that the universe relies on an a 
priori Mind/God - to be incompatible.


    Peirce stated in what you quoted from CP 1.412, "Our conceptions of the 
first stages of development, before time yet existed, must be as vague and 
figurative as the expressions of the first chapter of Genesis."  This is 
relevant in at least two ways--something "vague and figurative" is subject to 
subsequent clarification, which is what I am suggesting that CP 6.490 
accomplished; and "the first chapter of Genesis" obviously presents a cosmology 
that explicitly includes a divine Creator.


      ET:  Realities are generalizations - and generals do not 'exist' except 
within the particular. Your outline is Platonic - with Ideal Forms that are 
Real. Again, Peirce was not a Platonist and his generals, even though real, are 
part of the particular instantiation.


    As I quoted previously, Peirce's outline in "The Logic of Continuity" is 
explicitly Platonic in precisely this sense.  By 1898, Peirce clearly held that 
everything in all three categories (or Universes) is Real, even though only 
that which belongs under Secondness is Actual--i.e., Ideas (or ideal 
possibilities) and Signs (or Mind) are Real, not just Brute Actuality (or 
physical facts).


      CSP:  Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential 
consequence of it ... is the scholastic doctrine of realism.  This is usually 
defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general, among the 
number being the modes of determination of existent singulars, if, indeed, 
these be not the only such objects.  But the belief in this can hardly escape 
being accompanied by the acknowledgment that there are, besides, real vagues, 
and especially real possibilities.  For possibility being the denial of a 
necessity, which is a kind of generality, is vague like any other contradiction 
of a general.  Indeed, it is the reality of some possibilities that 
pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon. (CP 5.453; 1905)


      CSP:  In other places, I have given many other reasons for my firm belief 
that there are real possibilities.  I also think, however, that, in addition to 
actuality [Secondess] and possibility [Firstness], a third mode of reality must 
be recognized in that which, as the gipsy fortune-tellers express it, is "sure 
to come true," or, as we may say, is destined [Thirdness] ... (CP 4.547; 1906)


    I know that you disagree, but I honestly think that it is abundantly clear 
from these and other writings that Peirce was a "three-category realist" from 
about 1896 until the end of his life, as Max Fisch argued.


      ET:  I don't see that 'matter as effete mind' means that mind and matter 
are separate. 


    I did not say that they are separate, I said that mind is more fundamental. 
 In Peirce's terminology (CP 6.24-25), mind is "primoridal," while matter is 
"derived and special."  Thus matter cannot exist without mind, but mind can be 
real (note the difference) without matter.  In fact, Peirce's cosmology seems 
to indicate that matter exists as discontinuity of mind.


      CSP:  The whole universe of true and real possibilities forms a 
continuum, upon which this Universe of Actual Existence is, by virtue of the 
essential Secondness of Existence, a discontinuous mark--like a line figure 
drawn on the area of the blackboard. (NEM 4.345; 1898)


    Regards,


    Jon


    On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 7:07 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

      Jon, list - I'll try to reply below
          1) ET:   I consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the 
universe are not compatible.


        JON:I just offered a lengthy argument showing that they are compatible. 
 This obviously does not prove the correctness of either or both accounts, but 
it does demonstrate that they are not contradictory.

        EDWINA: Sorry- but your argument despite its length does not convince 
me. I consider the two arguments, one that explains the universe is 
self-organized and evolving with its full identity only emerging as the Final 
Interpretant in the future; and the other that the universe relies on an a 
priori Mind/God - to be incompatible.
        ----------------------------

        2) ET:  The 1.412 description is specific in  'the original chaos, 
therefore, where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere 
indeterminacy, in which nothing existed or really happened 1.411.


        JON:That "nothing existed or really happened" means that nothing was 
actual; it does not entail that nothing was real.

        EDWINA: Realities are generalizations - and generals do not 'exist' 
except within the particular. Your outline is Platonic - with Ideal Forms that 
are Real. Again, Peirce was not a Platonist and his generals, even though real, 
are part of the particular instantiation.
        --------------------------------------------

        3) ET:  THought separate from matter????


        JON: Well, yes.  This is not problematic at all for me--or for Peirce, 
since he affirmed "the physical law as derived and special, the psychical law 
alone as primordial," because "matter is effete mind"; i.e., there can be mind 
without matter, but not matter without mind (CP 6.24-25).  I addressed this in 
the past thread about "Peirce's Objective Idealism."

