Jon - the difference between us is not merely theism/atheism - where the former
accepts an a priori agency - but, where the latter [might] include not an a
priori agency but instead, argues for self-organization.
So- I argue that indeed, everything could come from nothing, via the actions of
self-organization, as outlined by Peirce in the earlier sections... 1.412.
Edwina
----- Original Message -----
From: Jon Alan Schmidt
To: Edwina Taborsky
Cc: Gary Richmond ; Peirce-L
Sent: Monday, October 17, 2016 5:16 PM
Subject: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Peirce's Cosmology
Edwina, List:
ET: And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal
aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE
'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.
Only if you presuppose that only that which is spatial and temporal can be
"something." Peirce does not impose that requirement; in his terminology, the
Platonic worlds are real, even though they do not exist.
ET: I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order and
super-habit'.
According to Peirce in CP 6.490, it is because otherwise, "the three
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter
nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no
super-order whatsoever." But in such a state, absolutely nothing is absolutely
necessary; in fact, there cannot be any Being whatsoever, since "all Being
involves some kind of super-order ... Any such super-order would be a
super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever would be a super-order and
a super-habit."
ET: I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists
vs non-theists!
Probably so. It seems to come down to whether one finds it plausible that
everything could have come from nothing.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <[email protected]> wrote:
Gary R, list
That's a nice outline.
With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE has
been existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even if one
defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very
real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.
With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality of any
kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the
Reality of God. [see ** below]...
I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a
'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require self-organization of
order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410. That is, order and habit
emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter. They don't pre-exist. I think
this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists vs non-theists!
Edwina
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