ET: And that can be acceptable even if one defines these atemporal
aspatial Platonic world[s] as nothing for in a very real sense, they WERE
'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.
Only if you *presuppose *that only that which is spatial and temporal can
be "something." Peirce does not impose that requirement; in his
terminology, the Platonic worlds are *real*, even though they do not *exist*
ET: I don't see why continuity and generality require a 'super-order and
According to Peirce in CP 6.490, it is because otherwise, "the three
universes must actually be absolutely necessary results of a state of utter
nothingness"; that is, "A state in which there should be absolutely no
super-order whatsoever." But in such a state, absolutely nothing is
absolutely necessary; in fact, there cannot be *any *Being whatsoever,
since "all Being involves some kind of super-order ... Any such super-order
would be a super-habit. Any general state of things whatsoever would be a
super-order and a super-habit."
ET: I think this is a basic disagreement among those of us who are theists
Probably so. It seems to come down to whether one finds it plausible
*could have come from *nothing*.
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
On Mon, Oct 17, 2016 at 3:48 PM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:
> Gary R, list
> That's a nice outline.
> With reference to the Platonic world[s] ...plural...of which only ONE has
> been existential - I'm OK with that. And that can be acceptable even if one
> defines these atemporal aspatial Platonic world[s] as *nothing* for in a
> very real sense, they WERE 'nothing' - being aspatial and atemporal.
> With regard to Jon's point: Continuity is generality, and generality of *any
> *kind is impossible in the absence of super-order and super-habit; i.e.,
> the Reality of God. [see ** below]...
> I don't see this; I don't see why continuity and generality require a
> 'super-order and super-habit'. I think they merely require
> self-organization of order and habit and Peirce outlines this in 1.410.
> That is, order and habit emerge WITHIN the particularization of matter.
> They don't pre-exist. I think this is a basic disagreement among those of
> us who are theists vs non-theists!
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