Jon, list: “At the very end of his long effort measured by skyless space and time without depth, the purpose is achieved. Then Sisyphus watches the stone rush down in a few moments toward that lower world whence he will have to push it up again toward the summit. He goes back down to the plain.
It is during that return, that pause, that Sisyphus interests me. A face that toils so close to stones is already stone itself! I see that man going back down with a heavy yet measured step toward the torment of which he will never know the end… If this myth is tragic, that is because its hero is conscious. Where would his torture be, indeed, if at every step the hope of succeeding upheld him? The workman of today works everyday in his life at the same tasks, and his fate is no less absurd. But it is tragic only at the rare moments when it becomes conscious. One does not discover the absurd without being tempted to write a manual of happiness. "What!---by such narrow ways--?" There is but one world, however. Happiness and the absurd are two sons of the same earth. They are inseparable. It would be a mistake to say that happiness necessarily springs from the absurd. Discovery. It happens as well that the felling of the absurd springs from happiness. …The struggle itself toward the heights is enough to fill a man's heart. One must imagine Sisyphus happy.” ~Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus I imagine Peirce happy and it’s not simply the struggle that was enough to fill his heart. Rather, he knew that the harvest has come, at last, and to him, that harvest seems a wild one. His discovery was a tool to enhance movement. Best, Jerry Rhee On Wed, Jan 11, 2017 at 3:20 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: > Jon, List, > > I've been away and haven't been able to track the entire thread > but it's ground we've been over many times before and the bits > I've been able to sample seem to fall into familiar patterns. > > Generally speaking I haven't observed that much difficulty with the > use of these words in logic, math, science, or even to a large extent > in ordinary language, probably because practical use demands a modicum > of flexibility and context-sensitivity from the relevant language users. > It is only when people try to make metaphysical hay out of these simple > signs that a certain rigidity sets in and disputes of a quasi-religious > character begin to rule the day. > > Regards, > > Jon > > On 1/7/2017 8:52 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt wrote: > >> Jon A., List: >> >> Thanks for that. I came across CP 3.611-613 the other day and found it >> quite helpful; it dates to 1911, or at least that is when Baldwin's >> *Dictionary >> *appeared in print. Rosa Mayorga pointed to a considerably earlier >> passage >> from a draft of "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" >> in >> her book, *From Realism to "Realicism": The Metaphysics of Charles >> Sanders >> Peirce*. >> >> Hence every cognition we are in possession of is a judgment both whose >> subject and predicate are general terms. And, therefore, it is not merely >> the case, as we saw before, that universals have reality on this theory, >> but also that there are nothing but universals which have an immediate >> reality. But here it is necessary to distinguish between an individual in >> the sense of that which has no generality and which here appears as a mere >> ideal boundary of cognition, and an individual in the far wider sense of >> that which can be only in one place at one time. It will be convenient to >> call the former singular and the latter only an individual … Now a >> knowledge that cognition is not wholly determined by cognition is a >> knowledge of something external to the mind, that is the singulars. >> Singulars therefore have a reality. But singulars in general is not >> singular but general. We can cognize any part of the singulars however >> determinate, but however determinate the part it is still general. And >> therefore what I maintain is that while singulars are real they are so >> only >> in their generality; but singulars in their absolute discrimination or >> singularity are mere ideals … In short, those things which we call >> singulars exist, but the character of singularity which we attribute to >> them is self-contradictory. >> >> With reference to individuals, I shall only remark that there are certain >> general terms whose objects can only be in one place at one time, and >> these >> are called individuals. They are generals that is, not singulars, because >> these latter occupy neither time nor space, but can only be at one point >> and can only be at one date. (W2:180-181; 1868) >> >> Peirce noted here that "the character of singularity" is itself a general, >> which seems to render nominalism--the view that everything real is >> singular, so nothing real is general--effectively self-refuting. He >> defined an individual as a collection of singulars joined across places >> and >> times, which is thus general when taken as a whole. Furthermore, >> *absolute >> *singulars are "mere ideals," such that (ironically) an individual is >> really a *continuum *as Peirce came to understand that concept decades >> later. Consequently, anything that we cognize *about *individuals is >> *necessarily >> *general, rather than singular. This suggests to me the following >> argument >> for realism. >> >> P1. All singulars are absolutely determinate. >> P2. No objects of thought are absolutely determinate. >> C1. Therefore, no objects of thought are singulars. >> P3. If no objects of thought are singulars, then all objects of thought >> are generals. >> C2. Therefore, all objects of thought are generals. >> P4. Some objects of thought are real. >> C3. Therefore, some generals are real. >> >> My impression is that P1 and P3 are commonly accepted definitions of >> terms, >> so the nominalist must deny one of the other two premisses in order to >> deny >> the conclusion. Rejecting P2 amounts to claiming that we can ascertain >> that an object of thought has or does not have every conceivable >> predicate; >> but those are infinite, and our minds are finite, so this is impossible. >> Rejecting P4 amounts to accepting that we have no genuine knowledge of >> reality--i.e., that it consists entirely of incognizable >> "things-in-themselves"--and this is precisely the view for which Peirce >> frequently criticized nominalists, because it blocks the way of inquiry. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon S. >> >> On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 6:22 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >> >> Here is one page: >>> >>> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/Doctrine_Of_Individuals >>> >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com >>> >>> On Jan 7, 2017, at 6:54 PM, Jon Awbrey <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>> Jon, >>> >>> Away from home now but if you search the InterSciWiki site for “Doctrine >>> of Individuals” I think there is a collection of excerpts and comments. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon >>> >>> http://inquiryintoinquiry.com >>> >>> On Jan 7, 2017, at 5:49 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <[email protected]> >>> wrote: >>> >>> List: >>> >>> I have been reading up on Peirce's version of scholastic realism and his >>> opposition to various forms of nominalism. He seems to have consistently >>> preferred the term "general" to "universal" (e.g., CP 2.367); has anyone >>> ever tried to figure out why? In a new book, *Peirce's Empiricism: Its >>> Roots and Its Originality*, Aaron Bruce Wilson suggests that "it might be >>> that he thinks 'general' is a better translation of Aristotle's >>> *katholou*," >>> or because "laws are the type of generals his realism emphasizes the >>> most," >>> and "propositions expressing such laws are not universal propositions ... >>> but are general propositions which can admit of exceptions" (p. 51). >>> >>> On the flip side, "universal" is usually contrasted with "particular," >>> while "general" is opposed to "singular." All of these identify types of >>> propositions--singular when the subject is determinate, general when it >>> is >>> indeterminate; and the latter further divided into universal (all) and >>> particular (some). Finally, Peirce described continuity as a higher type >>> of generality, and contrasted it with individuality; specifically, >>> individuals are actualized from a continuum of potentiality. >>> >>> Any further insights on these terminological distinctions would be >>> appreciated. >>> >>> Regards, >>> >>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >>> >>> >>> >> > -- > > academia: http://independent.academia.edu/JonAwbrey > my word press blog: http://inquiryintoinquiry.com/ > isw: http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/JLA > facebook page: https://www.facebook.com/JonnyCache > > > ----------------------------- > PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON > PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to > [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L > but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the > BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm > . > > > > > >
----------------------------- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to [email protected] . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to [email protected] with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