        EDWINA: I  disagree with your interpretation. I don't see that 'matter 
as effete mind' means that mind and matter are separate. My interpretation is 
that - as in the  frog and the crystal - they are not separate.
        ---------------------------------------
        4) ET:  My reading of this - a pure disembodied mind - is that it is 
Platonic - and this contradicts Peirce's basic Aristotelianism which does not 
allow for Mind separated from Matter.


        JON: Although Peirce self-identified more with Aristotle, there are 
still Platonic aspects of his thought, some of them quite explicit.  For 
example, with respect to cosmology, we have already brought up the last 
Cambridge Conferences lecture, "The Logic of Continuity," in this thread.


          CSP:   From this point of view we must suppose that the existing 
universe, with all its arbitrary secondness, is an offshoot from, or an 
arbitrary determination of, a world of ideas, a Platonic world; not that our 
superior logic has enabled us to reach up to a world of forms to which the real 
universe, with its feebler logic, was inadequate ...  The evolutionary process 
is, therefore, not a mere evolution of the existing universe, but rather a 
process by which the very Platonic forms themselves have become or are becoming 
developed ...   In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of 
evolution at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that 
locus in the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic 
world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too ... 
At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the 
existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are, therefore, 
to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and subordinated to one 
another; until finally out of one of these Platonic worlds is differentiated 
the particular actual universe of existence in which we happen to be. (CP 
6.192, 194, 200, 208; 1898)


        Peirce clearly stated here--several times, in multiple ways--that "a 
world of ideas, a Platonic world" (i.e., mind) precedes "the existing universe, 
with all its arbitrary secondness" (i.e., matter).  Just because something is 
"Platonic" does not entail that Peirce rejected it.

        EDWINA: I consider the above quotation to be an analysis of 
conceptualization  [our ideas, our factual experiences] - and not of the three 
categories and of matter and mind nor of the integral embodiment of the one 
with the other - as in the decapitated frog or the crystal.
        ---------------------------------------------------------------------
        5) ET:   I think you and even Peirce are, indeed, using the arguments 
for the 'existence of God' from Anselm, the classical ontological argument, 
that If one can think of a perfect Being, then, this perfect being is 
real....and..if such a belief is common, then, this is 'evidentiary' proof that 
such a being exists.


        JON: This is definitely not the argument that I am using, nor the one 
that Peirce used.  What we are discussing is more akin to the so-called 
"cosmological" and "transcendental" arguments, since it is grounded primarily 
in the reality of order and intelligibility in the existing universe.  It has 
nothing to do with what "one can think" or "a perfect Being."


          ET:   I consider that this analysis is insufficient as proof ...


        Who said anything about "proof"?  We have different hypotheses, for 
which we have marshaled our supporting evidence; and as previously agreed, 
"many others have to read Peirce - and - your and my comments - and make up 
their minds as to how 'accurately' we interpret him."

        EDWINA: Agreed.
        --------------------------------------------------


          ET:  I cannot explain these two, to my reading, very different 
descriptions of the emergence and evolution of the universe of mind and matter 
- and simply have to leave it as that: I cannot explain it.


        Jon: You really should not give up so easily.  As I am sure you are 
aware, Peirce would not countenance throwing up our hands and deeming anything 
to be inexplicable; it is one of the "solutions" that he identified as blocking 
the way of inquiry.  Besides, I already offered you an alternative 
explanation--maybe he just changed his mind between 1887-1888 and 1908.  Of 
course, another is that at least one of your readings is incorrect.

        EDWINA: Your explanation is that both of his analyses are compatible 
[mine is that they are incompatible]. So...did he change his mind? Am I 
incorrect? I simply don't know and so far, your explanations have not convinced 
me to agree with your view that the two are compatible. So....I DO have to 
leave it at that!

        After all - I am reading the early outline as explaining a 
self-organized, evolving universe where both Mind and Matter co-evolve together 
- focused on Final Cause/ Interpretant; that is, there is no pre-determined 
agenda. Evolution is open to spontaneity, even when constrained by habits.

        The later outline sets up an a priori Mind, separate from Matter and 
with a certain amount of determination [Truth] in its nature. 

        I simply don't see the two outlines as compatible....and so, must run 
and bury myself in the fictional haven of Downton Abbey for an hour or two. But 
..I appreciate our discussion.

