Gary R., List:

GR:  I think one way of looking at this Platonic vs Aristotelian question
is to, at least in a sense and for the purposes of this kind of
cosmological discussion, restrict Peirce's Platonism (which, imo, ought not
be conflated with other versions of Platonism) to his consideration of the
proto-cosmos;  then seeing that once there is an actually existent
universe, that Peirce's attitude becomes at least predominantly
Aristotelian.


I think that you are probably quite right about this, and appreciate the
helpful clarification.

GR:  So I would also like to repeat my sense that it may be
counter-productive to insert the God of Genesis much into this discussion
of "the first stages of development, before time yet existed" as all Peirce
claims is that such discussions "must be *as vague and figurative
**as* the expressions
of the first chapter of Genesis" (emphasis added by me).


I agree with you about this, as well.  It is merely a hypothesis of mine
that CP 6.490 clarifies CP 1.412, and I would not want that suggestion to
inhibit *anyone *from considering and commenting on the combined blackboard
diagram that I have proposed, since I think/hope that it is viable for
*any *interpretation of "the beginning" as described by Peirce.

GR:  I have already suggested that I do not myself see Peirce as a
doctrinaire or dogmatic theist, that is, his view of God appears to me very
unlike that of any theistic sect past or present.


We are in agreement yet again.  This is one reason why I try to be very
careful about distinguishing my own views from those that I attribute to
Peirce.

GR:  I just read your last post Jon and find your solution to the
ur-continuity issue promising (although I'll have to further study it).


I was (obviously) hoping that you would, and look forward to further
feedback once you have had a chance to ponder it.

GR:  As Jon suggested, the super-order material is complex and difficult to
interpret and analyze. But the connection of the God-idea to ur-continuity,
primordial 3ns, super-order, and super-habit is well worth pursuing for
those of us who want to get a better grasp of what characterizes Peirce's
theism ... So, this seems to me like yet another reason to move this part
of the discussion to another thread.


Are the notions of "ur-continuity" and "primordial 3ns" inextricably tied
to theism?  I suppose that might be one of the questions to explore in a
new thread.  Would you mind taking the lead on getting it started?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:06 PM, Gary Richmond <gary.richm...@gmail.com>
wrote:

> Jon, Edwina, List,
>
>
> I think one way of looking at this Platonic vs Aristotelian question is
> to, at least in a sense and for the purposes of this kind of cosmological
> discussion, restrict Peirce's Platonism (which, imo, ought not be conflated
> with other versions of Platonism) to his consideration of the proto-cosmos;
>  then seeing that once there is an actually existent universe, that
> Peirce's attitude becomes at least predominantly Aristotelian.
>
> This way of looking at the Platonic vs Aristotelian matter is strongly
> suggested--at least to me--by this passage which has occasionally appeared
> in forum discussions, snippets of which I've quoted in this thread, and
> which was given at greater lengh by Jon. For the purpose of this message
> I'll quote but one salient passage from Jon's extended quote:
>
>
> In short, if we are going to regard the universe as a result of evolution
> at all, we must think that not merely the existing universe, that locus in
> the cosmos to which our reactions are limited, but the whole Platonic
> world, which in itself is equally real, is evolutionary in its origin, too
> ... At the same time all this, be it remembered, is not of the order of the
> existing universe, but is merely a Platonic world, of which we are,
> therefore, to conceive that there are many, both coordinated and
> subordinated to one another; until finally out of one of these Platonic
> worlds is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in
> which we happen to be. (CP 6.200, 208; 1898)
>
>
> So I think it might be helpful in these discussions to clearly distinguish
> between  "the whole Platonic world, which in itself is equally real" and
> the "existing universe" where "finally out of one of these Platonic worlds
> is differentiated the particular actual universe of existence in which we
> happen to be." The first is out of (or 'before') time, the latter
> establishing(?) the continuum of time (and space, for that matter) in *this
> *universe.
>
> For those for whom the question as to what came before the putative Big
> Bang the answer is "nothing" (while, as previously mentioned, I personally
> find the Big Bang singularity itself problematic), Peirce's several
> discussions throughout his life concerning his conception of God, will
> probably have little resonance. So I would also like to repeat my sense
> that it may be counter-productive to insert the God of Genesis much into
> this discussion of "the first stages of development, before time yet
> existed" as all Peirce claims is that such discussions "must be *as vague
> and figurative **as* the expressions of the first chapter of Genesis"
> (emphasis added by me). So, as I suggested by introducing the dominant
> early cosmological myth of Atum in Nun, there are other "vague and
> figurative" ways of conceiving of "the first stages of development,
> before time yet existed."
>
> On the other hand, if one studiously avoids *specific* religious
> allusions, as Peirce does, for example, in his discussion of super-order
> (which, btw, Jon, I would say is masterfully analyzed by you such that I
> think it deserves a threaded discussion of its own, one in which I'd be
> eager to participate), *and* if one is not an atheist, in light not only
> of the N.A. but of the various things Peirce wrote throughout his life
> regarding God, it is hard not to find your argument sound and your
> conclusion regarding the super-order convincing.
>
> Jon: Continuity is generality, and generality of *any *kind is impossible
> in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e., the Reality of God.
> [see ** below]
>
> As Jon suggested, the super-order material is complex and difficult to
> interpret and analyze. But the connection of the God-idea to
> ur-continuity, primordial 3ns, super-order, and super-habit is well worth
> pursuing for those of us who want to get a better grasp of what
> characterizes Peirce's theism. I have already suggested that I do not
> myself see Peirce as a doctrinaire or dogmatic theist, that is, his view of
> God appears to me very unlike that of any theistic sect past or present.
>
> **[There is a remark on super-order and super-habit in the context of
> Peirce's religious thought in West and Anderson's, *Consensus on Peirce's
> Concept of Habit*,  but I don't know of any extended discussions of
> super-order and I haven't read much of CPCH yet.]
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> PS I just read your last post Jon and find your solution to the
> ur-continuity issue promising (although I'll have to further study it). So,
> this seems to me like yet another reason to move this part of the
> discussion to another thread.
>
> [image: Gary Richmond]
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
> *C 745*
> *718 482-5690 <718%20482-5690>*
>
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