Eric, List: I think that you have hit upon something that I recently brought up here--why Peirce consistently preferred "general" to "universal" when discussing realism vs. nominalism. It is related to his broad use of "habit," even when referring to "laws of nature." These terms convey the idea of not being *completely *exceptionless--this is the tychism aspect of his synechism--such that they refer to *conditional *necessities (or tendencies), rather than *absolute *necessities. Therefore, even if it turns out that "every discoverable regularity is of limited range," and thus not the manifestation of a real *universal *law, it would still be the manifestation of a real *general *law.
As for the definition of "real," as far as I know, Peirce never explicitly characterized it as "that which has effects." He did define *existence *as "reacting with the other like things in the environment," but in his view, existence is only a *subset *of reality; it is brute actuality (2ns), but possibilities (1ns) and habits (3ns) are also real. This is another distinction between realists and nominalists--the latter typically *equate *reality with existence/actuality. Note also that the pragmatic maxim refers to *conceivable *practical effects, not just *actual *effects. In his later years, Peirce emphasized that the proper formulation is not "If I do X to Y, what is the result?" but "If I *were *to do X to Y, what *would *be the result?" Regards, Jon S. On Sun, Jan 29, 2017 at 12:34 AM, Eric Charles < eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: > Jon, > With regards to the second point, on whether there might not be natural > laws, I was thinking about things like "Order of nature", in which Peirce > points out that: "If we could find out any general characteristic of the > universe, any mannerism in the ways of Nature, any law everywhere > applicable and universally valid, such a discovery would be of such > singular assistance to us in all our future reasoning, that it would > deserve a place almost at the head of the principles of logic. On the other > hand, if it can be shown that there is nothing of the sort to find out, but > that every discoverable regularity is of limited range, this again will be > of logical importance." > > In the remainder of that essay, and elsewhere, Peirce seems clearly to > believe that there *are *laws everywhere applicable and universally > valid. However, he also seems unwilling to completely discount the > possibility that when the indefinite community has conducted its infinite > inquiry, it might be the case that every discoverable regularity *is*, in > fact, of limited range. Now, one can, if one wants, define "laws of > nature" as having whatever scope one wants, but my intended point was that > Peirce allows that universal laws - laws of nature as classically conceived > - might not exist. > > With regards to the first point, regarding "real", you might have me. > However, I cannot be sure, because of my basic confusion regarding the > distinction in question. Of what might our infinite inquirers reach > agreement, which does not entail consequences? Peirce is (in no small part) > trying to explicate the world as the scientist sees it, and so the > agreement he is interested in is the agreement which results from inquiry, > primarily experimental inquiry. That is, he is interested in the result of > myriad investigations of the form "If I do X, to Y, what is the result?" As > such, it would seem that being "real" and having "effects" are inseparable, > because we cannot possibly reach agreement regarding things which do not > have effects. > > We can get at the problem similarly by going back to Peirce's assertion > that any two ideas with all the same consequences are the same idea. Let us > posit something that has no effects detectable under any circumstances, > call it "galblax". The concept of galblax that is real, and the concept of > galblax that is not-real have exactly the same implications, and so any > attempt to distinguishing the two concepts is incoherent. Only if the > "stuff" in question has an effects, is it coherent to inquire about it, and > only if we can follow the path of inquiry is it possible that a consensus > be reached, which again connects "real" with "having effects". > > Note again that my intention is not to bring us into the weeds of the > issues, but to try to understand what (people think) "nominalism" and > "realism" mean in a pragmatist concept. > > Best, > Eric > > ----------- > Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. > Supervisory Survey Statistician > U.S. Marine Corps > <echar...@american.edu> > > On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 6:08 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt < > jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > >> Eric, List: >> >> Actually, Peirce's definition of "real" was being such as it is >> regardless of what any person or finite group of people thinks about it. >> Taken to the third (pragmatic) grade of clarity, the "real" is that which >> *would >> *be the object of the "final opinion"--the consensus of an indefinite >> community after infinite inquiry. >> >> Where in Peirce's writings do you see him leaving open the possibility >> that there might not be real laws of nature? The indispensable reality of >> 3ns (abbreviation for Thirdness) was one of his bedrock principles, >> although his fallibilism precluded him from holding it (or anything else) >> to be *absolutely *certain. Maybe that is all you meant. >> >> Regards, >> >> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA >> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman >> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt >> >> On Sat, Jan 28, 2017 at 3:58 PM, Eric Charles < >> eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >>> Jon, >>> Interesting! Dropping the answers in terms of the offending terms: >>> >>> - Is there anything real that cannot, in principle, be known by >>> humans? >>> >>> The pragmatist says "no", on account of that not being what the term >>> "real" means. Real things are just those things that have effects, and >>> effects are things that can, at least in principle, be detected/known. So a >>> proper contemplation of what our terms mean (i.e., taking the time to get >>> our ideas "clear") gives us the answer to that, without any need for >>> metaphysical assertions. >>> >>> - Are there real laws of nature that govern existing things and >>> events? >>> >>> Well, Perice leaves open the possibility that there might not be. He >>> implores us to latch onto any regularities we might think we see, and >>> determine the scope of those regularities, for the value they provide, >>> while leaving open the possibility that none might truly be "laws of >>> nature" in the classic sense. So in this sense he is optimistic regarding >>> the realist assertion that laws of nature exist and can be discovered, but >>> is not asserting with certainty that the effort to find them will work out. >>> >>> Or so it seems to me...... >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> Eric >>> ----------- >>> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D. >>> Supervisory Survey Statistician >>> U.S. Marine Corps >>> >>>
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