        Edwina


        Regards,


        Jon


        On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 4:47 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> 
wrote:

          Jon, list - I'm going to continue to disagree with your 
interpretation. I consider that the two descriptions of the emergence of the 
universe are not compatible. But - as to why Peirce wrote the two - of course, 
that is beyond me. 

          The 1.412 description is specific in  'the original chaos, therefore, 
where there was no regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy, in 
which nothing existed or really happened 1.411.  And his outline of the 
emergence of both matter and mind seem to me, [I've provided the quotes before] 
a clear outline of the self-organization and evolution of both.
          There is, in this outline,  no a priori Mind - pure or otherwise.

          Then, in 6.490, Peirce talks about the 'disembodied spirit or pure 
mind, has its being out of time' - This is clear - that we have here an a 
priori agency which "is destined to think all that is is capable of 
thinking".THought separate from matter???? This means, also, that this Pure 
Mind is NOT a 'state of utter nothingness'.

           My reading of this - a pure disembodied mind - is that it is 
Platonic - and this contradicts Peirce's basic Aristotelianism which does not 
allow for Mind separated from Matter. 

          That is, throughout Peirce's many discussions of Mind and Matter and 
his discussion of the three categories - we do not read [as far as i can 
recollect] any hint of their  separation, any suggestion that Mind is 
'disembodied' and 'full-of-its truths'. Indeed, Thirdness is, as embedded 
within Secondness/Firstness - always able to change and evolve its habits, 
something a pure Mind would not do.

          So- my reading of these two sections is that they are two completely 
different outlines, and are incompatible with each other. I think you and even 
Peirce are, indeed, using the arguments for the 'existence of God' from Anselm, 
the classical ontological argument, that If one can think of a perfect Being, 
then, this perfect being is real....and..if such a belief is common, then, this 
is 'evidentiary' proof that such a being exists.  I consider that this analysis 
is insufficient as proof - and that the very notion of a 'pure mind' 
contradicts the outline of a  self-organized mind-matter universe that Peirce 
provided in 'A guess at the riddle'. 

          I cannot explain these two, to my reading, very different 
descriptions of the emergence and evolution of the universe of mind and matter 
- and simply have to leave it as that: I cannot explain it. As an atheist and 
someone who accepts the power of self-organization and evolution, I admit to 
being drawn to the 1.412 Guess at the Riddle [and other outlines of agapasm and 
evolution] rather than the agential power-of-god outline. But that doesn't mean 
anything conclusive - other than an awareness of my own predeliction for the 
one outline versus the other! But - I do think they are incompatible.

          Edwina
            ----- Original Message ----- 
            From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
            To: Edwina Taborsky 
            Cc: Peirce-L 
            Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 5:05 PM
            Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


            Edwina, List: 


              ET:  I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know 
for sure which of the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 
'really held' by Peirce.


            On the contrary--I think that we do know for sure, or at least have 
to assume, that Peirce "really held" what he said in "A Guess at the Riddle" in 
1887-1888, and "really held" what he said in "A Neglected Argument" in 1908.  
This is why I always try to include the date with any quotation from him--it is 
important to recognize its timing within the overall development of his 
thought, which was far from static.


            The question, then, is simply whether the 1908 statements that I 
have cited represent a significant change in his views over two decades, or if 
they are compatible with the 1887-1888 paragraph that you quoted below.  Again, 
I think that CP 6.490--which also dates to 1908, and in fact was intended 
precisely to serve as a supplement to "A Neglected Argument"--strongly suggests 
the latter conclusion.  My apologies in advance for the lengthy excerpts this 
time.


              A full exposition of the pragmaticistic definition of Ens 
necessarium would require many pages; but some hints toward it may be given. A 
disembodied spirit, or pure mind, has its being out of time, since all that it 
is destined to think is fully in its being at any and every previous time. But 
in endless time it is destined to think all that it is capable of thinking. 
Order is simply thought embodied in arrangement; and thought embodied in any 
other way appears objectively as a character that is a generalization of order, 
and that, in the lack of any word for it, we may call for the nonce, 
"Super-order." It is something like uniformity. The idea may be caught if it is 
described as that of which order and uniformity are particular varieties.   
Pure mind, as creative of thought, must, so far as it is manifested in time, 
appear as having a character related to the habit-taking capacity, just as 
super-order is related to uniformity.


