Jon, Interesting! Dropping the answers in terms of the offending terms:
- Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by humans? The pragmatist says "no", on account of that not being what the term "real" means. Real things are just those things that have effects, and effects are things that can, at least in principle, be detected/known. So a proper contemplation of what our terms mean (i.e., taking the time to get our ideas "clear") gives us the answer to that, without any need for metaphysical assertions. - Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and events? Well, Perice leaves open the possibility that there might not be. He implores us to latch onto any regularities we might think we see, and determine the scope of those regularities, for the value they provide, while leaving open the possibility that none might truly be "laws of nature" in the classic sense. So in this sense he is optimistic regarding the realist assertion that laws of nature exist and can be discovered, but is not asserting with certainty that the effort to find them will work out. Or so it seems to me...... Best, Eric ----------- Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. Supervisory Survey Statistician U.S. Marine Corps <echar...@american.edu> On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 8:19 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > Eric, List: > > Welcome! A couple of issues come to mind. > > - Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by > humans? The nominalist says yes, the realist says no. > - Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and > events? The nominalist says no, the realist says yes. > > In both cases, the nominalist blocks the way of inquiry by insisting that > some aspects of experience are brute and inexplicable. > > Regards, > > Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA > Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman > www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt > > On Fri, Jan 27, 2017 at 5:19 PM, Eric Charles < > eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Oh hey, my first post to the list.... >> >> I must admit that I find much of the recent discussion baffling. In part, >> this is because I have never had anyone explain the Nominalism-Realism >> distinction in a way that made sense to me. Don't get me wrong, I think I >> understand the argument in the ancient context. However, one of the biggest >> appeals of American Philosophy, for me, is its ability to eliminate (or >> disarm) longstanding philosophical problems. >> >> With that in mind, I have never been able to make sense of the >> nominalist-realist debate in the context of Peirce (or James, etc.). The >> best I can do is to wonder: If I am, in a general sense, a realist, in that >> I think people respond to things (without any *a priori* dualistic >> privileging of mental things vs. physical things), what difference does it >> make if I think collections-of-responded-to-things are "real" as a >> collection, or just a collection of "reals"? >> >> I know it might be a big ask, but could someone give an attempt at >> explaining it to me? Either the old fashioned way, by explaining what issue >> is at argument here.... or, if someone is feeling *even more* >> adventurous, by explaining what practical difference it makes in my action >> which side of this debate I am on (i.e., what habit will I have formed if I >> firmly believe one way or the other?). >> >> Best, >> Eric >> >> ----------- >> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >> Supervisory Survey Statistician >> U.S. Marine Corps >> >
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