Jon, List,
I've been away and haven't been able to track the entire thread
but it's ground we've been over many times before and the bits
I've been able to sample seem to fall into familiar patterns.
Generally speaking I haven't observed that much difficulty with the
use of these words in logic, math, science, or even to a large extent
in ordinary language, probably because practical use demands a modicum
of flexibility and context-sensitivity from the relevant language users.
It is only when people try to make metaphysical hay out of these simple
signs that a certain rigidity sets in and disputes of a quasi-religious
character begin to rule the day.
Regards,
Jon
On 1/7/2017 8:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote:
Jon A., List:
Thanks for that. I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found it
quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's *Dictionary
*appeared in print. Rosa Mayorga pointed to a considerably earlier passage
from a draft of "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" in
her book, *From Realism to "Realicism": The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders
Peirce*.
Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose
subject and predicate are general terms. And, therefore, it is not merely
the case, as we saw before, that universals have reality on this theory,
but also that there are nothing but universals which have an immediate
reality. But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in
the sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere
ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of
that which can be only in one place at one time. It will be convenient to
call the former singular and the latter only an individual … Now a
knowledge that cognition is not wholly determined by cognition is a
knowledge of something external to the mind, that is the singulars.
Singulars therefore have a reality. But singulars in general is not
singular but general. We can cognize any part of the singulars however
determinate, but however determinate the part it is still general. And
therefore what I maintain is that while singulars are real they are so only
in their generality; but singulars in their absolute discrimination or
singularity are mere ideals … In short, those things which we call
singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute to
them is self-contradictory.
With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain
general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and these
are called individuals. They are generals that is, not singulars, because
these latter occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point
and can only be at one date. (W2:180-181; 1868)
Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a general,
which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything real is
singular, so nothing real is general--effectively self-refuting. He
defined an individual as a collection of singulars joined across places and
times, which is thus general when taken as a whole. Furthermore, *absolute
*singulars are "mere ideals," such that (ironically) an individual is
really a *continuum *as Peirce came to understand that concept decades
later. Consequently, anything that we cognize *about *individuals is
*necessarily
*general, rather than singular. This suggests to me the following argument
for realism.
P1. All singulars are absolutely determinate.
P2. No objects of thought are absolutely determinate.
C1. Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars.
P3. If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of thought
are generals.
C2. Therefore, all objects of thought are generals.
P4. Some objects of thought are real.
C3. Therefore, some generals are real.
My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of terms,
so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in order to deny
the conclusion. Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that we can ascertain
that an object of thought has or does not have every conceivable predicate;
but those are infinite, and our minds are finite, so this is impossible.
Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that we have no genuine knowledge of
reality--i.e., that it consists entirely of incognizable
"things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely the view for which Peirce
frequently criticized nominalists, because it blocks the way of inquiry.
Regards,
Jon S.
On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Here is one page:
http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <jawb...@att.net> wrote:
Jon,
Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine
of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments.
Regards,
Jon
http://inquiryintoinquiry.com
On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
wrote:
List:
I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his
opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently
preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone
ever tried to figure out why? In a new book, *Peirce's Empiricism: Its
Roots and Its Originality*, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be
that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's *katholou*,"
or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the most,"
and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ...
but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51).
On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular,"
while "general" is opposed to "singular." All of these identify types of
propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it is
indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and
particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type
of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically,
individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality.
Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be
appreciated.
Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
--
academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey
my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/
isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA
facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache
-----------------------------
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