            I have already discussed the hint that Ens necessarium is "pure 
mind."  The rest of this passage implies that thought is always "embodied" in 
some kind of "super-order," of which order and uniformity are two examples.  
Peirce then draws an analogy--the thought-creating character of pure mind is to 
the habit-taking capacity as super-order is to uniformity.  Since he just said 
that uniformity is a particular variety of super-order, the habit-taking 
capacity must be a particular variety of the thought-creating character of pure 
mind.  Recall that the "second flash" of CP 1.412 came about "by the principle 
of habit"; so evidently it was a manifestation of pure mind, as creative of 
thought.  Likewise for the "other successions ever more and more closely 
connected, the habits and the tendency to take them ever strengthening 
themselves."  While CP 1.412 might plausibly be interpreted in isolation as 
describing "the self-organized emergence of the Universe" with "no metaphysical 
Agent" involved, CP 6.490 indicates that the habit-taking capacity depends on 
there being such an Agent.


              Now imagine, in such vague way as such a thing can be imagined, a 
perfect cosmology of the three universes. It would prove all in relation to 
that subject that reason could desiderate; and of course all that it would 
prove must, in actual fact, now be true. But reason would desiderate that that 
should be proved from which would follow all that is in fact true of the three 
universes; and the postulate from which all this would follow must not state 
any matter of fact, since such fact would thereby be left unexplained. That 
perfect cosmology must therefore show that the whole history of the three 
universes, as it has been and is to be, would follow from a premiss which would 
not suppose them to exist at all. Moreover, such premiss must in actual fact be 
true. But that premiss must represent a state of things in which the three 
universes were completely nil. Consequently, whether in time or not, the three 
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter 
nothingness. We cannot ourselves conceive of such a state of nility; but we can 
easily conceive that there should be a mind that could conceive it, since, 
after all, no contradiction can be involved in mere non-existence. A state in 
which there should be absolutely no super-order whatsoever would be such a 
state of nility. For all Being involves some kind of super-order.


            This is a difficult passage, but it s me to strikes me as a kind of 
reductio ad absurdum for any claim that the universe came about without the 
Reality of God.  A "perfect cosmology" conforming to such a claim "must not 
state any matter of fact," but must instead "follow from a premiss which would 
not suppose [the three universes] to exist at all."  As a result, "the three 
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter 
nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no 
super-order whatsoever."  But in such a state, absolutely nothing is absolutely 
necessary; in fact, there cannot be any Being whatsoever, since "all Being 
involves some kind of super-order."  Hence the Reality of God--an eternal 
Being, Ens necessarium--is the only premiss that can account for the reality of 
the three universes, without already assuming it.


              Any such super-order would be a super-habit. Any general state of 
things whatsoever would be a super-order and a super-habit. In that state of 
absolute nility, in or out of time, that is, before or after the evolution of 
time, there must then have been a tohu bohu of which nothing whatever 
affirmative or negative was true universally. There must have been, therefore, 
a little of everything conceivable.


            Peirce explicitly mentioned the first chapter Genesis in CP 1.412, 
and invoked it again here--tohu bohu is the Hebrew expression in verse 2 that 
is usually translated as something like "without form and void."  The notion of 
a state where "nothing whatever affirmative or negative was true universally," 
which thus involves "a little of everything conceivable," is consistent with 
Peirce's late theory of a continuum.  It does not consist of discrete points, 
as Cantor and others defined it, but of potential points that are welded 
together and thus indistinct.  Even this description is misleading, because the 
contiguous points do not comprise the continuum; the latter is the more 
fundamental concept.  The principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle 
thus do not apply, unless and until an actual point is determined, which is a 
discontinuity.  Continuity is generality, and generality of any kind is 
impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the Reality of 
God.


              There must have been here and there a little undifferentiated 
tendency to take super-habits. But such a state must tend to increase itself. 
For a tendency to act in any way, combined with a tendency to take habits, must 
increase the tendency to act in that way. Now substitute in this general 
statement for "tendency to act in any way" a tendency to take habits, and we 
see that that tendency would grow. It would also become differentiated in 
various ways.


            This really says nothing different from the last sentence of CP 
1.412 that you quoted.  So it looks like Peirce has not changed his basic 
cosmology over the intervening two decades; he has simply clarified the 
necessity of the Reality of God before it ever could have gotten off the ground.


            Regards,


            Jon


            On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 2:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

              Jon, list:

              I think you will have to admit that neither you nor I know for 
sure which of the two arguments for the emergence of the universe are 'really 
held' by Peirce.  There is, A,  the self-organized emergence and evolution of 
Mind and Matter within the axioms of the three categories - and this reference 
to the embodiment and evolution of Mind with Matter is found all through 
Peirce's writings. And, there is, B, the introduction of an a priori agency,  
God, in a later text- without any real examination of the relation of Mind and 
Matter in this god-created universe.

              Your reliance on "IF it's written at a later date, THEN, this 
means Peirce believed in its axioms even more' - is merely your view of linear 
writing. Then, there is your own open declaration of theism - and my equally 
open declaration of atheism. These have to affect each of us.

              This leads me to conclude that - as I said, neither you nor I 
know which of the two arguments is 'really held' by Peirce. I think we'll have 
to leave it at that.

              Edwina
                ----- Original Message ----- 
                From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
                To: tabor...@primus.ca ; Peirce-L 
                Sent: Saturday, October 15, 2016 2:42 PM
                Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology


                Edwina, List: 


                  ET:  What i read from the above is the self-organized 
emergence of the Universe.


                Peirce wrote "A Guess at the Riddle" in 1887-1888 and "A 
Neglected Argument" in 1908.  The latter, including its various drafts, states 
explicitly that in Peirce's belief, God is Really creator of all three 
Universes of Experience and everything in them, without exception.  This means 
that either (a) he changed his mind at some point during the intervening twenty 
years, or (b) he saw no incompatibility between the two positions.  His 
cosmological remarks in CP 6.490, written only a little later in 1908 than the 
article itself, suggest strongly that (b) is the case.


                Regards,


                Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
                Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
                www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt


                On Sat, Oct 15, 2016 at 8:26 AM, Edwina Taborsky 
<tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

                  Gary R - you wrote:

                  "I am not an atheist because, for one thing, I refuse to 
'reduce' the origins of this cosmos to an improbably singularity (a Big 
Bang--and, as you probably know, there is not one version of this theory, but 
several, and competing theories as well, although the current scientific dogma 
won't allow for that). 


                  Nor do I see self-organization (a sound enough principle) and 
self-creation (whatever that may mean) as the only principles of semiosis, life 
and evolution."

                  I certainly won't critique or comment on your rejection of 
atheism as that's hardly my right, but I'd like to comment on the 'singularity 
of origin of our universe' [Big Bang] and self-organization.

                  With regard to the singular explosive origin, there certainly 
are numerous theories, including for or against the Big Bang. Since I am 
rejecting a metaphysical origin [God] as the origin of the universe, I stick 
with the Big Bang for now. I refer to Peirce's 'A Guess at the Riddle'...

                  "The original chaos, therefore, where there was no 
regularity, was in effect a state of mere indeterminacy in which nothing 
existed or really happened. 
                  Our conceptions of the first stages of development, before 
time yet existed, must be as vague and figurative as the expressions of the 
first chapter of Genesis. Out of the womb of indeterminacy we must say that 
there would have come something, by the principle of Firstness, which we may 
call a flash. Then by the principle of habit there would have been a second 
flash. Though time would not yet have been, this second flash  was in some 
sense after the first, because resulting from it. Then there would have come 
other successions ever more and more closely connected, the habits and the 
tendency to take them ever strengthening themselves, until the events would 
have been bound together into something like a continuous flow.....' 1.412

                  What i read from the above is the self-organized emergence of 
the Universe. There is no metaphysical Agent [God- which requires an a priori 
agency, something which the Scholastics dealt with by not dealing with it 
except within belief] - but - the basic principles of organization of the three 
categories ARE there. And that's all three - pure spontaneity, discrete 
instantiations, and regularity or habit-taking. These are all aspects of Mind - 
and matter, as Peirce constantly wrote, is 'effete Mind'. So, Mind seems to be 
primal...and even, self-organized.

                  As Peirce outlined in his examples of crystals as 
instantiations of Mind, or the decapitated frog which, lacking a brain, 'almost 
reasons. The habit that is in his cerebellum serves as a major premiss. The 
excitation of a drop of acid is his minor premiss. And his conclusion is the 
act of wiping it away. All that is of any value in the operation of 
ratiocination is there, except only one thing. What he lacks is the power of 
prepatory meditation" 6.286.  

                  Just so- the above triad is a semiosic action - and equally 
applicable to a crystal, which also lacks the power of prepatory meditation but 
does have the entire semiosic act/syllogism within it.

                  Edwina


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